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ABSTRACT
INTERNET MARKETS:
EXCHANGE RELATIONS ON CRAIGSLIST, EBAY, AND SILK ROAD
Jonathan Pace
Dr. Sharrona Pearl

Cyberlibertarianism is a dominant ideology in the technology industry. Internet markets
represent cyberlibertarianism ideals put into practice. According to cyberlibertarianism,
internet markets should be self-regulating, but problems of fraud nevertheless emerge. On
internet markets, fraud occurs through the manipulation of platform protocols that are
designed to replace regulations. Actors take various steps to mitigate concerns of fraud
and control the commercial process. These steps rely on website infrastructure, platform
culture, and state, commercial, and domestic institutions — factors that are supposed to
be external to electronic commerce. Users develop social customs that rely on website
infrastructure, platform culture, and state institutions. Vendors perform practices that are
also connected to website infrastructure, platform culture, and state institutions, but in
ways that reflect their goal of selling goods. State, commercial, and domestic institutions
figure centrally in the circulation of market objects, which often enter digital exchange in
places where institutional control falls short. Far from being a story of self-regulation,
exchange on internet markets is a story of regulatory endeavors, as individual and
institutional actors aim (and sometimes fail) to control the process of electronic
commerce. This tells us that cyberlibertarianism overlooks the role of regulations and
institutions on the internet. As venues that embody cyberlibertarian principles, internet
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markets are among the most productive case studies of the digital ideology. By meeting
the radical conditions demanded by cyberlibertarianism, internet markets are experiments
in the digital ideology that decisively disprove its hypotheses. If the predictions of
cyberlibertarianism cannot be realized in the free digital market, then they likely cannot
be realized anywhere. Moving forward, they may serve as a counterpoint to the claim that
an internet equilibrium is just one regulatory removal away.
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INTRODUCTION
CYBERLIBERTARIANISM AS DIGITAL IDEOLOGY

Overture: Why Exchange?
Internet markets are major centers of online activity. Exchange platforms, such as
Craigslist, eBay, and Silk Road are exceptionally popular, with consistently high levels of
internet traffic,1 exceptionally innovative, with roots in the early days of their respective
webs,2 and exceptionally profitable, with hundreds of millions of dollars passing through
these powerhouses of the digital economy each year.3 One in five Americans sells
something on the internet every year, making these exceptional cases also quite ordinary.4
Exchange platforms are new media with traces of the old, replicating and transforming
the local market, the antique market, and the black market. As electronic spheres of
commercial and interpersonal exchange, they are host to a vibrant interplay of economic,
social, and technological dynamics.

1

"How Popular is Craigslist?" Alexa, published 2017, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/
craigslist.org. "How Popular Is eBay?" Alexa, published 2017, http://www.alexa.com/
siteinfo/ebay.com. Nichols Christin, "Traveling the Silk Road: A Measurement Analysis
of a Large Anonymous Online Marketplace,” International World Wide Web Conference
Committee Proceedings (May 2013): no pagination, ACM 978-1-4503-2035-1/13/05.
2
See the discussion of Craigslist, eBay, and Silk Road histories later in this introduction.
3
"eBay's Annual Net Revenue in the United States from 2013 to 2016,” Statista,
published 2016, https://www.statista.com/statistics/221854/ebays-annual-net-revenue-inthe-united-states/
"Leading Shopping and Classified websites in the United States, based on market share
of visits,” Statista, published 2014, https://www.statista.com/statistics/266203/us-marketshare-of-leading-shopping-classifieds-websites. Nichols Christin, ""Traveling the Silk
Road: A Measurement Analysis of a Large Anonymous Online Marketplace.”
4
Aaron Smith, "Gig Work, Online Selling, and Home Sharing,” Pew Research Center,
published November 2016, http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/17/gig-work-onlineselling-and-home-sharing.

2
Despite their popularity and novelty, internet markets are neglected objects of
inquiry in digital media studies. Contemporary literature on electronic commerce largely
foregrounds the trading of informational objects rather than material ones. This is the
case in studies of platforms and studies of networks. In studies of platforms, the
reproducibility of information becomes a point of departure for digital gift economies and
their concomitant systems of reciprocity and status.5 Trade is here understood in broad
terms: every online contribution is a discrete economic transaction, leading some to
jettison the very distinction between the social and the economic within digital culture.6
In studies of networks, the management of information becomes a competitive business

5

Dave Elder-Vass, Profit and Gift in the Digital Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2016). Julia Velkova, "Open Cultural Production and the Online Gift
Economy: The Case of Blender,” First Monday 21, no. 10 (2016): no pagination,
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/6944. Vili Lehdonvirta and Edward
Castronova, Virtual Economies (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2014). Etienne Pelaprat and
Barry Brown, "Reciprocity: Understanding Online Social Relations,” First Monday 17,
no. 10 (2012): no pagination, http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3324.
Erika Pearson, "Digital Gifts: Participation and Gift Exchange in LiveJournal
Communities,” First Monday 12, no. 5 (2007): no pagination,
http://firstmonday.org/article/view/1835/1719. Matei Ripeanu et al., "Gifting
Technologies: A BitTorrent Case Study,” First Monday 11, no. 11 (2006): no pagination,
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1412/1330. Kevin McGee and
Jörgen Skågeby, "Gifting Technologies,” First Monday 9, no. 12 (2004): no pagination,
http://firstmonday.org/article/view/1192/1112. Kylie Veale, "Internet Gifting Economies:
Voluntary Payment Schemes as Tangible Reciprocity,” First Monday 8, no. 12 (2003):
no pagination, http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1101/1021. Hillary
Bays and Miranda Mowbray, "Cookies, Gifting, and the Internet,” First Monday 4, no. 11
(1999): no pagination, http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/700/610.
Richard Barbrook, "The Hi-tech Gift Economy,” First Monday 3, no. 12 (1998): no
pagination, http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/631/552.
6
Kylie Jarrett and D.E. Wittkower, "Economies of the Internet,” First Monday 21, no. 10
(2016): no pagination, http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/6939/5624.
Tiziana Terranova, "Free Labor: Producing Culture for the Digital Economy,” Social Text
18, no. 2 (2000): 33-58. Göran Bolin, Value and the Media: Cultural Production and
Consumption in Digital Markets (Farnham: Ashgate Press, 2011).
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advantage, to be leveraged through financial instruments or logistical apparatuses.7 Trade
is again understood in broad terms: every piece of information becomes a commodity,
leading some to jettison the distinction between informational and material regulation.8
Even studies of internet retailers and craft sites, such as Amazon and Etsy, display a
preference for informational systems of status and recommendation over material systems
of goods and payment.9 Research is still catching up with Facebook Marketplace, an
exchange platform that was launched in October 2016 as an internal part of the social
media giant.10
The neglect of exchange is symptomatic of broader trends within digital media
studies. In the context of digital media, political economy tends to focus on production

7

Christopher Westland et al., Global Electronic Commerce (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1999). Hassan Masum and Mark Tovey, eds. The Reputation Society (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 2011). Eric Brousseau and Nicolas Curien, eds., Internet and Digital Economics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of
Networks (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). Manuel Castells, The Rise of the
Network Society (Hoboken: Wiley & Blackwell, 2000).
8
Hassan Masum an Mark Tovey, eds. The Reputation Society.
9
Dave Elder-Vass, "Lifeworld and Systems in the Digital Economy,” European Journal
of Social Theory 21, no. 2 (2018): 227-244, doi: 10.1177/1368431017709703. Regina
Connolly, "Trust in Commercial and Personal Transactions in the Digital Age,” in The
Oxford Handbook of Internet Studies, ed. William H. Dutton (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2013): 165-192. Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It
(New Haven: Yale University Press). Michelle White, Producing Women: The Internet,
Traditional Femininity, Queerness, and Creativity (New York: Routledge, 2015). Brian J.
Hracs and Doreen Jakob, "Selling the Stage: Exploring the Spatial and Temporal
Dimensions of Interactive Cultural Experiences,” in Spatial Dynamics in the Experience
Economy, eds. Anne Lorentzen et al. (New York: Routledge, 2015): 71-87. Tara LissMarino, "Sell (It) Yourself: Marketing Pleasure in Digital DIY" (doctoral dissertation,
University of Pennsylvania, 2014). Susan Luckman, Craft and the Creative Economy
(New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2015).
10
Facebook, "Introducing Marketplace,” published October 2016,
http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/10/introducing-marketplace-buy-and-sell-with-yourlocal-community. Stanislav Mamonov and Raquel Benbunan-Fich, "Exploring Factors
Affecting Social E-Commerce Service Adoption: The Case of Facebook Gifts,”
International Journal of Information Management 37, no. 6 (December 2017): 590-600.
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and ownership, and cultural studies tends to focus on consumption and signification.11
Hence, many political-economic studies of social media sites center on the commercial
valorization of user data.12 Meanwhile, many cultural studies of these same sites focus on
the signification of identity and the transformation of language.13 For instance, digital
studies of eBay situate the platform within political-economic configurations of new
media labor14 and cultural formations of online community15. In this respect, the

11

This is not to reduce political economy or cultural studies to production and
consumption, respectively, but to highlight a general tendency in order to understand the
lacuna of exchange. To be sure, even when political economy and cultural studies fit
these tendencies, they incorporate a variety of additional factors into analysis.
12
Christian Fuchs, Social Media: A Critical Introduction (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2017).
Nick Srnicek, Platform Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017). Sebastian Sevignani,
Privacy and Capitalism in the Age of Social Media (New York: Routledge, 2016).
Ganaele Langlois et al., Compromised Data: From Social Media to Big Data (New York:
Bloomsury Academic, 2015). Lee McGuigan and Vincent Manzerolle, eds., The
Audience Commodity in a Digital Age: Revisiting a Critical Theory of Commercial
Media (New York: Peter Lang, 2014). Christian Fuchs et al., Internet and Surveillance:
The Challenges of Web 2.0 and Social Media (New York: Routledge, 2012). Daniel
Trottier, Social Media as Surveillance (New York: Routledge, 2012). Nicole Cohen,
"The Valorization of Surveillance: Towards a Political Economy of Facebook,”
Democratic Communiqué 22, no. 1 (2008): 5-22.
13
John Cheney-Lippold, We Are Data (New York: NYU Press, 2017). Patrick Davison
"The Language of Internet Memes," in The Social Media Reader, ed. Michael Mandiberg
(New York: New York University Press, 2012): 120-135. Christopher Pullen and
Margaret Cooper, eds., LGBT Identity and Online New Media (New York: Routledge,
2010). David Crystal et al., Language and the Internet (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006). danah boyd, "Friends, Friendsters, and Myspace Top 8: Writing
Community into Being on Social Network Sites," First Monday 11 (2006): no pagination.
14
Janice Denegri-Knott and Detlev Zwick. Tracking Prosumption Work on eBay:
Reproduction of Desire and the Challenge of Slow Re-McDonaldization,” American
Behavioral Scientist 56, no. 4 (2012): 439-459, doi: 10.1177/0002764211429360. Mary
Calkins, "My Reputation Always Had More Fun Than Me: The Failure of eBay's
Feedback Model to Effectively Prevent Online Auction Fraud,” Richmond Journal of
Law and Technology (Spring 2001).
15
Michelle White, Buy It Now: Lessons from eBay (Durham: Duke University Press,
2012). Josh Boyd, "In Community We Trust: Online Security Communication at eBay,”
Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 7, no. 3 (2002): no pagination,
10.1111/j.1083-6101.2002.tb00147.x.

5
methodological dichotomy reflects the critical-theoretical division of the social totality
into an economic base and a cultural superstructure.16 Exchange occupies an awkward
position within this theoretical edifice: the circulation of commodities exceeds the hidden
abode of production, proper to political economy, but precedes the conspicuous realm of
consumption, proper to cultural studies.
Given the neglect of internet markets in digital media studies, this research project
examines three exchange platforms — Craigslist, eBay, and Silk Road — in order to
understand exchange on internet markets. My argument runs as follows.
Cyberlibertarianism is a dominant ideology in the technology industry (introduction).
Internet markets represent cyberlibertarianism ideals put into practice. According to
cyberlibertarianism, internet markets should be self-regulating, but problems of fraud
nevertheless emerge. On internet markets, fraud occurs through the manipulation of
platform protocols. This matters, because protocols are supposed to replace regulations
on internet markets (chapter 1). Actors take various steps to mitigate concerns of fraud
and control the commercial process. These steps rely on website infrastructure, platform

16

Raymond Williams, "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory,” New Left
Review 1, no. 82 (November 1973), https://newleftreview.org/article/1568. Janice Peck,
"Why We Shouldn't Be Bored with the Political Economy versus Cultural Studies
Debate,” Cultural Critique 64 (2006): 92-126, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4489259.
Larry Grossberg, "Cultural Studies versus Political Economy: Is Anyone Else Bored with
this Debate?,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 12, no. 1 (1995): 72-81. Larry
Grossberg, "Toward a Genealogy of the State of Cultural Studies: The Discipline of
Communication and the Reception of Cultural Studies in the United States,” in
Disciplinarity and Dissent in Cultural Studies, eds. Cary Nelson and Dikip Parameshwar
Goankar (New York: Routledge, 1996): 131-147. Timothy Havens et al., "Critical Media
Industry Studies: A Research Approach,” Communication, Culture, and Critique 2
(2009): 234-253. Stuart Hall, "The Rediscovery of 'Ideology': Return of the Repressed in
Media Studies," in Culture, Society, and the Media, ed. Michael Gurevitch et al. (New
York: Routledge 1982): 52-86.
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culture, and state, commercial, and domestic institutions. This matters, because internet
markets are supposed to be self-contained, yet digital exchange implicates factors that are
external to electronic commerce, especially the state institutions that cyberlibertarianism
claims to obviate. For instance, users develop social customs that rely on website
infrastructure, platform culture, and state institutions (chapter 2). Vendors perform
practices that are also connected to website infrastructure, platform culture, and state
institutions, but in ways that reflect their goal of selling goods (chapter 3). State,
commercial, and domestic institutions figure centrally in the circulation of market
objects, which often enter digital exchange in places where institutional control falls short
(chapter 4). Far from being a story of self-regulation, exchange on internet markets is a
story of regulatory endeavors, as users, vendors, and institutions aim (and sometimes fail)
to control the process of electronic commerce. This tells us that cyberlibertarianism
overlooks the role of regulations and institutions on the internet. In turn, this suggests that
actors outside of the technology industry should insist on the reality of regulations and
institutions in order to create a fair and cooperative internet (conclusion).
As venues that embody cyberlibertarian principles, internet markets are among
the most productive case studies of the digital ideology. By meeting the radical
conditions demanded by cyberlibertarianism, internet markets are experiments in the
digital ideology that decisively disprove its hypotheses. If the predictions of
cyberlibertarianism cannot be realized in the free digital market, then they likely cannot
be realized anywhere. Internet markets are valuable objects of research, because they
uniquely actualize the tenets of cyberlibertarianism and, in so doing, demonstrate

7
significant flaws in the dominant paradigm. Moving forward, they may serve as a
counterpoint to the claim that an internet equilibrium is just one regulatory removal away.

Cyberlibertarianism
Cyberlibertarianism is a particular way of thinking about digital technology and a
dominant ideology in Silicon Valley. It is important to understand cyberlibertarianism,
because the paradigm informs the principles of industry leaders, the practices of major
firms, and the sensibilities of high-technology workers. This has consequences beyond
the Valley, insofar as these figures and firms are the ones who invent and design popular
digital technologies, influence governmental policies related to the internet, and play an
outsized role in public debates surrounding technology and society. Further, as I argue in
the body of this project, cyberlibertarianism shares key assumptions with other paradigms
for understanding digital media: electronic reputation studies, free labor theory, accounts
of the digital economy and digital labor, and internet commodity studies. This means that
even scholars can operate under the assumptions of cyberlibertarianism.
Conceptually, cyberlibertarianism combines the market theory of libertarianism
with the system theory of cybernetics. For libertarianism and cybernetics, economic and
technological systems tend toward equilibrium through the independent decisions of their
constituent actors. Both discourses construe regulation as unnecessary, even
counterproductive. The key thinkers of libertarianism and cybernetics — Friedrich Hayek
and Norbert Weiner — follow remarkably similar logic in their respective arguments.17

17

Friedrich von Hayek, The Fatal Conceit, ed. William Warren Bartley (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1989). Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics (New York: Wiley,
1948).
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For Hayek, regulation undermines the spontaneous order of the economic market. For
Weiner, regulation hinders the self-regulating capacity of the technological system. Both
discourses cast institutional intervention as impractical, even hazardous. For Hayek, the
state should never attempt to manage economic markets; for Weiner, the state should
never attempt to police technological systems. Both discourses position cooperation as
the foundation of social life, upon which economic markets and technological systems
are built. Libertarianism and cybernetics have been subject to widespread criticism in the
economic and social sciences throughout the twentieth century.18 As it turns out,
regulations can be productive, institutions can be equitable, and conflict can be inevitable
in economic and technological systems. Yet libertarianism and cybernetics make a stealth
comeback in the way that Silicon Valley understands the technologies that it produces.
According to cyberlibertarianism, the internet is a self-regulating system that is
incompatible with external regulations. Cyberlibertarianism can operate on the level of
internet firms (don't regulate the technology industry), internet networks (don't regulate
cable traffic), and internet platforms (don't regulate website content). In this line of
thought, external regulations, including state regulations, are not only unnecessary but
actually detrimental to the internet as a self-contained system. At the heart of
cyberlibertarianism is the vision of an internet in perpetual equilibrium. As in
libertarianism, every attempt to manipulate the system ultimately backfires: the
regulation of internet activity ends up undermining the vitality of online exchange. As in

18

Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Economic Role of the State (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1989).
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Eye and Mind," trans. Carleton Dallery, in The Primacy of
Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, ed. James M. Edie
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964): 159-192. See the discussion of
libertarianism and cyberneticism in the introduction.

9
cybernetics, every flaw in the system is ultimately incorporated into its superlative
functioning: the system ends up neutralizing and integrating errors, dysfunctions, and
interruptions. I follow several others in referring to this conceptual framework as
cyberlibertarianism.19 To be sure, not everyone in Silicon Valley is a cyberlibertarian,
and not every cyberlibertarian believes in the paradigm whole. However,
cyberlibertarianism is an influential way of thinking about technology in the place where
many technologies are created. In order to demonstrate the existence of
cyberlibertarianism as a dominant ideology in Silicon Valley, I highlight traces of the
paradigm in the beliefs of industry leaders; the practices of technology firms; and the
books, magazines, manifestos, conferences, and think tanks that populate the Valley.
In the early 1990s, many technology workers began to think of the economy as a
self-regulating system. In his 1990 book Bionomics, Michael Rothschild put forward an
elegantly simple thesis that affirmed the self-regulating nature of the market: "the
economy is a rainforest".20 So compelling was this notion in Silicon Valley that an annual
Bionomics conference was established — organized by die-hard libertarians from 1993 to
1996 and then by the Cato Institute from 1997 to 1999 — and attended by technology

19

Langdon Winner, "Technology Today: Utopia or Dystopia?" Social Research 64, no. 3
(Fall 1997): 989-1017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40971195. Richard Barbrook and
Andy Cameron, "The California Ideology," Science as Culture 6, no. 1 (1996): 44-72,
https://doi.org/10.1080/
09505439609526455. The concept of cyberlibertarianism has a tangled genealogy.
Langdon Winner coined the term in 1997, but Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron
established its conceptual foundations in a famous essay on "the California ideology" the
previous year. For Winner, Barbrook, and Cameron, cyberlibertarianism positions
individual freedom at the core of digital technology. I accept this core premise, even as I
develop my own definition of the term.
20
Michael L. Rothschild, Bionomics (New York: H. Holt, 1990).
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heavyweights, such Larry Ellison, CEO of Oracle, and Scott Cook, CEO of Intuit.21 The
Cato Institute is a longstanding libertarian think tank that received a major influx of
funding by conservative industry leaders, such as the Koch brothers, in the 1980s; and its
interest in Silicon Valley attests to the region's libertarian sensibility early on.22 Outside
of conferences, Wired magazine began to speak the language of cyberlibertarianism,
starting with its founding in 1993, when it ran the headline "Big Brother Wants To Look
Inside Your Bank Account (Anytime It Pleases)"23. Along with the suspicion of state
power came a distaste for state regulations. A 1994 Wired piece proclaimed, "Regulation
was the last concern of the highway builders."24 Paulina Borsook, who worked at the
magazine in the 1990s, observed, "The magazine almost never ran anything that was
anything that was other than laudatory of technology or other than libertarian in
outlook."25 In 1994, a Berkeley professor observed that Silicon Valley engineers
"[assumed] that the dynamism of free markets would be self-perpetuating and selfgoverning" and therefore "saw no need to attend to the institutional foundations of their
vitality."26

21

Paul Krugnman, "The Power of Biobabble", Slate, October 24, 1997,
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/the_dismal_science/1997/10/the_power_of_bioba
bble.
22
Jane Mayer, Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of
the Radical Right (New York: Anchor, 2017).
23
Wired Staff, "Big Brother Wants To Look Inside Your Bank Account (Anytime It
Pleases)", Wired, December 1993.
24
Wired Staff, "There Will Be No Information Superhighway," Wired, February 1994.
25
Paulina Borsook, Cyberselfish, (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), 128.
26
Anna Lee Saxenian, Regional Advantage (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1994).
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Two years later, Andy Grove, the CEO of Intel, referred to the PC as an "organic
phenomenon" that should not be manipulated by the state.27 Around this time, as the Cato
Institute took a greater interest in the emergent technology industry, T.J. Rogers, Cato's
west coast emissary, created a petition to decrease corporate taxes by ending corporate
subsidies; the document was signed by a collection of technology CEOs and venture
capital firms in Silicon Valley.28 By the end of the decade, many were speaking about
technology in ecological and anti-statist terms. Richard Dawkins, with his socialevolutionary approach to intelligence and innovation, graced the cover of Wired in
1998.29 In her 1998 book, The Future and Its Enemies, Virginia Postrel followed Hayek
and cast technological society as a conflict between the forces of dynamism, marked by
free exploration, and the forces of statism, marked by state planning.30 Libertarianism
was plainly in the Bay Area ether at this time, as a San Francisco Recorder headline read,
"California's Tech Elite Remains Stubbornly Libertarian".31
The 2000s witnessed the increasing popularity and profitability of the internet, as
well as the instrumentalization of cyberlibertarianism by major technology figures and
their firms. These figures, in the words Noam Cohen, "propose a society in which
personal freedoms are near absolute and government regulations wither away, where bold
entrepreneurs amass billions of dollars from their innovations and the rest of us struggle
in a hypercompetitive market without unions, governmental regulations, or social-welfare

27

Daniel Gross, "Greatest Businessmen of All Time," Forbes, October 1996.
T. J. Rogers, "Silicon Valley versus Corporate Welfare," Cato Institute Briefing Paper
no. 37, April 27, 1998.
29
Wired Staff, "Bad Boy Evolutionist," Wired, May 1998.
30
Virginia Postrel, The Future and Its Enemies (New York: Touchstone, 1998).
31
George Craw, " California's Tech Elite Remains Stubbornly Libertarian" San
Francisco Recorder, June 1998.
28

12
to protect us"32. Their actions also highlight a paradox of cyberlibertarianism: a
simultaneous rejection of the state and courtship of the state. These figures draw less on
the ecological language of cybernetics and more on the self-regulating language of
libertarianism. Peter Thiel, a founder of Paypal turned venture capitalist, is the likely
most outspoken libertarian in the Valley, claiming he built Paypal "because he wanted to
create a currency that could circumvent government control"33. Thiel funds the
Seasteading Institute, which aims to create a free libertarian society on a manufactured
island, beyond the jurisdiction of governments; and he famously paid twenty-four
students to not attend college, which he considers an outdated institution.34 At the same
time, Thiel's data mining company, Palantir, relied on the CIA as an early investor,
contradicting his principled opposition to the state.35 Jeff Bezos, founder and CEO of
Amazon, is also ambivalent toward state power. On the one hand, Bezos is comfortable
pushing the limits of occupational safety regulations: following a New York Times story
on the poor working conditions of Amazon fulfillment centers, Bezos insisted that the
labor market was self-regulating, such that any of his workers could leave if they
pleased.36 “I strongly believe," he wrote in a letter to employees, "that anyone working in

32

Noam Cohen, The Know It Alls (New York: The New Press, 2017), 4.
George Packer, "No Death, No Taxes," The New Yorker, November 28, 2011,
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/11/28/no-death-no-taxes.
34
China Mievelle, "Floating Utopias," In These Times, September 28, 2007,
http://inthesetimes.com/article/3328/floating_utopias. Ben Wieder, "Thiel Fellowship
Pays 24 Talented Students $100,000 To Not Attend College," The Chronicle of Higher
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a company that really is like the one described in the NYT would be crazy to stay."37 On
the other hand, Bezos directly lobbied for the Internet Tax Freedom Act of 1998, which
prevents governmental bodies from imposing internet-specific taxes; and he persuaded
the US Justice Department to sue Apple's Tiny eBookstore for anti-trust violations.38 For
Bezos, the state is only legitimate when conveniently so.
Likewise, Google is formally opposed to state regulations, as when it opposed the
Stop Online Piracy Act of 2012, a bill crafted to stop copyright infringement on search
engines like Google.39 Yet the company relies on the state to protect itself against foreign
regulations: it is likely that Google's $15 million lobbying efforts led members of
Congress to defend Google against EU regulatory bodies.40 There is also evidence of a
"revolving door" between Google and the United States government, as workers regularly
move from one to the other, suggesting a certain level of regulatory capture, or an
instance when regulators are controlled by the industries they are designed to regulate.41
Here, governmental regulations are problematic, unless they are crafted by industry
actors themselves. Similarly, as founder and CEO of Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg
oversees his company's extensive lobbying efforts. Along with Amazon and Google,
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Facebook used its lobbying power to influence the crafting of an anti-human-trafficking
bill that, in an early version, would have increased the legal liability of platform
companies.42 Zuckerberg is staunchly opposed to such governmental regulation and
positions users and engineers as superlative regulators. In 2010, when asked if Facebook
should be regulated like other utilities, he replied, "I mean, in terms of regulation, we get
regulated by users, right?"43 During his appearance in front of Congress in 2018,
Zuckerberg insisted that automated technologies would be better regulators than
governmental bodies. When Congressman David McKinley asked about Facebook's
accountability for preventing misinformation, Zuckerberg replied, "What we need to do is
build more A.I. tools that can proactively find that content."44 Here, the decisions of users
and the designs of engineers are the only regulations necessary for the social media giant.
Where these industry leaders are concerned with the regulation of internet firms and
internet platforms, internet service providers (ISPs) are concerned with the regulation of
internet networks. In 2018, Ajit Pai, chairman of the FCC, framed net neutrality
provisions — state mandates that ensure that all internet network traffic is treated the
same by ISPs — as "heavy-handed" regulations by an overbearing state.45 He even
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causally connected the vitality of the internet to the absence of regulatory controls; as he
explained in an interview, "We saw companies like Facebook, and Amazon and Google
become global powerhouses, precisely because we had light-touch rules that applied to
this internet."46 In all of these cases, the internet is a self-contained system, beyond the
messy realities of regulations and institutions.
This brief account of cyberlibertarianism highlights the paradoxical and flexible
nature of the digital ideology. In cyberlibertarianism, external regulations are detrimental
to the internet — unless those regulations benefit technology firms. The formal agenda of
regulatory resistance includes an exception when regulatory capture is necessary. In
addition to being paradoxical, cyberlibertarianism is highly flexible. It can operate on the
level of industry, as when technology firms resist regulation in the form of taxation and
oversight by the state. It can operate on the level of websites, as when platform
companies resist regulation in the form of legal liability over content. It can operate on
the level of networks, as when internet service providers resist regulation in the form of
net neutrality provisions. Each of these components of the internet may be positioned as
an ecological system that risks damage by artificial institutions, unless those institutions
can offer strategic leverage.
Needless to say, the role of the state in creating and maintaining the internet goes
unrecognized in this framework, and cyberlibertarianism neatly lines up with the
economic interests of technology firms — regulations are only legitimate when
strategically valuable. However partial and motivated, cyberlibertarianism is an
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influential way of thinking about technology, and it informs the beliefs of industry
figures, the practices of major firms, and the sensibilities of high-technology workers. It
is the dominant narrative against which alternative accounts are positioned. In the
following chapters, I show that internet markets offer an alternative account of
technology, one that recognizes the role of regulation in electronic commerce. First, I
review the research methods employed in this study and provide an overview of the case
studies in question.

Method
Given the state of electronic commerce research, I began with the following
question: what is the nature of exchange relations on internet markets? I understand
internet markets as internet sites where a significant volume of exchange occurs between
individual peers, and where peers generally do not manufacture the goods that they sell.
By contrast, internet retailers are internet sites where a significant volume of exchange
occurs between users and firms. In terms of digital architecture, internet markets are peerto-peer or distributed platforms where users primarily encounter one another, while
internet retailers are hierarchical or centralized platforms where users primarily encounter
business organizations. Further, internet retail sales have an implied warranty, or a legal
assurance that product claims are accurate.47 By contrast, internet markets need not
guarantee the accuracy of user claims, enjoying an exemption from implied warranty
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under telecommunications law.48 Moreover, internet markets are distinct from online
craft markets, where individuals themselves manufacture the goods that they sell, and
where production and circulation are consequently interwoven. Internet markets are
oriented around exchange, even as exchange carries within itself a collection of other
phenomena.
Having set the boundaries and the framework of the study, I selected three cases
on conceptual and methodological grounds.49 Craigslist, eBay, and Silk Road fit the
definition of internet market outlined above. Their central function is peer-to-peer
exchange — without the implied warranties of internet retail markets, without the microproduction of craft markets, and, as we'll see, without the regulations of conventional
local, antique, and black markets. Absent such processes that mediate commerce, these
internet markets isolate exchange as a conceptual object. As comparative case studies,
Craigslist, eBay, and Silk Road are similar enough to demonstrate trends but different
enough to illuminate nuances. That is, comparison helps distinguish between general
features (shared by internet markets) and particular features (unique to each platform).
Following the definitions laid out by Jeasik Cho and Allen Trent, I employed a paradigm
of constructivist transactional validity,50 This means I was seeking accurate claims about
internet markets that are grounded in evidence and that reflect an empirical reality.
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Consequently, I worked to confirm my research findings as accurate through
triangulation, a process of verifying facts through multiple data sources.51
Web crawls of six discussion boards constitute the first major source of research
data (see Appendix I). These discussion boards offered a breadth of data related to
patterns in user activity. Craigslist, eBay, and Silk Road each feature an internal
discussion board on their respective web domains, as well as auxiliary discussion boards
on the Reddit web domain. In order to identify trends in user activity on internet markets,
I ran a total of eighteen web crawls — three on each of the six discussion boards. I used
an iterative criterion sample to guide my data collection during the web crawls. 52 That is,
I sampled discussion board data based on a criterion (the inclusion of certain keywords)
and ran multiple iterations of web crawls based on the findings of the preceding crawl(s).
After developing a corpus of posts, I pattern-coded the parsed data with themes that
emerged progressively during the initial review.53 Following collection, I employed a
critical, interpretive approach to these case samples. Drawing on textual analysis, I
sought to identify patterns in user activity, understood as a triplex of user experience, user
practice, and user attitude.54
Twenty-seven semi-structured interviews with internet merchants constitute the
second major source of research data (see Appendix II). I followed IRB protocol at each
stage of interview research, from contacting participants to storing data, and I received
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IRB approval from the University of Pennsylvania.55 Where the discussion boards offered
a breadth of data related to user activity, the interviews offered a depth of data related to
user activity. I selected interview participants first through a theoretical sample and then
through a sequentially-driven conceptual sample.56 In the theoretical sample, I sought out
experienced users of internet markets, understood as users who had been on Craigslist or
eBay for over seven years. In the sequentially-driven conceptual sample, I sought
interview participants who would reflect a variety of perspectives in terms of experience,
age, and gender.57. Following recruitment, I conducted text-only internet interviews that
occurred in private chat rooms over Cyph, a peer-to-peer online messaging system. 58 In
creating an interview template, I followed Herbert Rubin and Irene Rubin in thinking of
interviews as "structured conversations"59 designed to cover research problems, which the
interviewer develops beforehand, and to explore organic themes, which arise during the
course of the interview. In analyzing the interviews, I pattern-coded the data with themes
that emerged progressively during review. Following coding, I employed a critical,
interpretive approach to the interview data.
Legal and governmental records constitute my third source of research data (see
Appendix III). These records offered a breadth of data related to patterns in institutional
activity. My goal in looking at these records was to understand the legal and
governmental systems within which internet markets operate. In analyzing the data, I
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pattern coded the material according to themes that emerged during review. In
interpreting the documents, I continued to employ a critical, interpretive approach,
drawing on textual analysis to identify patterns in the systems surrounding internet
markets. Here, however, I foregrounded the institutional context of their production. In
addition to drawing on textual analysis, I drew on political-economic analysis in seeing
states as actors with material and symbolic resources, as well as strong incentives to
protect and maintain those resources.
Platform documents produced by internet markets constitute my fourth major
source of research (see Appendix IV). These offered a depth of data related to patterns in
platform activity. This allowed me to hone in on the proximate context and deliberate
decisions of platforms, as they relate to institutional and user activity. These included
user agreements, terms of use, user guidelines, market policies, and promotional
materials. I pattern-coded this data with themes that emerged progressively through
review, and some of these overlapped with themes that developed from other research
sources. In interpreting these documents, I drew on textual analysis to identify patterns in
platform activity. More notably, I drew on political-economic analysis to consider how
the material interests of platforms inform their user documentation. This includes, for
instance, how user agreements enable platform companies to control economic resources
or evade legal liabilities. Finally, a variety of journalistic reports constitute the final
source of my research (see Appendix V). These were selected on the grounds of
relevance, mostly direct but sometimes direct, to the case studies.

Case Studies
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A brief word on the case studies (see Appendix VI for a full primer). It should be
noted at the outset that each of these platforms is an unstable conceptual object:
architectures, protocols, functionalities, interfaces, and policies change over time. This
means that accounts of platform activity are chronologically situated, and they should be
taken as snapshots of fluid sites rather than as conclusive accounts.
Craigslist is a local internet market with over seven hundred internet domains (or
addresses) serving seventy countries.60 Each month, Craigslist users post over eighty
million classified advertisements, directed at physically proximate individuals within
their neighborhood, city, region, state, or country.61 This is the reason for the plurality of
internet domains: Craigslist addresses are location-based, meaning users in different
geographical regions navigate to different website domains in order to conduct local
commerce. In this respect, Craigslist is something of an umbrella term for the variety of
local Craigslist domains, as there is no centralized market designed to reach the
geographically distributed userbase in one fell swoop. This userbase is expansive:
Craigslist is the fifteenth most visited website in the United States.62 These market
participants post advertisements in a broad range of section categories: goods for sale and
goods wanted, rentals and real estate, job opportunities and services for hire, community
events and announcements, and a variety of discussion boards. There was previously a
personals sections, which went through several incarnations before being removed
entirely in 2018, following the passage of internet legislation that reduced platform
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immunity from criminal liability.63 Merchants meet one another in person to conduct the
final transaction. In recent years, Craigslist has generated upwards of $700 million in
revenue.64 With a small staff of forty people and minimal operating costs,65 plus a
userbase of millions, the company enjoys a profit margin of 80%, making it the most
profitable classified advertising site in the world.66 Despite increasing competition from
similar (if not copycat) sites, such as Offer Up, Internet Yard Sale, and (as of 2016)
Facebook Marketplace, Craigslist continues to dominate the field of peer-to-peer markets.
eBay is an online auction market with an expansive global presence.67 There are
over 150 million active eBay users68 and 25 million active eBay sellers69 around the
world, and the platform is ranked in the top ten for internet traffic in the United States
and the top hundred in China, Japan, Canada, and Russia. 70 In contrast to Craigslist users
who are balkanized in local jurisdictions, eBay users meet in a common market, where
they exchange upwards of a hundred billion dollars in merchandise each year.71 Given the
size of the market, eBay is neatly (if not compulsively) divided into sections and
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subsections: collectibles, fashion, electronics, cars, home and garden, sporting goods, and
others. These sections are Russian dolls with multiple nested subsections. Collectibles,
for example, divides into antiques, coins, and comics, which may then be filtered
according to era, brand, and condition. eBay began as an online antique market, and, after
going public in 1998, expanded its product selection and acquired dozens of electronic
commerce sites in the wake of the Web 2.0 boom.72 Significantly, in 2004, eBay took a
28% stake in Craigslist when it bought out a disgruntled shareholder, but the relationship
ended in 2008, when eBay sued Craigslist for diluting its stake in the company to 24%
and thereby removing its board seat; Craigslist ultimately bought back to the minority
stake.73
Silk Road was one of the first dark web markets74 and among the most active
during its run from 2011 to 201375. The site dealt predominately in drugs, firearms, fake
IDs, hacking manuals, criminal guidebooks, bootlegged software, and money laundering
services. Although buyers hailed from over a hundred countries worldwide, sellers tended
to be based in the Western world, especially North America and Europe.76 Over the
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course of its tenure, Silk Road generated over two hundred million dollars in sales, and
its owner, Ross William Ulbricht, collected over eighteen million dollars in commission
therefrom.77 The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) shut down the site in 2013
following a two-year investigation into its operation and ownership, leading a federal
judge to sentence Ulbricht to life in prison without parole during a 2014 trial.78
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CHAPTER 1
HOW TO GET AWAY WITH INTERNET FRAUD
EXPLOITING DIGITAL PROTOCOLS
Internet markets represent cyberlibertarian ideals put into practice. As free digital
markets, they embody the laissez faire principles championed by cyberlibertarianism.
Craigslist, eBay, and Silk Road each draw on cyberlibertarianism to characterize their
platforms as self-regulating. By these accounts, internet markets should be perfect. Yet
problems of fraud, deception, manipulation, and coercion emerge on these platforms, and
institutions make sporadic appearances in economic conflicts. In such cases, users pursue
their economic self-interest through the manipulation of platform protocols. This is
significant, because protocols are designed to replace regulations in the context of digital
exchange. Not only are internet markets far from self-regulating, but the digital protocols
that are supposed to make regulations obsolete end up being the very tools by which
internet actors defraud and deceive one another. So much for digital equilibrium.

Platform Cyberlibertarianism
In the introduction, I noted that cyberlibertarianism operates on the level of firms,
networks, and platforms. Internet markets fall under the aegis of platform
cyberlibertarianism, according to which internet websites are self-regulating. Several
authors describe how the discourse of cyberlibertarianism operates on the level of
platforms, although they use different terms to characterize that discourse. Tarleton
Gillespie considers how platform companies draw on cyberlibertarianism to position their
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websites as neutral venues of exchange.79 Gillespie argues that the very term "platform"
connotes an impartial foundation upon which free association rests. A platform is not an
active participant on the internet but a "mere facilitator, supporter, host" whose central
function is "the neutral provision of content".80 As neutral venues of internet exchange,
platforms are not responsible for the actions of users, and they need not institute
regulations to control user behavior. Similarly, for Trevor Scholz, the term "Web 2.0"
implies that internet platforms are beyond regulation, governed by peer-to-peer
agreement rather than hierarchical authority.81 José Van Dijck and David Nieborg
relatedly observe that electronic commerce manifestos position user activity as
fundamentally cooperative.82 Here, platform regulations are unnecessary, because
voluntary participation is at the center of internet exchange.
Silk Road, eBay, and Craigslist each draw on cyberlibertarianism to characterize
their platforms as self-regulating and to justify their laissez faire regulatory regimes. This
is evident in their public presentation, legal strategy, and platform policy — even as it is
sometimes contradicted by their cooperation with state institutions. As a black market set
in opposition to state power, Silk Road most dramatically embodies cyberlibertarian
ideals. Ross William Ulbricht, Silk Road's architect and executive operator, saw Silk
Road as a principled libertarian sphere of exchange. His logic ran as follows: trade is
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inherently cooperative; the state is inherently coercive; when the state ceases to regulate
trade, actors will come together to form mutually beneficial economic relationships. In
his LinkedIn profile, Ulbricht directly contrasted economic cooperation and political
compulsion:
I want to use economic theory as a means to abolish the use of coercion and
agression [sic] amongst mankind. Just as slavery has been abolished most
everywhere, I believe violence, coercion and all forms of force by one person
over another can come to an end. The most widespread and systemic use of force
is amongst institutions and governments, so this is my current point of effort. The
best way to change a government is to change the minds of the governed,
however. To that end, I am creating an economic simulation to give people a firsthand experience of what it would be like to live in a world without the systemic
use of force.83
For Ulbricht, Silk Road was an "economic simulation" of a libertarian society, in which
the invisible hand of the free market underwrote economic cooperation. Absent state
economic regulation, nonviolent agreement among self-interested actors would become
the salient principle of economic relationality.
Further, Ulbricht saw economic cooperation on Silk Road as a means of eroding
state power. In a discussion board post on the Silk Road forums from September 2012, he
positioned the popular agora of Silk Road in opposition to the coercive apparatus of the
state: "Every single transaction that takes places outside the nexus of state control is a
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victory for those individuals taking part in the transaction. So there are thousands of
victories here each week and each one makes a difference, strengthens the agora, and
weakens the state."84 Here, Ulbricht subscribed to a market-centric version of
libertarianism (agorism) and a repressive theory of state power, in which governments
"limit people's access" to commodities that would otherwise circulate freely in the
market. He saw each transaction on Silk Road as a countervailing actualization of
negative liberty, specifically the freedom to trade "outside the nexus of state control". As
economic freedom in civil society expanded, he reasoned, political authority in state
structures would diminish. Exchange relations — cooperative, consensual, and egalitarian
— would make obsolete centralized state power and a fortiori state economic regulation.
After his arrest in October 2013, Ulbricht continued to defend his actions on
principled libertarian grounds. In his pre-sentencing submission to the court, Ulbricht
wrote, "I believed at the time [of creating Silk Road] that people should have the right to
buy and sell whatever they wanted to long as they weren't hurting anyone else... Silk
Road was supposed to be about giving people the freedom to make their own choices, to
pursue their own happiness, however they individually saw fit."85 Even the popular press
branded Ulbricht has a kind of entrepreneurial cyberpirate. The Economist, a flagship of
economic liberalism, noted that product quality on Silk Road was higher than in the street

84

Gwern Branwen et al., "Dark Net Market Archives, 2011-2015,” Gwern, accessed
December 10, 2014, https://www.gwern.net/DNM-archives. Dread Pirate Roberts, "Silk
Road discussion / Re: chat,” Silk Road Forums, archived September 23, 2012.
http://dkn255hz262ypmii.onion. In the federal case against Ross Ulbricht, the prosecution
convinced the jury that Dread Pirate Roberts was Ulbricht's username. See the disucssion
of United States of America v. Ross William Ulbricht in the introduction.
85
United States of America v. Ross William Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540 (S.D.N.Y.,
2014). Sentencing Submission.

29
trade, a fact that ostensibly demonstrated the self-regulating capacity of the free market.86
Forbes highlighted the political nature of Ulbricht's black market experiment, likening
him to "Julian Assange with a hypodermic needle".87 The libertarian celebration of the
site was not limited to the fiscally conservative press, however. When Gawker published
the first major exposé of Silk Road in June 2011, a staff writer declared that Silk Road
made "buying and selling drugs as easy as buying used electronics" and embodied a
"dream of a distributed digital economy outside the law, where money flows across
borders as free as bits".88
Where Ulbricht positioned Silk Road as a extrastate market utopia, eBay positions
itself as a cooperative consumer arcade. As a publicly traded company, eBay is less
dramatically cyberlibertarian than Silk Road, but it nevertheless draws on the discourse
of self-regulation in several arenas. In their promotional materials, eBay is "the perfect
store": the platform circulates superlative commodities among a collaborative group of
users, scattered around the country and the world.89 Customers purchase goods at low
prices, and vendors sell them at high prices — an evidently contradictory claim that is
meant to attract buyers and sellers alike, both of whom are said to contribute to a thriving
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and idiosyncratic online marketplace. eBay's origin story features an emblematic mix of
merchant cooperation and market serendipity. As related by eBay's public relations
manager in 1997, the story runs as follows. Pierre Omidyar, eBay's founder, created the
site to help his fiancée locate a rare Pez dispenser. As antique dealers began to populate
the platform, Omidyar spoke with knowledgeable merchants, learned about the
collectibles trade, and followed scattered leads until he found the treasured piece of
plastic. The tale is a colorful combination of market acumen, digital crowdsourcing, free
association, commodity culture, and romantic tropes, all in one fell swoop. It is also a lie:
as Adam Cohen revealed several years later, the story was entirely fabricated by eBay's
public relations manager to create a compelling narrative for the press.90 Despite being
factually incorrect, the origin story captures the cooperative ethos of the company's
public presentation, an ethos that lives on in its colorful television commercials and print
advertisements. eBay's 2017 Fill Your Cart With Color commercial features a
concatenation of eccentric figures, each exhilarated by a recent purchase, and asks,
"When did shopping get so beige?"91
In its legal claims, eBay affirms a wide-ranging immunity from state regulations.
Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, as well as the 4th circuit ruling
in Zeran v. American Online, Inc., internet platforms are largely immune from liability as
speakers, publishers, or distributors of third-party content.92 That is, they cannot be held
legally responsible for the behavior of users on their platform. eBay asserts and extends
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its legal immunity in its terms of use. The agreement exempts the platform from damages
in a variety of commercial circumstances: "eBay has no control over and does not
guarantee the existence, quality, safety or legality of items advertised; the truth or
accuracy of users' content or listings; the ability of sellers to sell items; the ability of
buyers to pay for items; or that a buyer or seller will actually complete a transaction or
return an item."93 Users cannot hold the platform responsible for "loss of money,
goodwill or reputation, profits, other intangible losses, or any special, indirect,
consequential damages"94, even in cases of property destruction or malicious software
infection.
eBay's team of litigators has relied on these legal protections to thwart damage
claims in a number of contested cases. In 2004, an eBay user, Roger Grace, sued the
company after another user posted negative feedback on his page.95 Claiming that the
negative feedback constituted defamation and injured his commercial reputation, Grace
sought damages from eBay in California court. The court ruled in eBay's favor, citing
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and eBay's terms of use in determining
that the platform was not responsible for the user's loss of commercial reputation. In
2008, eBay took on a bigger fish: Tiffany & Co., a publicly traded luxury jewelry
business. Tiffany & Co. sued eBay for false advertising, trademark infringement, and
trademark dilution, pointing to the sale of counterfeit Tiffany & Co. items on the platform
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and the presence of the company logo in eBay's promotional materials.96 The court again
ruled in eBay's favor, citing Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and the
principle of nominative fair use. As a host of third-party content, eBay was not
responsible for the sale of counterfeit goods on the site.
At the same time, the Tiffany & Co. lawsuit demonstrates that eBay is willing to
cooperate with state institutions. During the case, eBay revealed that companies who find
counterfeit versions of their products in the auction market may request the takedown of
those items through a copyright violation functionality. Hence, even as eBay resists state
regulation, it follows state directives over copyright law, incorporating those directives
into platform infrastructure. The cyberlibertarian paradox of the state is evident here, as
eBay moves between regulatory evasion and regulatory abidance. eBay's status as a
publicly traded company figures largely into this picture: the platform wants to minimize
the economic costs associated with platform regulation, as well as the political costs that
would accompany state violations.
Craigslist draws on cyberlibertarianism to present itself as a local neighborhood
market governed by countercultural reciprocity. As a venue that regularly cooperates with
the state, Craigslist is the least dramatic case of cyberlibertarianism, but it draws on the
discourse in multiple contexts. Despite being a multimillion-dollar company, Craigslist
regularly presents itself with minimal fanfare, ostensibly the embodiment of a laid-back
and user-friendly digital platform. Though rarely advertised, the platform enjoys a wordof-mouth popularity, having leveraged its early web presence and sheer utility to become
an emblem of straightforward internet exchange. Its famously unassuming interface has
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remained virtually unaltered since the late 1990s, becoming a point of cheeky
contestation between minimalist users and their aesthete counterparts. (In a
characteristically ambivalent headline, Wired describes the interface as "ugly, janky, oldschool... and unbeatable".97) Its logo, also unchanged since the late 1990s, is the company
name, stylized in all lowercase, in purple, Times New Roman font, sometimes preceded
by a small peace sign. CEO Jim Buckmaster designates himself as "anti-establishment"
and "a socialist anarchist".98 At the 2013 Open Source Convention, the company's booth
consisted of a plain white backdrop and small, round table, draped in a tie dye cloth.99
Like eBay, Craigslist employs a team of litigators to defend its lax regulatory
regime. In 2008, after someone posted a racially discriminatory housing advertisement on
the site's Chicago portal, a group of civil rights lawyers sued the platform for violating
nondiscrimination statutes.100 The court ruled that Craigslist was not accountable for
discriminatory posts, relying on Section 230 to justify the platform's hands-off regulatory
regime. When the Sheriff of Cook County sued Craigslist for facilitating prostitution in
its (now deleted) Erotic Services section, the court ruled in favor of Craigslist on similar
grounds, noting in its verdict, "Craigslist does not 'provide' the [illegal] information, its

97

Justin Peters, "Craigslist is Ugly, Janky, Old School... and Unbeatable,” Wired,
February 14, 2017, https://www.wired.com/2017/02/craigslist-is-ugly-janky-oldschooland-unbeatable.
98
"Jim Buckmaster,” About, Craigslist, accessed May 9, 2018,
https://www.craigslist.org/
about/jim_buckmaster.
99
Jim Buckmaster, "CL at OSCON," craigslist blog, last modified July 13, 2013,
http://blog.craigslist.org/2013/07/23/cl-at-oscon.
100
Chicago Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law v. craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d
666 (7th Cir. 2008).

34
users do."101 In addition to its legal efforts, Craigslist encodes its combination of
executive authority and regulatory neutrality in its terms of use. There, the platform
affirms its exclusive discretion over platform moderation and its laissez-faire policies on
market regulation: "[W]e make no promise as to CL, its completeness, accuracy,
availability, timeliness, propriety, security, or reliability."102 Hence, in 2010, when the
internet company Naturemarket developed software to automatically post advertisements
on Craigslist, Craigslist won a permanent injunction suit against them.103 Here, the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act underwrote the court's decision that the violation of
Craigslist's terms of use constituted a contract violation. This case, in turn, served as a
precedent for three subsequent cases, in which Craigslist successfully sued groups and
individuals who posted content on behalf of third parties,104 developed similar auto-post
software,105 or scraped Craigslist content for redistribution on other sites.106 In these
instances, Craigslist affirmed its executive authority over the platform and its legal
immunity from any misconduct transpiring therein.
At the same time, Craigslist regularly accommodates state institutions. The saga
of the Craigslist Personals section is a nice illustration of this paradoxical relationship.
For many years, the platform included an Erotic Services section, where sex workers
often posted advertisements. In 2009, the same year that Craigslist faced off with the
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Sheriff of Cook County, platform executives met with attorney generals in multiple
states; and they ultimately replaced the Erotic Services section with an Adult Services
that was to be subject to manual review.107 A year later, after Craigslist executives were
called to testify in front of the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security, the company shuttered the Adult Services section
entirely, releasing a statement that affirmed their cooperation with institutional actors: "In
Craigslist, law enforcement and NGO advocates have a highly responsive partner."108
More recently, Craigslist closed its Personals section, which became the de facto venue
for sex work in the wake of section shutdowns, in response to internet legislation
designed to fight human trafficking.109 This brief history demonstrates the ambivalence
toward the state operative in cyberlibertarianism: Craigslist evades state regulations, on
the one hand, and follows state directives, on the other.

Fraud, the Fatal Conceit
Internet markets embody the laissez-faire principles of cyberlibertarianism. They
are free markets, or spheres of economic exchange that are not subject to commercial
regulatory systems.. They feature no economic regulation in the form of contracts and
courts; and they feature no social regulation in the form of status codes and tight-knit
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communities. Further, as free digital markets, they feature no stable identities, insofar
users may create and delete online avatars with relatively little effort and with relatively
little consequence. Internet markets are built upon the mutual association and voluntary
cooperation of independent traders. According to cyberlibertarianism, they should be
self-regulating centers of economic activity. Yet these platforms are host to fraud,
deception, manipulation, and coercion, which occur through the manipulation of platform
protocols designed to replace regulations. Far from self-regulating, internet markets
feature diverse forms of economic conflict, underwritten by the very protocols designed
that are supposed facilitate cooperative exchange.
Fraud is a form of economic or social gain that operates at the intersection of
deception (having others think what you want them to think) and manipulation (having
others do what you want them to do). Scams, or confidence schemes, are sophisticated
forms of fraud that exploit foibles of the human psyche, such as greed, vanity, or naïveté.
Fraud is a major criminal problem on the internet. According to the United States Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), internet fraud is the single most commonly reported
internet crime in the US, with over 100,000 complaints each year.110 In addition to
personal anonymity and physical distance, the predominance of linguistic communication
online makes the internet an ideal venue for deception. Lies are generally more difficult
to detect in computer-mediated encounters than in face-to-face ones, mainly because the
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chief indicators of interpersonal deception — body language, facial expression, vocal
inflection, and conversational pauses — are absent in text-based, online interactions.111
Regulations typically safeguard merchants against fraud. There two major forms
of regulation that concern us here. There are economic regulations, or the formal legal
mechanisms by which institutions (including state institutions) intervene in trade relations
— the Federal Trade Commission, small claims courts, consumer protection agencies,
anti-trust laws, and so forth. In the sphere of exchange, the contract is the foundational
form of economic regulation, and the court system is the central enforcing authority.112
For instance, if a seller violates the terms of a contract, a buyer may seek institutional
recourse through legal arbitration in order to enforce the contract's terms.113 As Kojin
Karatani argues, economic regulations by the state help minimize the conflictual
dimension of capitalist market exchange.114 There are also social regulations, or informal
standards of appropriate conduct that indirectly mediate exchange relations — notions of
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reputation, fidelity, decency, character, and good faith. In the sphere of exchange, status
codes are a common form of social regulation, and the community is a central enforcing
authority.115 Michael Aglietta notes that social regulations are particularly important in
the context of contemporary market exchange, where traders meet one another as abstract
actors rather than as community members.116 Economic and social regulations both rely
the known identities of actors, who may be bear the consequences of contract violations
and status injuries.
On the internet, there are a variety of mechanisms designed to control user
behavior and stabilize internet exchange.117 One of these mechanisms is the protocol, an
infrastructural rule of engagement that sets the groundwork for computational
operations.118 For example, payment protocols determine whether or not a user has
entered valid financial information or placed money in a website escrow. As basic rules
of computational engagement, protocols are grounded in programmed systems, and,
though they may be overseen by humans, they are largely automated.119 By contrast,
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regulations are grounded in jurisdictive institutions, such as courts and communities,
which can legitimately control human behavior through coercive measures, such as
contract violations and status injuries. Regulations are superstructural operations that rely
on judicious human arbitrations, while protocols are infrastructural operations that rely on
authenticating automated mechanisms.
Some studies of electronic commerce frame protocols as effective replacements
for regulations. These studies operate under the cyberlibertarian assumption that internet
exchange is fundamentally cooperative and that internet platforms are basically selfregulating — with the caveat that automated protocols lay the foundation for selfregulation. The idea that commerce can be fully automated, and thereby transcend the
vagaries of contract and state, is particularly evident in discussions of reputational
protocols. For instance, Eric Goldman argues that reputational protocols, or online
feedback systems, are effective replacements for market regulations.120 For Goldman,
reputational protocols ensure cooperation in online markets by exposing misbehaving
merchants through negative reviews. These protocols are "secondary invisible hands"121
that require no regulatory authorities, just as Adam Smith's invisible hand of price
determination requires no central institution to appraise the value of goods.122 Goldman
anticipates an objection to his argument: what if those feedback systems are themselves
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unreliable, as when restaurant owners review their own businesses on Yelp123 or when
Amazon sellers use fake accounts to post feedback on their own wares124? Goldman
counters: to determine if reputation systems are reliable, users can furnish second-order
reputations systems that rate the quality of each feedback system. Goldman refers to this
meta-reputation system as the "tertiary invisible hand"125, a reputation system that
determines the reputation of another reputation system. For Goldman, the fraudulent
elements of exchange can always be mediated by a supplementary cooperative tool, and
the regulatory lacunae of internet platforms can always be replaced with automated
protocols.
Let's now turn to the internet markets under consideration. We'll begin with a
radically automated market (Silk Road), move onto a widely automated market (eBay),
and conclude with a minimally automated market (Craigslist).

Honor Among Thieves
Exchange relations on Silk Road were the most fraudulent and aggressive among
the internet markets under consideration, and they contradicted Ulbricht's cyberlibertarian
presentation of the platform as a principled libertarian sphere. As a free market, Silk
Road relied on a series of protocols in place of regulations. In place of status codes,
vendor pages featured a rating protocol through which buyers could assess the seller's
customer service, delivery time, and quality of purchased goods. In place of contracts,
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transactions occurred through a payment protocol: when purchasing a product, buyers
placed their bitcoin in a site-supported escrow, which released the currency to the vendor
once the buyer confirmed receipt of the contraband. The escrow protocol also furnished
profits for the site executive, Ross William Ulbricht, who collected a commission from
each transaction, ranging from 10 to 20% of the sale price. In place of identities,
merchants used profile protocols. To create an account, users had to provide their bitcoin
wallet information and generate a unique username. Purchasing contraband on the site
also required buyers to provide a delivery address. Buyers alternately provided their own
home address, a postal office box, or a working mailbox at a nearby unoccupied home.
Anonymity distinguished Silk Road from the traditional black market, where face-to-face
interactions generally give rise to the status codes that the platform sought to automate.
126

Fraud, deception, manipulation, and coercion were significant problems on Silk
Road. In those cases, users pursued their economic self-interest by manipulating platform
protocols designed to replace regulations. In white-washing scams, vendors exploited the
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the site without major consequence. During rating extortion schemes, vendors
manipulated the rating protocol and the profile protocol, leveraging customer information
and the specter of state power in order to boost their platform reputation and on-site sales.
Ulbricht himself was subject to extortion through the payment protocol, as blackmailers
demanded that he send website commission their way, lest they expose him to state
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power. Ulbricht ultimately turned to brute force to counter these protocol exploits,
enacting the very violence that the site was designed to obviate.
Vendor scams on Silk Road occurred through the manipulation of payment,
rating, and profile protocols. The most prevalent scam on the site was known as
whitewashing: a vendor developed a high rating, accepted multiple payments in exchange
for contraband, persuaded buyers to immediately verify their transactions, collected the
escrow payments released thereby, and then closed her vendor account without sending
the purchased products. Ulbricht's records and correspondences, gleaned from his federal
trial, paint a picture of a digital black market beset by scams.127 Less than a year after
launching the site, Ulbricht noted to a friend that he was banning between one and three
vendors per week for engaging in whitewashing scams.128 In January 2013, Ulbricht
banned a vendor for "scamming many buyers with fake products"129, after which the
vendor returned to the site under a different username. As Ulbricht explained in his
business log, "He goes in stealth and then comes back and repeats."130 In April, a Silk
Road vendor developed a "quickbuy" program that lured new buyers with product
markdowns, only to disappear after accepting payments.131
The site's discussion board was filled with accounts of these whitewashing scams,
as well as strategies to avoid them. After ordering three thousand dollars worth of
narcotics, a buyer was stonewalled by her vendor: "Now he will not answer my emails. I
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called his phone and he denied knowing who I was, even though I know his voice from
having spoken to him over the phone before." A discussion board poster noted that others
had complained about the same vendor, who "clearly built up his reputation and trust as a
vendor with small and medium sized orders" before "scamming people on his way out
with some big orders". One user maintained a list of Silk Road scammers on the
discussion board, and nearly sixty vendors were listed by the time the site was shut down.
Part of the problem of identifying scammers was the ease with which they could make
new accounts. After a reputable vendor, under the username tony76, executed the most
lucrative white-washing scam in the history of the site, users tried to identify his new
account through textual cross-analysis of his product advertisements. As one user noted,
"It's just so hard to punish scammers when everything is anonymous." One bitter user
complained that Silk Road was "nothing but scamming and hacking, disappearing
vendors and disappearing [bitcoin]". Another agreed, writing, "Out of the ~10 purchases I
have made, I have only NOT been ripped off on 1 order. Fuck [Silk Road]. Last time I
get ripped off."
The collection of buyer addresses for blackmailing purposes was quite common
among Silk Road vendors. Here, sellers exploited the rating protocol and the profile
protocol to leverage customer information and boost their platform reputation. Ulbricht's
correspondences reveal concerns over the practices of rating extortion. One user wrote
privately to Ulbricht in December 2011, warning him that a major vendor, Paperchasing,
was regularly extorting buyers for high vendor ratings: "Paperchasing is not only
blackmailing folks into 5/5's or face his wrath, he's also keeping addresses — or as he
says, he has a 'good memory' for them — so in spite of his 1000+ orders if someone
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who's [sic] crossed his little feedback fetish tries to order under another name, he can
'remember' their addy [sic] from before."132 During his testimony in United States v.
Ulbricht, a Silk Road vendor by the name of Mr. Duch confessed to similar practices.
Responding to questions from the prosecution, Mr. Duch explained:
Q: What records did you keep?
A: Essentially, I created a spreadsheet that tracked all the business that I
conducted, all the drugs that I sold on Silk Road.
Q: Did you keep your customers' addresses?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: You weren't supposed to do that under Silk Road's rules, right?
A: No, I wasn't.133
Mr. Duch even forced buyers to grant him high ratings as a condition of sale. As he
explained on his vendor page, "YOU MAY NOT ORDER unless you agree to rate 5 out
of 5 no matter what happens, with the product, the packaging, delays or anything else!"134
In a private conversation, Ulbricht referred to this kind of forced feedback as among the
site's "major issues", along with scams and fake products.135
On the site's discussion board, many users complained about being subjected to
rating extortion. When a buyer left a vendor a negative review in March 2013, the vendor
demanded a revision to the feedback, threatening, "I'll hand over your info to the cops...
I've got your address, your purchasing stats, a list of what your ordered from me." One
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discussion board poster noted, "Most vendors on here are stupid enough to keep a list of
addresses in a text document for blackmail purposes later." Another responded cheekily
to this claim, "Hey now... not always a text document. Some of them use an Excel
spreadsheet." When a buyer complained that forcing 5/5 ratings seemed "to defeat the
purpose of the review system", another responded, "It shouldn't be the norm, but it is."
The problem of address blackmail and feedback extortion lead some buyers to open a
P.O. box with false identifying information. This relieved their concern "about being
blackmailed" if they "worked with the wrong person". After a vendor offered free
samples of narcotics on the discussion board "to establish credibility", a buyer asked,
"How do we know you're not LE [law enforcement] or someone who is harvesting
addresses in order to blackmail people at a later date?" Similarly, in August 2013, a few
weeks before the site closed down, a discussion board poster asked, "What on EARTH is
there to prevent a vendor from turning into a blackmailer?"
Ulbricht himself was subject to extortion on numerous occasions, as blackmailers
exploited the payment protocol and the abeyant presence of state power to demand that
platform commission come their way. The executive kept track of these extortion
schemes in his personal records. In November 2012, he received a message from an
anonymous Silk Road user, who threatened to attack the site through a flaw in its
infrastructure: "I was able to exploit a vulnerability in one of the pages on silk road in a
way that will cause a DOS [denial-of-service] attack and SQLI [structured query
language injection] attack. Send 5k to [encrypted address] if you are satisfied with
WHAT I am doing. Send 15k to the same address to know HOW I am doing it."136
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Ulbricht apparently yielded and sent the ransom to prevent a shutdown. In May, Ulbricht
paid a steeper price to stop a similar attack, writing in his business log, "attacker agreed
to stop if I give him the first $100k of revenue and $50k per week thereafter."137 In
addition to the functionality of the site and its concomitant profitability, Ulbricht's
personal identity became an object of leverage during several extortion schemes. Shortly
before the attack in May, Ulbricht noted in his business log, "being blackmailed again.
someone says they have my ID, but hasn't proven it".138 By the next day, Ulbricht had
concluded that the blackmailer was a fraud: "guy blackmailing saying he has my id is
bogus".139
Ulbricht went to violent lengths to counter these threats and maintain his assets,
evading protocols altogether and employing the very coercion that the site was designed
to obviate. Ulbricht kept track of his revenge plans in his personal records. When a
vendor threatened to release thousands of buyer addresses in March 2013, Ulbricht hired
a hit man to identify, locate, and murder him.140 The hit man claimed to be associated
with The Hells Angels Motorcycle Club, as Ulbricht noted in his business log.141 Yet, as
the federal court case revealed, the hit man was actually a con artist — one who
ultimately cheated Ulbricht out of three hundred thousand dollars for a hit that never
transpired.142 A month later, Ulbricht hired the same hit man to execute a Silk Road
vendor who, in classic whitewashing style, "[made] selling accounts, [sold] for a while,
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and then [pulled] a big scam and just [kept] creating new accounts after he [did] his
scams".143 The hit man encouraged Ulbricht to have him execute not only the scamming
vendor but also his three associates, who had "probably ripped off millions of $ at this
point".144 Ulbricht responded quite casually to the suggested four-person hit: "hmm... ok,
I'll defer to your better judgment and hope we can recover some assets from them."145
The prosecution highlighted this occurrence in arguing "Ulbricht was just as willing as a
traditional kingpin to use intimidation and violence in furtherance of his criminal
enterprise."146 Indeed.
All of these forms of economic conflict relied on the manipulation of platform
protocols. White-washing vendors exploited the rating protocol to develop a positive
reputation; the payment protocol to receive an early payment; and the profile protocol to
leave the site without major consequence. These protocols respectively failed to replace
status codes, economic contracts, and stable identities — the conventional basics of social
and economic regulations. In cases of rating extortion, vendors manipulated the rating
protocol and the profile protocol, leveraging the delivery details of buyer profiles and the
abeyant presence of state power to artificially inflate their reputation. This kind an
artificial inflation could only occur because platform reputations were formalized and
automated, in contrast to an interpersonal community, where status is informal and
interpersonal. Further, the executive extortion of Ulbricht occurred through the
exploitation of the payment protocol and the specter of state power, as blackmailers
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threatened to shut down the site and expose Ulbricht to federal authorities, in order
collect platform revenue that flowed through the commission system. The state was
present in abeyance during rating extortion and executive extortion schemes, as the threat
of exposure to state power served as strategic leverage for blackmailers. At the same
time, the state was absent when Ulbricht needed it the most — as an institution to protect
his property rights over the platform. Without property rights, or even status claims,
Ulbricht had to rely on brute force to protect his ownership of the site, ultimately evading
protocols altogether and enacting physical violence.

The Perfect Store
Compared to Silk Road, exchange relations on eBay are far less fraudulent and
deceptive, but they stand in opposition to the platform's cyberlibertarian self-presentation
as a cooperative consumer arcade. As a free market, eBay relies on a series of protocols
in place of regulations. In place of status codes, the platform features a rating protocol
through which trading partners can assess their mutual experiences in conducting
commerce. After winning an auction for a product, buyers pay vendors through PayPal, a
payment protocol designed to replace contracts and commercial intermediaries. eBay
collects a commission on each transaction, ranging from ten to twenty percent of the
selling price, and charges a fee for vendors to post goods. In place of court arbitration, the
site maintains a dispute resolution center to resolve contested transactions, including
claims of fraud. The dispute resolution center is a largely automated economic protocol
that determines appropriate compensation through prescribed rules and algorithms.
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Finally, in place of identities, merchants use profile protocols, which require only a
working email address and, in the case of vendor profiles, a valid credit card number.
The dispute protocol is key to fraudulent exchange on the site, and its intricacies
are worth noting. eBay is a publicly traded company with a fiduciary responsibility to to
its investors.147 Because eBay collects a commission on each transaction, and because the
platform hosts far more products than customers, the company is also committed to
widespread buyer satisfaction. To assuage buyer concerns about internet fraud, eBay
maintains a Money Back Guarantee policy, which ensures that buyers will be refunded if
they are unsatisfied with their purchase.148 Consequently, eBay's dispute resolution center
is decidedly biased in favor of the customer. When buyer and seller differ in their
accounts of an exchange, the dispute resolution center overwhelmingly favors the buyer's
account of events. Significantly, when a contested transaction concludes in the buyer's
favor, eBay automatically refunds the buyer by charging the vendor's credit card or
Paypal account (recall that vendor profiles require a credit card number). When this
happens, eBay also prevents the buyer and the seller from giving each other ratings, lest
harsh words scare the former away. In this respect, the company's commitment to the
maintenance of a customer base undermines the neutrality of its dispute resolution center.
Hence, the dispute resolution protocol is far removed from the independent adjudication
of contract disputes found in institutional court systems.
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eBay plays host to fraud, deception, manipulation, and coercion. In such instance,
users pursue their economic self-interest through the manipulation of platform protocols.
During delivery scams and fake object scams, deceptive users exploit the dispute
resolution protocol, the payment protocol, and the profile protocol to obtain money or
objects without a reciprocal exchange of value and without significant consequence.
Intimidation tactics are likewise designed to occasion a one-way value transfer through
the manipulation of the dispute resolution protocol. State structures are less of a presence
on eBay than on Silk Road, furnishing the postal system through which auction items are
delivered without serving as an actual commercial intermediary. However, corporate
structures are more of a presence on eBay than on Silk Road, insofar as the platform's
financial organization informs the biases of the dispute resolution protocol — biases that
are exploited during fraudulent schemes. In all of these cases, eBay is far from selfregulating; and digital protocols not only fail to replace regulations but contribute to the
economic conflict that regulations are designed to mediate.
Two scams are particularly common on eBay, and both rely on the manipulation
of the dispute resolution protocol and the payment protocol. In the delivery scam, a buyer
purchases a product from a vendor, claims that the received product is different from the
purchased one, demands a refund through eBay's dispute resolution center, and then
returns a different product entirely. This scam is effective, because there is no platform
intermediary who determines the accuracy of product description during exchange, and
because the dispute resolution center can be expected to grant buyer refunds. On the
discussion board, users relate their own experiences with delivery scams. Sellers, in
particular, bear the economic brunt of these fraudulent designs. After a seller auctioned
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off a pack of print cartridges in 2015, the buyer claimed that the cartridges had a terrible
smell and demanded a refund. The dispute resolution center sided with the buyer,
removed the initial payment from the seller's PayPal account, and instructed the buyer to
return the items. When the seller opened the returned box, inside was one print cartridge
— from a entirely different printer. Later that year, a new user sold his collection of
South Park DVDs, which the buyer claimed were "illegally duplicated copies... not at all
authentic or officially licensed". When the seller received the returned box, it was filled
with illegal duplicated copies of the South Park DVDs. The eBay subreddit also features
accounts of delivery scams. As related in the peripheral discussion board, a user sold a
used laptop with a Windows 7 Enterprise operating system. After the buyer claimed the
product was damaged, eBay issued a refund upon return of the item. When the seller
received the laptop, the operating system "was erased, along with all the software".
Another reddit user described a delivery scam that occurred in the midst of Bitcoin's 2017
price inflation: the seller sold a premium graphics card, which a buyer purchased, utilized
to mine cryptocurrency for a month, and then returned as defective. eBay granted the
return under the Money Back Guarantee and removed the original payment from the
account of the seller, who was left with a burnt-out graphics card and no compensation.
Still, eBay's discussion board featured most accounts of high-stakes delivery
scams. In one expensive case, a vendor auctioned off a $11,500 Rolex watch, packed and
shipped the product, and then received a message from the buyer claiming that the box
was empty. eBay's dispute resolution center ultimately ruled in favor of the buyer,
leaving the vendor without the watch and without the initial payment. As the incensed
vendor explained on the discussion board, "Bottom line is it is incredibly easy to steal
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tens of thousands of dollars from sellers on eBay. All you have to say it that it was an
empty box." Other vendors reported similar experiences in selling expensive platinum
rings, video game consoles, sets of dishes, vintage paper currency, and hardware tools.
Regular eBay users recognized the hazards of selling expensive goods on the platform.
One seller explained the ease with which buyers could defraud sellers, noting the
dysfunctional nature of the platform's feedback system:
Let's say you have a busted toaster. You can go on eBay and buy the same model,
brand new, and when the item arrives, you can open a case saying that the item
was defective and return your old broken toaster, and now the seller has to refund
your money PLUS shipping and give you a new toaster, FREE. No investigation,
no nothing. Seller policies mean nothing as long as the buyer rips you off within
30 days. The seller can't even leave negative feedback. This is a license to steal. It
has become so unethical, that I am now actively selling on Reverb.
Delivery scams are easy enough to execute and prevalent enough to send this merchant to
another exchange platform entirely.
On the other side of the exchange is the fake object scam, which exploits the
dispute resolution protocol, the payment protocol, and the profile protocol. In this
scheme, a vendor auctions off a product, purposefully sends the wrong object, and then
shuts down her account before the product arrives. This is similar to the whitewashing
scam on Silk Road, with one important exception: eBay's PayPal system issues a
payment to the vendor upon purchase agreement, rather than upon product delivery.
Consequently, vendors need not pressure buyers to verify the transaction in order to
receive an uncompensated payment. By the time the buyer receives the fake product, the
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vendor has left the platform with an uncompensated payment, and the burden of equitable
reimbursement falls on the platform itself. The discussion board features many accounts
of fraudulent exchange that are alternately comical and disturbing. One buyer purchased
a Macintosh computer and received "a certified letter from Jesus" instead. Another user
bitterly recalled receiving "a broken item, a rock, a phonebook" in place of purchased
products over the years. Several buyers complained about receiving a photograph of the
object that they had purchased, rather than the object itself. A new user was relieved to
receive a flash drive in good condition, only to realize that the write-only technology
couldn't retrieve the data it had stored. One user purchased two bottles of Bio-Oil, a highend skincare product. The product had a strange smell, so the user took the bottle to her
university's chemistry lab, where she discovered that the product "contained a chemical
dye that could be damaging to the skin". Bemoaning the "decline" of eBay, another user
claimed that "some eighty percent" of the products she had purchased on the platform in
recent years were "cheap replicas, wrong colour, damaged, spoilt, and altogether nothing
to do with the description".
Counterfeit items are commonly sent to defrauded buyers during fake object
scams. On the discussion board, many user complain about receiving pieces of jewelry or
technical equipment that are of exceptionally low quality. One user purchased a David
Yurman ring and received a compelling counterfeit. By the time she spoke with
salespeople at the David Yurman store, the vendor had disappeared from the platform.
Another complained about ordering a gold ring with a gemstone, having realized the
gemstone was artificial and the gold was thinly plated. Indeed, it was common wisdom
on the discussion boards that jewelry was a risky purchase on the site, given the high
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market price and relative ease of counterfeit. As already noted, Tiffany & Co. was willing
to sue eBay over the presence of knock-offs on the site. Permanently locked smart phones
are also common in fake object scams, revealing a link between the underground
economy of stolen goods and the online economy of auction sales. In those cases,
vendors sell dozens of phones at below-market prices and then leave the platform before
buyers realize they have been defrauded.
In certain instances, buyers harass, intimidate, and threaten sellers into sending
them additional products or providing them full refunds, exploiting the dispute resolution
protocol and leveraging the rating protocol. Regular eBay users refer to this as the bully
tactic: order a product, complain about its quality, and then threaten to demand a refund
through the dispute resolution protocol, unless the seller sends a supplementary gift. The
problem of intimidation is widely deliberated on the discussion board. After auctioning
off a flannel shirt, one seller received a threatening message from a buyer, who claimed
the fabric was not real flannel and threatened to demand a complete refund unless the
seller sent a gift to compensate. "What can I do?" the distraught seller asked on the
discussion board. "I feel like I'm being held hostage." The seller ultimately sent an
additional shirt in order to placate the buyer and avoid a full refund. A few days later, a
user replied to the original post, "Your buyer is using the bully tactic to get a freebie. It
usually works on small sellers with good accounts and little experience. They are usually
so afraid of getting a dispute that they will give the complainer a freebie to make the
problem go away." Abusive language is common during these intimidation schemes. One
seller gave his personal phone number to a buyer, only to be left with a hateful message
on his answering machine, in which he was called "a f---ing Arab" for allegedly sending
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a different product than the one described. Another seller was threatened "with prayers
for divine intervention that would result in [her] complete and utter destruction. The
words 'fire and brimstone' were actually mentioned." She was not the only seller to
receive death threats. One woman received a message from a suspicious buyer with
whom she refused to trade, reading, "You'll pay for this, for ignoring and turning away
my offers. It won't be long." A longtime seller even left the platform when the "profanity,
hate speech, and threats" had become intolerable.
On eBay, economic conflict occurs through the exploitation of digital protocols.
In delivery scams, deceptive users manipulate the dispute resolution protocol and the
payment protocol in order to acquire goods without a reciprocal payment. Automated,
biased, and predictable, these protocols are easy to jockey, unlike conventional economic
regulations, which are grounded in contracts and courts. Fake object scams exploit the
payment protocol and the profile protocol, as vendors disappear from the platform
without economic consequence (contract violation) or social consequence (status injury).
Intimidation tactics also leverage the dispute resolution protocol to occasion a one-way
value transfer, combining digital tactics of protocol exploit with confidence-scheme
tactics of interpersonal pressure. The state is in the background of these economic
conflicts, delivering objects through a postal system without serving as a formal
regulatory intermediary. By contrast, eBay's corporate structure is in the foreground of
these scams, as the publicly traded company orients its protocols to maintain a loyal
customer base and an positive balance sheet. Like the black market on Silk Road, the
auction market on eBay market is in no state of equilibrium. Digital protocols are poor
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proxies for conventional regulations, providing the raw material with which fraudulent
schemes are built.

The Social Conceit
Exchange relations on Craigslist are far less fraudulent and deceptive than those
on Silk Road and eBay. Still, the presence of fraud and deception on the local market
contradicts the platform's cyberlibertarian self-presentation as a casual sphere of
cooperative trade. As a free market, Craigslist relies on a series of protocols in place of
regulations. Site advertisements are published with a flag protocol, through which users
may report posts that appear suspicious.149 Advertisements are removed when they accrue
a certain number of flags, although that number is not publicly known. Craigslist utilizes
an auto-post protocol that prevents the posting of multiple identical advertisements.150
Users who wish to post advertisement are required to complete a profile protocol. This
consists of an email verification process, after which Craigslist furnishes a temporary
email account through which users can communicate with one another. The platform also
maintains a site manual for avoiding scams, which contains tactics for recognizing
deception, law enforcement resources, and examples of fraudulent messages. 151 Craigslist
users meet in person to conduct commerce, at which point objects and money are
exchange.
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Problems of fraud, deception, manipulation, and coercion emerge on Craigslist. In
such cases, users pursue their economic self-interest through the manipulation of platform
protocols. In advanced fee scams, deceptive actors exploit the profile protocol and
outmaneuver the auto-post protocol, all while manipulating and coercing the victims of
their confidence schemes. These scams also rely on payment technologies and financial
institutions that exist outside of the platform, such as wire transfer payments through
Western Union. However, the Craigslist interpersonal encounter serves as a failsafe
against fraudulent exchange and deceptive communication. In face-to-face commerce,
false claims are difficult to uphold, and users cannot rely on platform protocols to defraud
and deceive one another. Still, Craigslist is far from self-regulating, and the exchange
process is in no state of equilibrium. Fraud occurs through the manipulation of digital
protocols, but, once users step outside of those protocols, the likelihood of deception
decreases.
The most common form of fraud on Craigslist is the advanced fee scam — a
confidence scheme designed to solicit payment without a reciprocal exchange of goods.
These are often variations on the now-classic Nigerian 419 email scam: an enthusiastic
seller with an elaborate backstory requires immediate payment before sending a valuable
or underpriced object. Because these scammers post unique advertisements, rather than a
barrage of identical messages, they are able to outmaneuver the auto-post protocol on
Craigslist. Once scammers have gained the attention and trust of their victims, they
request up-front payment through wire transfer and then disappear without sending the
promised good. Here, deceptive actors rely on external financial institutions to enact a
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one-way value transfer, and they exploit the profile protocol to leave the platform without
consequence.
On the Craigslist discussion board, users relate their various encounters with
advanced fee scams, as fraudulent actors aim to convince users to wire money in
exchange for a variety of goods and services: housing rentals, real estate, cars, bicycles,
sex, firearms, and job opportunities. One San Francisco user received a fairly typical
scam email while looking for a housing rental in 2011. The email read, in part,
I am the owner of the place you want to rent and also want you to know that it
was due to my transfer that makes me and my husband to leave the house and also
want to give it out for rent and looking for a responsible person that can take very
good care of it , as we are not after the money for the rent but to be clean at all
time and the person that will rent it have to take absolute good care of it as if it
were its own. I and my Husband came over to Africa for a missionary work, so i
[sic] hope you will promise us to take very good care of the house. So get back to
me on how you could take care of our house or perhaps experience you have in
renting home. Hope you are okay with the price of US$1,300 (1 months first
payment) with internet,gas,water,micro wave,hydro,heat laundry facilities, air
condition and so on. I am looking forward hearing from you ASAP so that we can
proceed .feel free to fill in the rent application form below so we can proceed
asap.
This message combines a variety of common scam tactics: an attractive object (the cheap
rental), an exceptional circumstance (the owner is out of the country and not interested in
profits), a sympathetic figure (the missionary worker couple), and a request for financial
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information (the rent application). As a paradigmatic confidence scheme, this email plays
on the vices of the human psyche — opportunistic greed for a cheap rental and emotional
benevolence toward a devout couple.
Rare and forbidden items regularly serve as bait during advanced fee scams — a
circumstance noted by many discussion board users, some of whom express anger over
the anarchic state of the local market. For instance, users report suspicious advertisements
for adopted children and nanny jobs, sports memorabilia and antiques, and vintage cars
and motorcycle parts. They also note the presence of forbidden items, which are formally
banned in the platform's terms of use, and which sometimes appear to be fraudulent
offers. One Vancouver user reported advertisements for "hookers, drugs, guns, other
prohibited weapons, sperm, pet breeding ads, overpriced pets... fireworks, tobacco,
alcohol, bootleggers, fake ID, counterfeit goods, just to name a few". Beyond rare and
forbidden items, Craigslist users on the discussion board widely recognize the presence
of advanced fee scams on the platform, variously referring to the site as "a cesspool of
deceit and thievery", "a tragedy of the commons", "a sewer of overposting and scam ads",
"a nest for vipers", and "a free-for-all flea market for the mindless and criminal elements
of the internet".
Scams are far less common when Craigslist users meet in person. The house of
cards of interpersonal deception often collapses when computer-mediated communication
gives way to material encounters. Several discussion board threads center on occasions
when scammers failed to their enact fraudulent schemes. Users who are angered by
scammers take particular pleasure in hearing stories of their botched plans. When a DC
woman posted a missed connection in 2011, she was thrilled when the man responded.

60
She was less thrilled when she met him in person: he was not the handsome man she had
fleetingly encountered, but he did offer her a job smuggling drugs into the country. In
2012, a Manhattanite traveled to Brooklyn to purchase an ergonomic office chair, which
promptly collapsed upon use. The seller then accused the prospective buyer of breaking
the chair and demanded immediate payment. True to form, the Manhattanite told the
seller "to go fuck himself". A Florida man purchased an engine for his 240SX in 2013,
only to discover that the a cylinder rod bear was "blown to oblivion" and the engine was
essentially "a giant paper weight". A Tokyo user met with a seller to purchase a
refrigerator and washer, described as "in excellent condition". The transaction did not
transpire: the refrigerator was filled with worms, "yes, small red worms", and the washer
secreted "long, stinky, black liquid". In the next chapter, we'll consider how the state
makes an appearance during these interpersonal encounters. For now, let's note that faceto-face exchange occurs outside of platform protocols — those mechanisms of fraud and
deception in the digital free market.
On Craigslist, fraud, deception, manipulation, and coercion occur through the
exploitation of platform protocols. In advanced fee scams, users exploit the profile
protocol to defraud and deceive their victims without economic and social consequence;
they evade the auto-post protocol by posting singular advertisements; and they relay
financial institutions and wire technologies, external to the platform, in order to collect
payment at a distance. This dance of exploit, evasion, and externalization would be
unthinkable in context of economic contracts, status codes, and known identities. Unlike
Silk Road and eBay, Craigslist commerce features an interpersonal encounter. When
digital protocols give way to face-to-face agreements, the likelihood of fraud and
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deception generally decreases. This underlines, through contrast, the importance of
protocols to fraudulent behavior in the digital free market, without which deception is a
matter of rhetorical skill rather than automated exploit. Host to a wide spectrum of
exchange relations, Craigslist is not the self-regulating platform imagined by
cyberlibertarianism, and its digital protocols end up being the vulnerable points of its
electronic commerce system.

Invisible Hand All The Way Down
As venues of fraud, deception, manipulation, and coercion, internet markets are
far from self-regulating centers of economic activity. They embody the laissez faire
principles celebrated by cyberlibertarianism, yet they deliver entirely different results
than those predicted by the digital ideology. Fraud undermines the narrative of economic
equilibrium, as does the presence of state, commercial, and financial institutions in
exchange. On internet markets, fraud and deception occur through the manipulation of
platform protocols designed to replace regulations. Not only are automated protocols
poor proxies for conventional regulations; but protocols end up furnishing the very forms
of economic conflict that regulations are supposed to mitigate. In short, protocols can
backfire. This state of affairs has broader consequences for understanding
cyberlibertarianism, electronic commerce, and digital free markets.
Cyberlibertarianism and electronic reputation studies share a vision of internet
exchange as fundamentally cooperative. The dream of a self-regulating internet finds a
natural counterpart in the dream of a fully automated interet market. Lovely are these
dreams, in which the cumbersome realities of contract, court, status, and community give
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way to the streamlined protocols of payment, dispute, rating, and profile. The cooperative
bias of these paradigms underwrites a faith in automated mechanisms, despite their
significant flaws, and an animosity toward institutional bodies, despite their oblique
appearances. Indeed, if internet exchange is integrally cooperative, and if internet
platforms are basically self-regulating, then internet exchange platforms may be
automated and let loose without regulatory oversight or institutional interference. Eric
Goldman's insistence on an invisible hand "all the way down" — according to which the
conflictual dimension of exchange can always be alleviated by a supplementary rating
protocol — evinces an attachment to cooperation as a foundational principle of the digital
market. This account, in particular, overlooks the ways that rating protocols can become
mechanisms of user extortion, underwriting economic conflict rather than mitigating it.
The reproduction of cyberlibertarian assumptions in this scholarly account attests the
appeal of the digital ideology in broad conversations surrounding technology. It is not
only motivated actors who yearn to see internet exchange as basically self-regulating; it is
also scholarly observers.
Internet market companies also fail to account for the role of conflict in electronic
commerce. In casting their platforms as self-regulating, Craigslist, eBay, and Silk Road
underplay the reality of regulatory breakdown in the digital free market, as well as the
vulnerability of the digital protocols at the heart of their electronic systems. Insofar as
they position themselves as neutral internet venues (Gillespie) marked by peer-to-peer
agreement (Scholz) and voluntary participation (van Dijk and Nieborg), these internet
market companies side-step debates over platform accountability, even as they are
regularly accountable to state and commercial institutions. The paradoxes of
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cyberlibertarianism are on display here. Internet market companies insist on freedom
from state regulations, yet they cooperate with state directives; and they insist on a free
digital market in perpetual equilibrium, yet they install protocols to prevent instability.
They want to have their regulatory cake and eat it too.
As sites of economic conflict, Craigslist, eBay, and Silk Road demonstrate that
the internet does not obviate critiques of the free market but makes those critiques all the
more poignant. As Kojin Karatani and Michael Aglietta argue, economic and social
regulations stabilize competitive capitalist exchange. Internet markets dramatize these
arguments by playing host to forms of economic conflict in the conspicuous absence of
regulations. Part of this drama is the absence of stable identities on internet markets —
the kind of identities that are necessary for conventional regulations to be effective.
Internet markets show us what happens when anonymous and self-interested actors
engage in unregulated electronic commerce. They are objectified counterproofs to the
cyberlibertarian notion that a less regulated internet is a better internet. They are also
objectified counterproofs to idea that automation can comprehensively eliminate conflict
in the context of electronic commerce. On internet markets, protocols are designed to
replace regulations, but without the jurisdictional authority that gives regulations their
power. These protocols can hardly be expected to perform the regulatory functions of
courts and communities, which are complex formations that cannot be easily automated
or reduced to an algorithm. In the absence of conventional regulations, and in the
presence of digital protocols designed to replace them, it is scandalously easy to get away
with internet fraud.
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CHAPTER 2
ROADS TO COMMERCE
DEVELOPING SOCIAL CUSTOMS
On internet markets, actors take steps to mitigate concerns of fraud and control
the commercial process. Notably, users develop social customs that rely on website
infrastructure, platform culture, and state institutions. Although internet markets are
supposed to be self-contained, digital trade implicates factors that are external to
electronic commerce. Website infrastructure, platform culture, and state institutions enter
the exchange process in ways contrary to the assumptions of cyberlibertarianism. As
informal commercial practices, social customs help us understand how cooperative
exchange occurs in the digital free market.

Custom and Control
Social customs are loose sets of practices oriented toward a general purpose. They
are one way of controlling the commercial process in the absence of regulations. In "The
Comedy of the Commons", Carol Rose argues that social customs are relatively effective
ways of managing the behavior of actors, without regulations or regulatory institutions.152
In the nineteenth century, Rose notes, thoroughfares and waterways were organized
through customary "rules of the road", which served as "informal techniques" for
managing transportation infrastructure.153 These were voluntary strategies by which
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travelers abided in the absence of regulations, terms of use avant le lettre. Through social
customs, the commercial public "ordered its affairs authoritatively"154 — without a
centralized authority enforcing regulatory controls. Insofar as roads and waterways
underwrote the movement of goods to and from the market, social customs facilitated
economic exchange. And they did so without exclusion or penalty, as travelers of all
stripes were welcome on roads to commerce. One of Rose's central arguments is that the
sphere of commerce benefited from unbounded access to transportation infrastructure,
made possible by social customs. As Rose puts the matter: "The more people who
engage in trade, the greater the opportunities for all to make valuable exchanges; and the
more exchanges, the greater the opportunities for division of labor and the attendant
increase in wealth and productivity that Adam Smith told us about."155 Here, social
customs underwrite economic activity through common access.
Social customs are also a way of controlling internet exchange in the absence of
regulations. Writing from a legal perspective, Trotter Hardy asks how one establishes
rules among internet users who "do not have prior contracts, by-laws, or other
agreements"156. He notes that one possibility for the regulation of online conduct is social
customs. Social customs on the internet parallel historical merchant laws, or lex
mercatoria, which were "sets of customary practices that inured to the benefit of
merchants"157 and governed exchange relations in the Medieval Europe across legal
jurisdictions. Like merchant laws, social customs develop among interested parties
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without "statute or other authoritative pronouncement"158. Hardy furthermore notes that
merchant laws were grounded in merchant courts. These alternative institutions arbitrated
trader disputes, and "their judges were drawn from the ranks of the merchant class itself
on the basis of experience and seniority"159. Similarly, Hardy argues, internet customs are
grounded in discussion groups, email, and other spheres of free association online. For
Hardy, these are "informal court systems,"160 where interested parties may resolve
disputes through customary rules in a common language. Drawing on Hardy's work,
David R. Johnson and David G. Post point to social customs on the internet as evidence
of the "self-regulatory efforts of cyberspace participants".161 Here, social customs are
ways of controlling internet exchange, enacted by users themselves.
Some see internet exchange as comprehensively economic, even in the presence
social customs. In her influential theory of free labor, Tiziana Terranova argues that
internet exchange is properly economic, because the collective labor of internet users is
central to the maintenance of digital technology.162 For instance, social media users "keep
a site alive through their labor, the cumulative hours of accessing the site (thus generating
advertising), writing messages, participating in conversations, and sometimes making the
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jump to collaborators"163. Unlike thinkers in the anarchist tradition,164 she argues that the
social and communal quality of internet exchange is not so discrete from its economic
and capitalist quality. Technology companies, for example, regularly capitalize on the
collective labor of the open source software community, which can debug and improve
its products without monetary compensation. For Terranova, the open source software
community demonstrates "the overreliance of the digital economy as such on free labor,
both in the sense of not financially rewarded and freely given"165. The open source
software community may have an anarchist sensibility, but its products are central to the
business plans of privately owned technology firms. In this respect, Terranova sees social
exchange on the internet as internal to the capitalist economy, insofar as social exchange
is consistently monetized by platforms. For Terranova, internet exchange is
comprehensively economic, because "it is technically impossible to separate neatly the
digital economy of the Net from the larger network economy of late capitalism"166. In this
context, where Eric Goldman sees an invisible hand "all the way down", Terranova sees
economic relations "all the way down".

Exchange Customs
On internet markets, users mitigate concerns of fraud and control the commercial
process by developing social customs that rely on website infrastructure, platform
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culture, and state institutions. On Silk Road, users formulated social customs related to
vendor profiles, discussion boards, libertarian cultures, outlaw sensibilities, and state
surveillance mechanisms. eBay users develop sets of social customs that depend on
message functionalities, auction pages, dispute resolution centers, and auction cultures.
On Craigslist, email relays, local cultures, and local law enforcement bodies inform the
development of social customs. This means that internet markets are not the selfcontained islands of cyberlibertarianism, nor the purely economic realms of free labor.
Rather, digital exchange involves factors — infrastructural, cultural, and institutional —
that are formally external to the internet economy. The road to commerce is long and
winding.

Thick As Thieves
To mitigate concerns of fraud and control the commercial process, Silk Road
users developed social customs related to website infrastructure, platform culture, and
state institutions. Users utilized website infrastructure to locate reliable merchants —
searching vendor profiles for timestamps, evaluating trading partners through logistical
conversations, and listing deceptive vendors on the platform discussion board. The
libertarian, drug-enthusiast, and cyberoutlaw culture of Silk Road also influenced the
social customs developed by users, marking longstanding members as trustworthy trading
partners. The abeyant presence of state power Silk Road not only underwrote a culture of
libertarian solidarity; it also informed the customs, developed by merchants, to evade
state detection on the internet on the internet and on the ground. Unlike eBay and
Craigslist, Silk Road as a platform did not respond to these social customs, likely because
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the site was consistently profitable, because its tenure was relatively brief, and because
Ulbricht was evidently occupied with other site-related matters.167 This means that users
were free agents in the free digital market, and their social customs were particularly
important avenues to fair exchange. This also means that Silk Road was not a selfcontained island but an vast archipelago that covered infrastructural, cultural, and
institutional waters.
On the discussion board, Silk Road users formulated a variety of social customs.
Many of these customs concerned the location of honorable vendors, or sellers that would
honor trade agreements and avoid fraudulent behavior. The platform's Buyer Guide
offered few strategies for navigating the world of vendors, only an assurance that the
escrow protocol was designed "to prevent fraud on both the end of the seller and the
buyer".168 Users consequently developed a series of social customs to evaluate vendor
reliability. One custom relied on website infrastructure in the form of the rating protocol,
but not in the way envisioned by cyberlibertarianism or electronic reputation studies.
Users were to identify the length of time for which a potential vendor had been
conducting commerce on the platform. Users could determine the date at which
merchants started selling on the platform, by scrolling through customer ratings and
finding the date of the earliest feedback. As seasoned explained on the discussion board,
these timestamps were valuable proxies of merchant reliability: the longer the history, the
more trustworthy the merchant. This rule of thumb was partially grounded in the
platform's libertarian culture, which cast trade as an inherently egalitarian deed and Silk
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Road as a liberated outlaw economy. The political investment in Silk Road meant that
longstanding members were likely to engage in cooperative commerce on principle, as
acts of cooperation set against a coercive state. For instance, in response to discussion
board questions from a new buyer, a longstanding user advised all merchants to "read the
vendor info page to get a sense of their history" rather than "exclusively trust Silk Road
vendor reviews". Here, social customs reflected the commercial infrastructure of time
stamps and the platform culture of veteran traders. Users took seriously the possibility of
fraud and developed exchange customs that did not rely on good faith agreement or free
market equilibria.
As a consequence of this social custom, experienced vendors constituted a de
facto merchant elite, described by one discussion board users as "an old guard who has
been here since the beginning". These merchants generated social capital on the platform
through an enduring engagement with the dark web marketplace, and this allowed them
to generate economic capital, in turn. Silk Road witnessed the emergence of an informal
vendor hierarchy, of which sellers and buyers took notice. On the discussion board, a new
vendor complained about the difficulty of customer acquisition: "Unless you have a longestablished, respected, prior customer base to vouch for you, buyers just never know".
One buyer felt torn between the desire for new products and the assurances of established
vendors. "As much as I like to try out new vendors and their wares," the buyer explained,
"I'm almost to the point where I say fuck it and deal exclusively with the trusted vendors
I've established a relationship with. The only downside to that is I love to try new things.
Although knowing the transaction will be smooth as silk is a good feeling." Another user
was willing to sacrifice product variety for reliable commerce, exclusively conducting
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exchange with a "tight group of highly trusted vendors" that had been on the platform
since its early days.
Another social custom was to evaluate potential vendors through private
conversations on the website's internal message infrastructure. According to discussion
board posters, trustworthy vendors were generally willing to go into detail about their
products, delivery plans, and commercial standards. One user articulated the metric of
vendor evaluation in question form: did the seller seem willing "do anything they can to
keep the customer happy", or were they "vague, weird, and noncommittal" when asked
questions about their commercial practices? Platform culture played a role in this
evaluation custom. Libertarians took trade seriously and could be expected to elaborate
on their commercial process, and drug enthusiasts took substances seriously and could be
expected to elaborate on their contraband wares. By contrast, fraudulent vendors could be
expected to evade major questions and hard-sell their goods. As one user put it on the
discussion board, deceptive vendors "pressure you into buying asap" by insisting "'I'm
almost out'" of whatever the buyer seeks to purchase. Deceptive vendors would also offer
elaborate stories to justify exchange practices that were forbidden in the platform
guidelines, such as paying vendors outside of platform escrow. One discussion board user
summarized this evaluation custom succinctly: "The more bizarre the story... the more
likely it's bullshit."
These evaluation customs were effectively formalized when one user took
advantage of website infrastructure and posted a list of scamming vendors on the site
discussion board. Merchants could check the list before purchasing from a certain vendor,
effectively crowdsourcing interpersonal vendor assessment. For many users, the list
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represented the community's cooperative response to the problem of internet fraud, an act
of solidarity among cyberoutlaws. In response to the list, one discussion board participant
wrote, "Thanks for the hard work... we as a community need to be aware of the asshats
that are out there." The discussion board thread that hosted the list subsequently served as
a sounding board for evaluation customs. When a discussion board participant speculated
that the vendor 18kt was a scammer, another user responded, "I don't agree that 18kt is a
scammer himself: too much evidence that he is actually proud of this site, and likes being
on the libertarian forefront. He's like an underground hero, and if his site turns into just
another burn joint, it would distress him." In this cultural assessment, the vendor's history
on the platform and his commitment to libertarianism made him a trustworthy seller. By
contrast, suspicious behavior was a potential sign of fraudulent intent. On the same
thread, another user noted that the vendor Professortwak was "behaving strangely.
Logging on but not communicating with outstanding customers". In the spirit of
cooperation, the user added, "I'm sorry to be adding this if unfounded, but there is a
serious lack of communication on the sellers part [and] I don't want to see innocent
buyers for [whom] Finalizing Early is a necessity getting mugged. I will fully revoke all
inflammatory/negative comments if communications from this seller begin again." The
concerned user provided an update on the discussion board thread the next day: "OK, this
vendor has begun to communicate again, he may well have been having some
logistical/data handling issues at the end. Still be wary, but this is not a confirmed
Scammer and thus so his name should not be tarnished. However, as always. Exercise
caution." Two weeks later, the user provided a final appraisal on the discussion board
thread, writing,
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Just to confirm. The Professor came through. He maintained communications,
provided me with a tracking number and even doubled my original order to make
up for the delay. I received my order 7 working days to the uk after he provided
the shipping details. I think he is a genuine good guy, just had some bad luck/
logistical issues at his end, which he is working hard to rectify. I hereby revoke
any negative comments previously posted.
Evident in this elaborate appraisal is a principled respect for commerce that attended Silk
Road's libertarian culture. In this culture, a merchant's honor was not something to be
casually besmirched, given the importance of long-standing membership in the digital
black market.
The state was not only a common enemy that informed Silk Road's cyberoutlaw
culture. It was also an institution with surveillance abilities and prosecutorial powers —
both of which needed to be avoided by black market participants. Silk Road vendors
developed social customs to avoid state detection, and these strategies were designed to
control the commercial process, albeit to avoid state detection rather than economic
fraud. The logistics of the drug trade garnered a great deal of attention on the discussion
board. Buyers and sellers alike would crowd-source contraband delivery strategies: how
to take drugs on a plane, in a car across the US, on a train in Europe. Packaging and
shipping were topics of great debate, as merchants spoke with their peers about delivery
methods that could evade customs detection. One users suggested that cocaine sellers
place their products "inside a snap lock smelly proof bag, crushed flat and wrapped again
in lavender scented tissue paper and mailed in a greeting card". Merchants offered a
plethora of tactics for shipping contraband within the United States and across
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international borders, including hand-writing addresses and padding envelopes "by trifolding a few sheets of paper and taping the product to one of the sheets". Several
suggested decoy objects as a means of evading the watchful eye of customs: sealed
tampon boxes, potato chip bags, candy wrappers. One user reported receiving his cocaine
in a sealed Skittles bag. There was a substantive debate over how to check the delivery
status of mailed goods. When one user suggested tracking the Digital Customer
Notification (DCN) attached to packages, another user responded forcefully:
Don't check your DCN from Tor NOT MATTER what. The post office can tell
when DCN info for a particular package has been access through a Tor browser.
Though the post office can't track where you accessed the info from they can tell
the type of anonymous browser and that is a red flag. The post office will then
pay particular attention to your package because they know a person who does not
want to be known access the DCN info. Access the info from an internet cafe.
Another user contested this claim, stating that "nobody has ever provided concrete
evidence that the USPS [United States Postal Service] can even tell Tour is being used to
track packages. Do not believe this bullshit." The original commenter cheekily defended
his insider knowledge: "this is not a crypto-cyber-international-drug-smuggling-punk
urban legend, we have been told this by people who work in the postal services industry".
Social customs related to privacy strategies were also major points of debate on
the discussion board, and users exchanged their experiences with different anonymizing
services. In response to a discussion board question, merchants discussed Tor-supported
email services, including safe-mail.net and i2pmail, which added another layer of
anonymity on top of Tor relays. They also distinguished between degrees of online
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anonymity and noted the limits of Tor concealment. One user explained the relationship
between the federal government and Tor, writing, "Also well known that the feds operate
large capacity exit nodes on Tor. The more they operate, and if they operate internal
relays (sure they do) the easier it is for them to correlate traffic." A related thread
centered on the best places for off-shore hosting of dark web sites, the consensus being
Ukraine or Russia. After someone asked the community "Which Security Setup Is Best?",
users offered explanations of Tails and PGP for anonymous internet navigation; Debian
and Ubuntu for disk encryption; CC cleaner, Secure Remove, File Shredder for disk
deletion; and Windows versus Linux versus OpenBSD for secure operating systems.
Another asked which burner phones were the most secure for drug dealing, which
sparked a debate on the strength of Android encryption. Stash spots were also widely
debated, from credit union safety deposit boxes to secure compartments inside walls.
Hundreds of posts centered on Bitcoin logistics: where to buy and store Bitcoin, how to
convert Bitcoin into dollars, and which wallets and institutions monitored the
cryptocurrency most carefully. Silk Road users carefully followed the 2012
Congressional Treasury Committee debates over the property status of Bitcoin, offering
libertarian commentary on the public proceedings.
On Silk Road, users developed social customs that were not only economic but
also infrastructural, cultural, and institutional. Website infrastructure did not automate the
commercial process, as cyberlibertarianism would expect, but offered informal
opportunities to evaluate trading partners. In particular, the rating protocol was not a
proxy of status but a series of traces to be "read" by users in their search for fair
exchange. Platform culture turned out to be a relatively dependable way of predicting
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vendor behavior, even more so than the rating protocol designed to fill that exact
function. In addition to playing a role in extortion schemes, the abeyant state also played
a role in the social customs of users, serving as a common enemy in the platform's
libertarian culture and informing the commercial practices of digital contraband trade.
The digital black market was not an isolated libertarian economy but an embedded
economic system that implicated infrastructures, cultures, and institutions. Social customs
were a way of controlling the commercial process in the conspicuous absence of
regulations, in the potential presence of deceptive merchants, and in the looming
surveillance of state institutions. A winding road to commerce indeed.

Antiques Roadmap
eBay users also develop social customs to control the commercial process. These
customs leverage website infrastructure and platform culture in ways contrary to
cyberlibertarianism. In order to avoid deceptive merchants, users mark certain practices
as signs of potential fraud. For example, lucrative offers that take place outside of eBay
infrastructure may signal a merchant's desire to step outside platform jurisdiction and
enact fraudulent exchange. Users analyze merchant advertisements for signs of expertise,
jockeying the website infrastructure of auction pages and the platform culture of object
knowledge to ensure the legitimacy of prospective trading partners. They also analyze
merchant history, embedded in user profiles, in order to determine if an account has been
hacked, an increasingly common phenomenon in recent years. In cases when merchants
have already been defrauded, users develop customs to minimize commercial damage
through a careful engagement with the dispute resolution protocol. As a platform, eBay
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sometimes enters the drama of social customs by formalizing them in infrastructure or
policy. Not state institutions but corporate institutions enter the exchange process in this
way, creating a tentative feedback loop between user and platform. In all of these cases,
the auction market is far from a self-contained island of economy activity. Rather, digital
exchange on the platform implicates factors that are infrastructural, cultural, and
institutional.
As on Silk Road, social customs on eBay often concern the selection of honorable
vendors. On the discussion board, eBay users note that certain practices are often signs of
fraudulent intent. For example, according to seasoned users, fraudulent merchants
sometimes make lucrative offers to vendors who post expensive items or to buyers who
bid on them — but in private messages outside of the eBay auction infrastructure. These
offers usually culminate in a delivery scam, in which a vendor sends an item but
ultimately receives no reciprocal payment, or fake object scams, in which a buyer sends a
payment but does not receive the advertised object.169 The evasion of eBay's commercial
infrastructure is meant to limit platform jurisdiction during the inevitable dispute: if
merchants conduct a private transaction without eBay exchange protocols, then the
platform has no authority over the exchange and no responsibility for its resolution. Of
course, eBay disavows any responsibility for fraudulent commerce in its user agreements,
even if merchants utilize platform exchange protocols, making interpersonal trade a
double-whammy of platform immunity.170 Platform guidelines formally forbid members
"to contact each other to buy or sell items outside of eBay" and warns that violators may
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be subject to account suspension.171 Nevertheless, likely in response to the problem, eBay
briefly featured a Private Offer function, which allowed merchants to conclude auctions
in order to accept private offers, provided those offers were realized in platform payment
protocols. The function came and left in 2016, exemplifying a provisional feedback loop
between user and platform in a major internet market. In the case of private offers, a
social custom emerged in response to commercial infrastructure and platform guidelines.
The platform then attempted to make the custom unnecessary by incorporating private
offers into site infrastructure, thereby monetizing the interpersonal transactions against
which users warned.
Another social custom relies on the website infrastructure of profile protocols and
rating protocols, but not in the ways predicted by electronic reputation studies. On the
discussion board, users note that rating is not always a reliable metric of vendor honor,
but a complete absence of feedback marks a profile as suspicious; a merchant without
history on the platform has nothing to lose during a confidence scheme. Like Silk Road
users, eBay merchants generally distrust the rating system but trust the infrastructural
traces that the system leaves behind; and they tend to view platform longevity as an
imperfect proxy of commercial honor. Platform culture indirectly underwrites the
importance of longevity, as eBay's long internet history comes with veteran merchants
who respect exchange relations on the platform. In particular, antique culture on the
platform values commercial expertise and, by extension, the commercial experience
necessary to possess that expertise. Whatever their wares, merchants with economic and
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cultural investments in the auction market are more likely to engage in cooperative
commerce. When a buyer on the discussion posted a story about being defrauded, a
seasoned user replied, "This is the type of thing that we see all the time. Buyer comes
here and is upset that a transaction went bad. Then we find out it was a transaction with a
zero-feedback, brand new seller..." Another buyer realized independently that purchasing
a bike from a new seller had been a bad idea. As related in a discussion board post, the
bike had been offered "at a price that was too good to be true, from a seller with no
feedback". When the package for the bike arrived, it was an empty envelope.
In another social custom, eBay users leverage website infrastructure and platform
culture when they analyze auction pages for signs of confusion or inexperience. Auction
pages, according to this custom, should generally exhibit expertise about the commodity
and familiarity about its market. Part of the exhibition of expertise is the ability to
communicate in clear and technical terms about an object. This includes the ability to
speak in relatively clear English — a standard inflected through the stereotype of
Nigerian scammers, the anxiety surrounding the rise of Chinese sellers on the site, and
the generalized xenophobia of Western culture.172 In 2017, a new seller received a
message that combined the signs of potential fraud covered so far: a lucrative offer, a
private transaction, a blank profile, and an inability to speak intelligibly about a product.
The seller posted the message on the discussion board:
I will like to offer you $400.00 for the Vintage Fostex x15 4 Track recorder. If my
offer is been accepted the payment will be made through check. I will send the
check via mail and my mover will only come over for pick up when you notify
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me that the check has been verified and cleared by your bank. Paying with check
will be easier for me on this transaction i haven't get chance to fund my PayPal
account recently due to the nature of my work here in Seattle and i really need to
buy this item for my business associate. Also due to the nature of my work i don't
have time to check my eBay messages.
The discussion board post prompted another user to explain why the sender of the
message should not be trusted. "It has so many scam markers," the user explained,
"offering more money than it's listed for, asking for your phone number for text
messages, vagueness — 'the nature of my work', can't check eBay messages". In eBay
parlance, "scam markers" are signs of potential fraud that distinguish certain practices as
suspicious. This jumbled message dramatically displays these scam markers and serves as
an object lesson for less experienced users.
Another social custom relies on the website infrastructure of profile protocols, but
not in the way anticipated by cyberlibertarianism. This custom concerns the identification
of hacked accounts, which are hijacked for the purpose of executing low-risk confidence
schemes. eBay accounts are not particularly difficult to hack, because username and
password are the only barriers to account access. However, as users point out, there are
relatively clear signs that an account has been compromised. Hacked accounts are usually
inactive for years and then suddenly hyperactive, making gaps and fluctuations in user
activity — which are visible in the profile protocol — potential marks of fraudulent
intent. On the discussion board, an experienced merchant listed the signs of a hacked
account for users new to the platform: "An account over 3 years old. Few if any feedback
as a seller, over a year old. Their buying feedback except for 2-3 recent feedback is all
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over a year old." Another user added: hackers often post "too good to be true item
listings" that "sell out in under 4 hours". This helps hackers execute whitewashing
schemes quickly and reliably: once the auctions close, hackers accept multiple payments
in exchange for the listed goods, transfer the payments from a PayPal account to a private
bank account, and then leave the platform without sending the purchased goods.
A related social custom concerns the platform culture of commodities. Criminal
market logic means that expensive and in-demand products are highly attractive to
hackers, who want to maximize the payments they receive prior to exiting the platform.
On the discussion board, users referred to these in-demand products as "scam items":
electronics, including smart phones and laptops; luxury items, such as bags and
accessories; and rare goods, such as collectibles and vintage objects. In particular,
according to users, smart phones are exemplary magnets for fraudulent exchange,
"because they are small, there is huge demand, and they are relatively valuable". Hackers
might auction off ten cell phones, sell them at $300 a piece, and then leave the platform
with a $3000 in profits before buyers realized that they had been defrauded. In 2017,
eBay instituted a new policy —one neither named nor mentioned in platform guidelines
— to cancel transactions conducted by hacked accounts. Black-boxed is eBay's
determination procedure for hacked accounts, but an eBay merchant who I interviewed
related the following account. After auctioning off an item, this merchant received an
email with a subject line, "Unauthorized use of buyer account — Transaction(s)
cancelled". The email read:
We’re writing to let you know that we had to cancel the following transaction(s)
because the item(s) were purchased without the account owner's permission... If
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you already sent the item(s) and they haven’t been delivered yet, please contact
your shipping carrier to find out if you can stop the shipment.
This merchant speculated that Russians had hacked the account, reflecting contemporary
anxieties surrounding Russian information warfare. That eBay is a corporate institution
likely played a role in its decision to monitor hacked account: the corporation may be
eager to avoid the public relations debacle that accompanies press reports of platform
infiltration. In the case of hacked accounts, social customs became formalized in website
policy, creating a feedback loop between users and platforms (and, perhaps, institutional
dynamics).
eBay merchants sometimes complete a transaction before realizing they have been
defrauded. In those cases, users develop social customs related to website infrastructure
in order to minimize commercial damage. Because users often come to the discussion
board in such moments, the arena of user debate is filled with strategies for negotiating
the dispute resolution protocol. According to one custom, the best way to deal with a
fraudulent buyer is to offer a partial refund on the object that they claim is "not as
described". The partial refund is a way to minimize the inevitable monetary losses
associated with the scam. Buyers have the upper hand in trade disputes,173 and the partial
refund decisively concludes those disputes and prevents the exchange from becoming a
one-way value transfer. This also forestalls any hostile encounters with buyers. eBay's
platform culture has a conflictual dimension, not just haggling and sniping but harassing
and coercing.174 Partial refunds offer a trap-door out of heated interactions with buyers.
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As one user explained on the discussion board, vendors should offer "no explanations, no
defending yourself, ONLY the same answer": a partial refund. On the eBay subreddit, a
dedicated seller went so far as to create a decision tree that informed vendors how to
handle the dispute resolution protocol in cases of delivery scams. The opening question
— "What reason did the buyer select for the return? — branches out to a series of actions
designed to minimize commercial damage. For instance, if the vendor suspects a
fraudulent return, the decision tree suggests that the vendor message the buyer and "ask
leading questions to see if the customer will admit to buyer remorse or altering the
product". The admission may then become leverage during the dispute resolution process.
This social custom allows users to control a commercial process that has become unruly.
This is particularly helpful in the case of delivery scams executed against vendors, who
must navigate a dispute resolution protocol that is decisively biased against them.
On eBay, users social customs develop social customs to mitigate concerns of
fraud and control the commercial process. These social custom relate to platform culture
and website infrastructure, including infrastructural protocols, but in different ways than
imagined by cyberlibertarianism. A lucrative offer outside of eBay's infrastructure is a
potential sign of fraudulent intent, as is a failure to conform to the platform culture of
object expertise. Users determine if an account has been hacked through the traces left by
the profile protocol, and eBay, as corporate institution, quietly enters the drama of
criminal infiltration by detecting hacked accounts and notifying users accordingly. In
cases when fraudulent exchange has already occurred, users take steps to control the final
stages of the commercial process through social customs related to the dispute resolution
protocol. These social customs are infrastructural, cultural, and (sometimes) institutional,
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extending well beyond the properly economic. eBay is not an autonomous sphere of
exchange but an embedded arena of economic activity, which implicates infrastructures,
cultures, and institutions.

Like A Good Neighbor
Craigslist users also develop social customs to avoid fraudulent exchange and
control the commercial process. These customs interface with website infrastructure,
platform culture, and state institutions. The state enters the exchange process most visibly
on Craigslist, compared to Silk Road and eBay, as users rely on local police stations to
ensure personal safety during face-to-face encounters. The website infrastructure of
advertisement solicitation and the platform culture of local commerce informs another
social custom, according to which merchants should conduct exchange in cash rather than
wire payment. Users respond to the website infrastructure of open exchange by
formulating social customs related to general market acumen. In all of these cases, social
customs help users manage local exchange, and they involve infrastructures, cultures, and
institutions that are beyond the economic as such. Craigslist is not an isolated sphere of
commercial activity but an entrenched arena of economic exchange that is infrastructural,
cultural, and institutional. Good fences might make good neighbors, but low fences make
good merchants.
A key social custom on Craigslist is to meet in person to conduct a transaction.
First and foremost, this custom is related to website infrastructure, which is designed to
furnish advertisements and connect merchants, but not to facilitate payment or delivery.
The interpersonal encounter helps mitigate concerns of fraud by reducing the ability of
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merchants to deceive their trading partners through digital protocols. At the same time,
the interpersonal comes with the risk of physical harm, unevenly distributed across social
categories, including gender.175 In response to this risk, as related in discussion board
conversations, Craigslist users adopt the social custom of meeting their prospective
trading partners in a public place: a city square, a parking lot, or a local business.
Craigslist formalizes this policy in its official guidelines for avoiding scams. While the
precise language has shifted over the past decade, the guideline reads, "Deal locally, faceto-face —follow this one rule and avoid 99% of scam attempts."176
Some users build on this foundational social custom by involving state institutions
in the interpersonal encounter. In particular, women take steps to ensure their safety
during face-to-face transactions. On the Craigslist subreddit, women users related a social
custom of meeting prospective trading partners in front of a local police station or in a
public setting. In 2017, a woman asked the Craigslist subreddit where "a female on
Craigslist" should meet a prospective buyer, and users of both genders proposed a local
police station in response. One woman suggested that the entire transaction be conducted
in an open public setting, explaining, "I always meet inside a Starbucks. I get there early,
order a coffee, and lug whatever I'm selling inside. Don't help them carry it to their car; If
you can carry it in by yourself then they can handle it on their own. This is a very public
transaction and definitely puts you in a stronger position if they are shady." For this user,
the risk of a suspicious or "shady" merchant informed the practices of exchange. When a
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presumptively male user asked, "What does your gender have to do with anything?" the
woman responsible for the post foregrounded the material dimension of interpersonal
exchange: "Well, I am much smaller than a dude I guess. About 90 lbs? I guess thinking
about it, if shit went down, I suppose it wouldn't matter. But I still don't have the physical
heft." When I interviewed a Los Angeles woman in her 20s, she explained that she took
her safety seriously during interpersonal encounters by bringing pepper spray and "a
friend or someone just to be on the safe side".
Still, for those without chemical agents or trusted confidantes, the local police
station is a trusted venue for the interpersonal encounter. When a user on the Craigslist
subreddit asked how to handle a face-to-face transaction, several users suggested local
law enforcement as a commercial resource. One user wrote, "If anything makes you
uncomfortable then ask to meet at a police station or someplace public." Another agreed
that it was wise to "meet at or across from a police station". The state is not always a
neutral venue in these contexts. Several police departments, including those in
Philadelphia, Virginia Beach, and Boca Raton, have responded to this social custom by
encouraging merchants to conduct commerce in the lobbies of law enforcement
offices.177 The police department in Columbia, Missouri even created a commercial for
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public television that advertised its lobby as an Online Exchange Zone.178 Here, not only
users but also state institutions work to control the commercial process within their
jurisdictions.
A related social custom is rooted in the platform culture of local commerce and
the website infrastructure of email relays. On the discussion board, users encourages their
peers to conduct exchange in cash rather than through wire payment, personal check, or
Paypal charge. These latter payment technology could be exploited by fraudulent
merchants, who might accept wire payments before handing over goods, write personal
checks that cannot be cashed, or send fake Paypal confirmation emails. If one party
insists on writing a check, so the custom goes, then the other party should cash the
payment before finalizing the exchange. As one user summarized, "Cash is the ONLY
way to go," because paper currency cannot be easily counterfeited or time-lagged. For
this reason, Craigslist users also avoid conducting commerce with distance merchants,
who contact them through the Craigslist message system, built into website
infrastructure, and make appealing offers to have the product delivered by post. Craigslist
formalized this custom in September 2014, when they added to their guidelines, "Ignore
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emails/texts from non-local persons"179 and, a month later, replaced that guideline with a
more specific one: "Do not extent payment to anyone you have not met in person."180
Craigslist users also follow broad social customs related to website infrastructure
in order to avoid fraudulent exchange. The absence of dispute protocols on Craigslist
means that users must fend for themselves in the digital free market. Part of this selfdefense is the knowledge of social customs related to market acumen. On the discussion
board, users refer to these customs as "due diligence" or simply "common sense". One
discussion board participant offered a set of questions to ask oneself before entering a
transaction: "Just be very careful. Ask yourself, 'Am I being caught up by greed or other
allure?' Ask, 'Can I afford the loss/hassle if this is a scam?'" Users cast greed as a
psychological trait that is easy to exploit, and they instruct their peers to beware of
listings that offer items well below their market value. When someone on the discussion
board reported a fraudulent car advertisement, a user replied, "Thieves get rich cheating
nitwits who think they can get something for nothing. NOBODY is going to sell a
beautiful 2008 Jetta with 77K miles for $2500. It is ALWAYS a scam." Another user
chimed in: "Scammers prey on cheapskates who think they can get something for
nothing." Cooperative exchange, according to many Craigslist users, was a matter of
psychological self-awareness. A seasoned platform merchant directly connected
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fraudulent exchange with improper conduct, insisting in a discussion board post, "You
can't be scammed unless you cooperate". Another discussion board participant from Fort
Collins elaborated on the relation between fraud and acumen: "You can be scammed in a
bank or supermarket or anywhere online. One must use common sense, and it helps if one
reads up on potential fraud and scams."
On Craigslist, users develop social customs to mitigate concerns of fraud and
control the commercial process. These customs relate to website infrastructure, platform
culture, and state institutions. The absence of payment and delivery protocols in
Craigslist infrastructure means that merchants must meet in person to conduct exchange.
With the interpersonal encounter comes a series of practices that jockey state institutions
and public spaces (and, sometimes, chemical agents) to ensure personal safety. The state
serves as a backdrop of commerce in some cases, as when commerce is conducted in
front of a police station; and functions as a direct actor in other cases, as when law
enforcement authorities encourage citizens to meet in the lobbies of their offices. Gender
also figures into the social customs surrounding interpersonal encounter, as women take
concrete steps to ensure their safety during unregulated exchange. Infrastructure and
culture intersect in the social custom of cash exchange, which eschews long-distance
commerce conducted over email relays in favor of local exchange conducted through
immediate payment. The loose set of social customs related to market acumen also
eschews infrastructural commerce for local exchange, proper to the platform's
neighborhood culture. In these diverse cases, Craigslist is not a fenced garden but an
overflowing lawn that implicates infrastructures, culture, and institutions in its greenery.
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Here, electronic commerce is far from exclusively economic, as a variety of factors
external to exchange enter the commercial process for the benefit of users.

Hidden Abodes of Exchange
On Silk Road, eBay, and Craigslist, users take steps to control the commercial
process, developing social customs that rely on website infrastructure, platform culture,
and state institutions. This means that internet markets are not self-regulating, insofar as
users furnish de facto regulations in the absence of formal ones. This also means that
internet markets are not self-contained, as infrastructures, cultures, and institutions enter
the drama of exchange, either as passive or active players. Digital exchange is not purely
economic but also infrastructural, cultural, and institutional. Electronic commerce has
"hidden abodes", or external factors that inconspicuously facilitate exchange. Users are
well positioned to understand these discreet factors, because they take steps to manage
their exchange relations, drawing on available resources, both economic and noneconomic. The role of external factors within internet market exchange has consequences
for cyberlibertarianism, free labor, and electronic commerce.
Cyberlibertarianism and free labor share a view of internet exchange as
comprehensively economic. According to cyberlibertarian logic, if internet platforms are
self-contained islands of digital activity, then internet markets are self-contained islands
of economic activity. The digital ideology affirms the autonomy of these venues and the
importance of boundaries around them. This is part of how cyberlibertarianism justifies
the evasion of state regulations, understood as the unnecessary encroachment of these
boundaries. According to free labor logic, if internet activity is consistently monetized,
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then internet platforms are comprehensively economic. This is how Terranova refutes the
argument that the internet is anarchocommunist. These paradigms arrive at the same
general way of thinking about the internet platform economy, albeit through entirely
different routes. In both accounts, internet platforms are comprehensively economic,
either because non-economic factors do not breach platform boundaries
(cyberlibertarianism), or because non-economic factors turn out to serve economic
purposes once inside those boundaries (free labor).
Contrary to the ideas of cyberlibertarianism, non-economic factors enter internet
market exchange through unexpected paths. Further, contrary to the ideas of free labor,
these factors cannot be characterized as purely economic: even though they facilitate
commerce, they exhibit their own infrastructural, cultural, and institutional dynamics. To
characterize website infrastructure, platform culture, and state institutions as purely
economic is to miss these situated dynamics — the ways infrastructures, cultures, and
institutions enter the commercial process, not as sources of direct monetization but as
touch-stones of user practices. Further, to characterize these factors as purely economic is
to forward a functionalist argument, in which economic, infrastructural, cultural, and
institutional factors are woven together so thoroughly that they cannot be analytically
distinguished. It's the economy all the way down. Not only does the functionalist
perspective fail to account for the unique qualities of infrastructures, cultures, and
institutions in the context of electronic commerce. It also falls victim to paraconsistent
logic: everything is either economic or non-economic, but the non-economic contributes
to the economic, so the non-economic is also the economic. In a formal contradiction, A
= A and not-A = A. Free labor theory ends up endorsing a self-contained internet
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economy in much the same way that cyberlibertarianism endorses a self-contained
internet as such.
As venues of social customs, internet markets help us understand how users
control internet exchange in the absence of regulations. Unlike the merchant laws
mentioned by Trotter Hardy, social customs are not grounded in jurisdictive institutions.
Rather, they are grounded in the dynamics of infrastructures, cultures, and institutions
that are formally external to electronic commerce. These procedures can include the
traces left by website infrastructure, such as the feedback dates on Silk Road or user
activity logs on eBay; the sensibilities of platform culture, including the outlaw mentality
of Silk Road veterans or the local preferences of Craigslist users; or the functions of state
institutions, such as the surveillance function of the state on Silk Road on the protective
function of the state on Craigslist. These infrastructures, cultures, and institutions have
their own independent existence and operational procedures, but they are leveraged by
users aiming to control the commercial process nonetheless. Paradoxically, on internet
markets, the protocols that are formally designed to facilitate commerce become the
means of economic conflict, and the systems that have different formal purposes become
the raw materials of economic cooperation. If these digital free markets, which are meant
to be self-regulating and self-contained, implicate factors external to trade, then it is
likely that electronic commerce will always be more than electronic and more than
commercial — not an isolated island but a vast archipelago.
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CHAPTER 3
MONEY ON THE SIDE
PERFORMING MERCHANT LABOR
On internet markets, actors take steps to manage exchange. In performing the
lion's share of platform work, vendors develop selling strategies to control the
commercial process, including its potential for fraud and its potential for profit. These
actors have a particularly vested interest in equitable exchange, given the resources they
outlay during online sales. Like the social customs developed by users generally, vendor
strategies are connected to website infrastructure, platform culture, and state and
commercial institutions, but in ways that reflect the vendor goal of selling goods. This
means that even the business side of internet markets is more than just business: sellers
with properly economic motives leverage infrastructures, cultures, and institutions to
realize those motives. This is important, because internet markets are supposed to be selfregulating and self-contained, yet vendors employ de facto regulations in the form of
selling strategies, and internet markets turn out to be embedded spheres of economic
activity in the very place where they should be thoroughly economic — the area of digital
labor.

Just Business
Scholarly and popular accounts of the digital economy tend to focus on its
properly economic dimension. In their Wikinomics manifesto, Don Tapscott and Anthony
D. Williams advocate a digital business plan centered on the monetization of online user
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activity and the ensuing minimization of overhead costs.181 Yochai Benkler, in The
Wealth of Networks, locates latent economic value in collaborative internet activity,
which he positions as constructively unregulated.182 Manuel Castells, during his
discussion of the digital economy in The Network Society, relates the structure of internet
networks to the global circulation of economic capital.183 The Four Hour Work Week by
Tim Ferris outlines an entrepreneurial strategy that leverages the distributed structure of
the internet to generate personal economic prosperity.184 Arun Sundararajan's The
Sharing Economy concerns the economic value of networks in the provision of ondemand services.185 These studies of the digital economy ask: where are the economic
resources on the internet, and how should they be managed?
Critical accounts of digital labor likewise tend to focus on its properly economic
dimension, despite their focus on the production of value rather than its mere location.
Tiziana Terranova sees internet exchange as comprehensively economic, insofar as it is
monetized by technology firms.186 Christian Fuchs follows Terranova in highlighting the
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economic value of user activity online.187 In line with Terranova and Fuchs, many
scholars argue that the surveillance of user activity is the skeleton-key to the extraction of
economic value on the internet; such that user activity, figured as a kind of digital labor,
sets the groundwork for a global industry in data.188 Lilly Irani analyzes the economic
bifurcation of digital labor into menial work and high-technology work.189 For Sarah
Roberts, content moderation is not just a user hobby but a legitimate micro-economy.190
These studies of digital labor ask: who provides the economic resources, and how does
that provision process work?
Despite their different perspectives and different objects, accounts of the digital
economy and accounts of digital labor are principally concerned with the economic
dimension of internet activity. When infrastructure enters the picture, it is an
infrastructure of capital circulation (Castells), monetized surveillance (Fuchs), or
outsourced task execution (Irani and Roberts). When culture enters the picture, it is a
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culture of voluntary user participation (Benkler) to be widely monetized (Tapscott and
Williams) without user compensation (Terranova). When institutions enter the picture,
they are outdated commercial institution, such as taxis and hotels (Sundararajan), ready to
be disrupted (Ferris). In these accounts, infrastructures, cultures, and institutions occupy a
marginal position in the digital economy and in digital labor.

User Accounts
Internet markets tell a different story. On Craigslist, eBay, and Silk Road, vendors
develop selling strategies connected to website infrastructure, platform culture, and state
and commercial institutions — factors considered minor players in accounts of the digital
economy, accounts of digital labor, and accounts of self-contained platforms advanced by
cyberlibertarianism. These selling strategies help vendors control the commercial
process. In contrast to user customs, however, these strategies reflect the vendor goal of
selling goods, and they tend to relate to different elements of infrastructures, cultures, and
institutions — factors that are not only present on internet markets but flexibly so. On
eBay, vendors formulate selling strategies connected to the website infrastructure of
algorithms, seller fees, hacked profiles, and digital protocols; the platform culture of rival
sellers, object expertise, and visual conventions; and the commercial institutions of
conventional businesses, yard sales, and thrift stores. On Silk Road, sellers execute
selling strategies related to the website infrastructure of price displays and seller
blacklists; the platform culture of anonymous users and unsophisticated actors; and the
surveillance of state institutions. On Craigslist, vendors develop selling strategies that
interface with the website infrastructure of filter protocols, post expiration, and scam text
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messages; the platform culture of casual buyers; and the state institutions of law
enforcement, as well as commercial institutions of retail stores. This is significant,
because digital labor is supposed to be an economic matter, and internet markets are
supposed to be self-contained spheres of economic activity. Yet even actors who treat
internet markets as business venues lean on infrastructures, cultures, and institutions
during digital exchange. Merchant labor on internet markets is more than just business.
The presentation of evidence in this chapter reflects the contextual nature of
selling strategies, or their connection to what, how, and why vendors are purveying
certain wares. Although I sometimes reference discussion board conversations, I
principally draw on the interviews I conducted with internet merchants in order to
provide a deep account of selling strategies.191 These are vendors portraits, which we will
consider one by one, with references to broader trends but a focus on individual user
accounts.

Practical Speculation
On eBay, vendors develop selling strategies to control the commercial process,
alleviating concerns of fraud and increasing profitable sales. These strategies are not only
economic but also infrastructural, cultural, and institutional. Vendors negotiate the
website infrastructure of market algorithms, which determine which products are
prominently displayed; seller fees, which inform the conditions under which sales are
profitable; hacked profiles, which are potential sources of fraudulent exchange; and
digital protocols, which inform what is technically possible on the site. Their selling
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strategies are also related to the platform culture of rival sellers, who may seek to
manipulate them; as well as object expertise and visual conventions, which inform the
way objects are presented. They furthermore interface with commercial institutions,
including formal business, yard sales, and thrift store. Even as they position profit as their
principal goal, these vendors leverage non-economic factors in their pursuit of online
sales. Digital labor on eBay is more than "just business", and the auction market is far
from a self-contained sphere of economic exchange. Rather, infrastructures, cultures, and
institutions enter into the process of merchant labor — the very part of digital exchange
that should be most thoroughly economic. In what follows, I describe the selling practices
of five eBay vendors who I interviewed.
A Baton Rouge man in his early 40s uses selling strategies related to the website
infrastructure of market algorithms and the platform culture of rival sellers. As an owner
of a pawn shop, he uses eBay to sell "purses, wallets, sunglasses, watches, jewelery [sic],
giftcards, and small electronics", which he has in stock in his store and which he knows
"will sell for sure". An eBay user since the late 1990s, he relies on a calculated pricing
strategy to decide on a reasonable starting price for goods. His formalized pricing
mechanism reflects the relatively high stakes of his online sales, bound up in his
professional goals. It also reflects his attempt to stand out in the expansive auction
market. eBay controls the visibility of items through a market algorithm, about which
vendors know little. This vendor reasons that a good price will attract user attention; and
this will, in turn, help increase the visibility of the object within the secret operations of
the market algorithm. "I care about eBay showing my stuff to people," the vendor
explained, and pricing strategy is a potential way to increase visibility. Price also takes on
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an increased importance from the perspective of eBay's history, a history to which this
vendor was witness over decades of platform involvement. In his recollection, Chinese
sellers flooded eBay with cheap electronics in the late 2000s, exploiting international
price differentials and crowding out pawn dealers like himself. These developments made
the market even more crowded and competitive, and they altered the platform culture by
shifting the kind of objects for sale on the site. Compared to the early days, he noted,
there are more technology vendors and "fewer average people selling off their junk". The
shift in object culture made his online sales more difficult, as eBay became increasingly
known for technological products rather than secondhand ones. More difficult than the
changes in platform culture, however, is the potential for fraudulent exchange on the site.
He recalled a recent incident, during which a buyer filed a return on a $1200 item just
days before the thirty-day cutoff for refunds. When he received the product, it had clearly
been used, but involving the dispute protocol was "not worth the mental effort", given its
bias in favor of the customer. Still, according to the vendor, the most frustrating part of
merchant labor is not the presence of fraudulent buyers but the platform culture of rival
sellers. "The most insidious people on eBay," he pined, "are the resellers who buy your
items because they think they are smarter than you." These are other vendors that will
purchase an item, leave a poor feedback as a form of vendor sabotage, and then attempt
to sell that item at a higher price. Rival sellers require that vendors remain attentive to
who is buying their products and why. Given the stakes of exchange, the Baton Rouge
develops selling strategies that are connected to these infrastructural and cultural
dynamics.
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Not all sellers use eBay as extensions of their professional endeavors, but even
casual vendors develop selling strategies to control the commercial process. A Raleigh
woman in her 50s sells miscellaneous goods on eBay to generate small profits for side
money, and her selling strategies are connected to the platform culture of visual
conventions and the commercial institutions of yard sales. She attends these sales several
times a month, "every weekend in the summer", and she purchases "guitars, clothing,
cosmetics, beer mugs, auto parts, pretty much anything [she] can make a little money
on". In tailoring her advertisements to the platform's visual standards, she spends "up to
four hours" each week taking pictures of her goods and writing detailed listings for them.
This is a significant amount of work, which she breaks up into small segments. As she
explains, "I go in spells where I'll list a bunch of stuff, then I won't do anything for a
while." Like the Baton Rouge pawn dealer, she points to fraudulent exchange as a
difficulty of merchant labor, one that has gotten worse over time. As she explains, "I've
seen more and more people that get taken advantage of because they don't cross every I
and every T." Despite the necessary attention to detail, she remains committed to the
thrill of speculative commerce, the "fun of buying something really cheaply at a yard sale
and selling it for a decent profit" to "someone who has been looking for it". Although her
compensation is usually minimal, in one exciting case, she purchased at a yard sale "a
particular type of musical keyboard, very old, very rare" and resold the instrument for
$299 to an antique collector. Her selling strategies proved effective during this exchange,
as she leveraged the commercial institution of yard sales and the platform culture of
visual conventions to sell a product at a significant profit.
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A New York man in his 60s, selling off his collectibles in retirement, likewise
takes steps to control the commercial process. These steps are connected to the website
infrastructure of digital protocols, as well as the platform culture of visual conventions
and object expertise. The vendor sells "mostly comics and magazines", as well as
"holograms, old games on CD, a small coin collection" that he has acquired over years of
collection. As a seller of collectibles, he puts great effort into the high-quality
presentation of his goods and the respectable presentation of himself. Responding to the
platform culture of visual conventions and object expertise, he explains, "I use sharp,
XXL photos/scans. Links to wikis and info. I position myself as an expert in the field." In
addition to presenting the objects according to platform conventions, the vendor stays up
to date on platform policies: "listing policies, branding, shipping times and policies,
return policies". The New Yorker repeated a common complaint about platform
protocols, mentioned by nearly all the vendors that I interviewed: sellers cannot leave
feedback on the profiles of deceptive buyers. The vendor referred to the feedback system
as "a total scam. Buyers can NEVER be negged [rated negatively]. Even the known
scammers have a 100% positive ratings." eBay's biased protocols, according to him,
make internet commerce feel like a typical job: "Ebay treats us like we work for it. Just
stocking it's shelves." Here, platform culture and website infrastructure inform the selling
strategies that are necessary in the auction market.
Meanwhile, a seasoned vendor in his 30s, based in the United Kingdom, uses
eBay as the principal sales venue for his computer hardware business. His selling
strategies interface with the platform culture of object expertise, as well as the website
infrastructure of digital protocols and hacked accounts. Given its relationship to his
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formal work arrangement, merchant labor takes up a significant deal of his time. Further,
given the technical nature of his wares, the vendor spends a plurality of this time
presenting his goods in an expert manner, as well as "testing the items and detailing all
the potential issues a customer will complain about". In addition to cultural conventions,
hardware sales at a distance comes with regular correspondence with customers over
delivery, maintenance, and quality. As a percentage, few customers complain; but the
business has a large customer base, meaning that there are many complaints in real
numbers. The website infrastructure of dispute resolution protocols, biased toward the
buyer, means that complaints are best handled "before they escalate" into full-blown
contests. Further, the website infrastructure of hacked accounts means that bad actors
have a clear path to free goods — a path that is treacherous for the vendor, given the high
cost of hardware products and the professional stakes of his online sales. After the vendor
sold a computer over eBay, he received an email from the platform, informing him that
the sale had been cancelled, because the buyer account had been hacked. The email read,
"We’re writing to let you know that we had to cancel the following transaction(s) because
the item(s) were purchased without the account owner's permission." The vendor was
relieved that he did not send the expensive product, but he expressed concern over the
recent presence of hackers on the site. Hacked accounts were now another dimension of
website infrastructure that informed his selling strategies, along with dispute resolution
protocols and platform conventions.
Lastly, a Virginia man in his 20s develops selling strategies related to the
commercial institution of thrift stores and the platform culture of rival sellers. Twice
weekly, he travels to nearby thrift stores, purchases miscellaneous items he thinks are
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valuable, and resells them for a profit in the auction market. These items include
"Gameboys, ink carts, old radios, fish finders, [and] curtains". He relishes this part of the
exchange process — the work of finding objects for resale, which he refers to as "a
treasure hunt, free money, ect. [sic]". But he finds the rest of the exchange process rather
tiresome. In particular, he finds frustrating the platform culture of rival sellers. One
vendor, he related, "bought a working radio, listed it on the same ebay account they
bought it with but several states from the original mailing address. While listed on their
ebay for sale, they opened a return claiming it didn't work, yet describing in their listing
that the radio was 'fully functional'." Nevertheless, he notes, navigating the platform
culture of rival sellers is worth the supplementary income that eBay furnishes. Despite
being oriented toward an economic end-game, his selling strategies are connected to
infrastructural and cultural dynamics.
On eBay, vendors develop selling strategies to control the commercial process
and execute successful sales. Even as they bear an economic purpose, these strategies
exceed the realm of the economic and implicate infrastructures, culture, and institutions.
Far from self-regulating, eBay relies on the de facto regulations of vendors, who work to
protect their assets in the free digital market. And, far from self-contained, eBay plays
host to non-economic factors, which figure importantly into the selling strategies of
vendors. The cyberlibertarian vision of an autonomous internet platform misses the ways
that digital exchange interfaces with factors that are formally external to electronic
commerce, even when digital exchange is treated as a business with properly economic
motives.
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Dark Figures
Criminologists define "the dark figure" as the number of crimes that occur but are
not recorded by the state.192 In considering Silk Road vendors, we are in a world of dark
figures — individuals who are remiss to detail their illegal activities, especially if those
activities continue into the present. Because I did not formally interview any Silk Road
contraband dealers, I must rely on secondhand accounts to paint a portrait of merchant
labor in the digital black market. Fortuitously, in August 2013, an unidentified individual,
claiming to have been a vendor on Silk Road, posted on Reddit an Ask Me Anything
(AMA) thread.193 In Reddit culture, an AMA is a real-time, question-and-answer thread,
hosted by people with a particular expertise or experience, from industry leaders and
politicians to computer scientists and factory workers. In this case, there is evidence to
suggest that the individual claiming to be a former Silk Road vendor was being truthful.
He was familiar with the technical niceties of the dark web, cryptocurrency, and stealth
product delivery; the cultural dynamics of the Silk Road discussion board; and the
chemical standards of drug purity evaluation. Moreover, in theory, a former dealer would
be more willing to talk about their experiences than an active dealer, and neither would
have anything to gain through a public forum, making an ulterior motive unlikely. In all,
there are compelling reasons to believe in the legitimacy of this individual, and, for these
reasons, the AMA will be the core of the subsequent analysis. We will also hear from
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other vendors, through their comments on the discussion board, and these comments will
help us identify trends in merchant labor in the digital black market.
On Silk Road, sellers developed selling strategies to control the commercial
process — its potential for fraud, for profit, and for state detection. These strategies were
related to website infrastructure of market prices, which were important determinants of
sales, and seller blacklists, which helped vendors avoid deceptive users. Vendor practices
were also connected to the platform culture of anonymous and unwitting users, who took
advantage of their dark-web privacy or failed to perform their due diligence during illegal
commerce. Notably, selling strategies interfaced with state institutions, which posed a
legal threat at nearly every stage of black market exchange. This means that Silk Road
was not self-regulating, insofar as vendors took steps to informally regulate the
commercial process and execute their economic goals. This also means that Silk Road
was not self-contained, as the digital movement of contraband marshalled factors that
were external to electronic commerce.
The Silk Road vendor who hosted the AMA did not directly identify his age or
location, but he did mention that he had recently impregnated his girlfriend, suggesting
that he is a man or an individual with male anatomy. I will consequently use the
presumptive masculine pronoun to refer to this vendor. According to his account, he was
a dealer of LSD, MDMA, and hash, none of which he would "personally consider
harmful", and he made "upper six-figures" over a year of part-time dealing. He worked a
conventional 9-5 job during his tenure on the platform, and, despite the profitability of
drug sales, he "never made a business out of it". His merchant labor generated money on
the side, and a lot of it — the markup on his products, or the difference between their cost

106
of acquisition and their price of sale, ranged "anywhere from 40% to 300% depending on
the quantity". Perhaps unsurprisingly, given his capital gains, he characterized his vendor
experience as generally positive, stating, "I think the year or so I spent selling on SR was
one of the most satisfying things I've ever done." He also characterized the digital black
market as generally avant-garde, asserting, "SR is absolutely the future. Dealers are much
safer, customers can be assured of some level of quality control and there's little risk of
violence. Everybody wins."
In the first instance, his selling strategies were related to the website infrastructure
of market prices. Prices were listed alongside objects, and buyers could even sort objects
in ascending order of price. Of course, price is important in all markets. However,
because there were so many vendors for each kind of drug, price was a particularly
important way of capturing market activity. By listing items at an attractive price, and by
listing items that were in high demand, vendors could generate sales in a crowded black
market. For the AMA vendor, LSD was his best-selling product, because "it's very tough
to find in a lot of places so there's a big market for it". He often leveraged geospatial price
differentials through international orders, taking advantage of the economic circumstance
that "some things are much cheaper in some markets than others". Price and demand were
important market determinants, as vendors the discussion board noted. In May of 2012, a
Silk Road user began a discussion board thread entitled Getting Started as a Vendor,
seeking advice on creating a seller account. Recognizing the importance of platform
longevity, the poster asked how to jumpstart his commercial venture without a broad
platform reputation. One vendor assured him that a low price would help him stand out in
the market, writing that "sales will be slow at first but if the demand for your product is
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there, people will buy it". Undercutting the competition was a dependable path to market
dominance, because, as the vendor continued to explain, "there are people on here, like
me, who are poor enough to care about that [price] difference".
Merchant labor on Silk Road required more than a strong pricing strategy,
however. As the AMA vendor explained, the work of packaging and shipping contraband
constituted the core of merchant labor on Silk Road. This work was connected to the
abeyant presence of the state on the platform, where black market sales were triply
criminal — it is illegal to sell contraband (conspiracy to distribute), to send it through the
postal service (mail fraud), and to lie about the reason for receiving the contraband
payment (wire fraud). After photographing, describing, and selling a product — hardly an
easy task in a crowded and stylized black market194 — the AMA vendor started the
substantive work of packaging. Wearing gloves in order to prevent fingerprint traces, the
vendor first wrapped the outgoing product in mylar, "after initially working with double
vacuum sealing, which wouldn't be as dog-proof". He then put the product into a large
envelope, which he subsequently put in a larger manila envelope, preferring "a letter
format" over the fake package format used by other sellers.
The question of stealth packaging occupied many vendors on the discussion
board, with users offering a variety of strategies for deceptive or discreet containers: resealed candy wrappers, re-glued tampon boxes, or the "inside a snap lock smelly proof
bag, crushed flat and wrapped again in lavender scented tissue paper and mailed in a
greeting card". In 2012, a vendor on the discussion board wrote about the labor of
packaging contraband, which served as a barrier to entry for new sellers: "I can spend
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upwards of 4 hours a day just packaging... it is a VERY time intensive [sic] and you are
always under the gun to get product out. I think this is what kills many vendors in the
beginning. They think it will be easy but it isn't so they end up quitting." He also noted
that packaging constituted an investment with a delayed yield: "I spend as much as $500
a week on packaging supplies and postage... that is $500 out of my pocket before I ever
see any money from The Road..." Here, the logistical practice of packaging was an
overhead expense, made elaborate and complicated by the spectral presence of state
surveillance.
The AMA vendor continued: once the product was in a stealth package, the
package needed to be shipped. This selling practice was likewise connected to the
abeyant presence of the state, as vendors took steps to avoid detection by the institution at
every stage of delivery. First, because the wholesale purchase of stamps and shipping
materials could look suspicious to state authorities, the AMA vendor "bought [his]
stamps and other supplies from multiple different places". He used an in-state,
established business for the return address, musing, "I don't know if any one of those
businesses every got a surprise return delivery though!" Then — and this became more
important as his sales grew — he dropped the packages "at multiple mailboxes on
relatively quiet streets". These were postal mailboxes, meaning he utilized the federal
postal system, rather than couriers, who, he claimed, were "more likely to open and check
your packages". While most of his deliveries were successful, he knew of three packages
that "for sure were intercepted", but "all were small enough amounts (<$200) that they
just resulted in a letter" from customs to the buyer. As the vendor explained, "It's not
possible to prove that [the buyer] ordered something like that so it's tough to make it
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stand up in court. Small orders usually result in angry customs letter and no more." Here,
the vendor's shipping practices responded specifically to the prosecutorial dynamics of
the state, or its legal inability to prosecute without rigorous evidentiary support. These
practices were shared by other vendors who spoke about their experiences on the
discussion board. When someone began a humorous discussion board thread entitled "25
ways to get caught as a vendor on Silk Road", sellers posted cheeky comments about
rookie vendor mistakes. Several discussion board posters described blunders in the
packaging and shipping process: "Buy a lot of stamps in the same shop all the time"; "put
your actual correct return address on the package"; and "throw something personal from
your pockets between the envelopes in the mail". These witty responses highlighted,
through negation, the selling strategies involved in moving contraband through the state's
postal system.
The platform culture of anonymous users and unwitting buyers also informed
vendor practices. According to the AMA vendor, anonymity and naivety complicated the
customer service dimension of vendor sales. Reflecting on the nature of anonymous
trade, the vendor noted generally that "it's difficult to tell if the client is being honest or
not". This made fraud a potential obstacle in the commercial process. Unlike the dealer
who went by the name of Mr. Duch during the Ross William Ulbricht trial,195 he claimed
that he did not keep a spreadsheet of buyer information, but he did keep "a log of refunds
so [he] could see if somebody was trying it repeatedly". Fortunately, the discussion board
furnished a partial strategy to avoid fraudulent actors — "a sellers blacklist (for
blacklisting bad buyers)" to which the vendor "added a couple of users". The AMA
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vendor went so far as to say that fraudulent and naive actors were more of a concern than
the law enforcement agents, who he believed were "browsing around the SR [Silk Road]
forums and such". The vendor, in particular, characterized irresponsible users as the
Achilles' heal of dark web markets. When someone asked about technological flaws in
dark web market architecture, the vendor inverted the question and offered a social
response. "Weakest point," he replied, "is the pile of meat sat in front of the keyword,"
referring to human actors, susceptible to error and manipulation. "There are enough
people out there with terrible OPSEC [operations security] that are too willing to trust
people they ultimately can't see." Dealing with the culture of anonymous and reckless
customers meant commercial record-keeping and infrastructural crowd-sourcing as
means to honorable commerce.
Other sellers related similar experiences on the discussion board. According to
one vendor, merchant labor partially consists of customers "bugging the shit out of you,
asking you all kinds of questions about each transaction". Here, the exchange custom of
vendor evaluation multiplied customer service work for the vendor, who needed to prove
his commercial trustworthiness through long conversations.196 When one user speculated
that "Silk Road drug dealer has got to be the best job on earth [sic]", "because it's so
damn easy", a vendor countered that sellers "have to deal with crappy ungrateful
customers", including "customers that lie about their package not making it". Another
agreed that "[h]aving to deal with idiot customers" was a principal challenge. According
to the AMA vendor, it was the "idiot customers" who were the most frustrating. "I had a
guy message me," he related, "every single day asking where he package was (it was
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going international, I had no idea) and after about five days he starts asking for a refund
even though shipping usually takes 8-12 days. He left a bad review."
In these cases, vendors developed selling strategies to control the commercial
process in ways their reflect their goal of selling contraband. These strategies were
connected to website infrastructure, platform culture, and state institutions, which helped
vendors determine what to sell, how to sell, and to whom to sell. Infrastructures, cultures,
and institutions were not neutral backdrops but influential factors in the decision-making
operations of black market sellers. Silk Road was far from a self-regulating libertarian
utopia, as vendor practices were de facto regulations that helped sellers control the
commercial process. Vendors sought control over economic exchange by leveraging noneconomic factors, making Silk Road embedded rather than self-contained. With an eye on
infrastructures, cultures, and institutions, vendors developed strategies that well exceeded
the economic.

Free Trade
Craigslist vendors also take steps to control the commercial process in their
pursuit of profitable sales. These steps are related to the website infrastructure of the filter
protocol, which determines how many times users may post advertisements; post
expiration, which removes posts after a certain period of time; and scam text messages,
which can sometimes accompany the posting of contact information in advertisements.
Vendor strategies are also connected to the platform culture of casual users, who may
express interest in an item without actually following through on its purchase. Selling
tactics also interface with the state institutions of law enforcement, which can provide a
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failsafe during the interpersonal encounter, and the commercial institutions of retail
stores, which make the secondhand market attractive through high prices and regular
product turnover. Despite their economic motives, Craigslist vendors leverage
infrastructures, cultures, and institutions to control the exchange process. The local
internet market is far from the self-contained and self-regulating platform envisioned by
cyberlibertarianism. Rather, Craigslist implicates a variety of other factors that are
external to electronic commerce, as vendors aim to exert de facto regulatory control in
the digital free market. In what follows, I draw on interviews I conducted with five
Craigslist vendors.
A Los Angeles woman in her 20s takes steps to control the commercial process on
Craigslist, and these steps are related to the commercial institutions of retail stores and
the state institutions of law enforcement. She sells and buys furniture on Craigslist, and
local market has become her "go-to place for finding furniture/getting rid of furniture"
after seven years of use. Craigslist offers a reasonable alternative to furniture stores,
which she sees as "way overpriced". She offers her wares at a significant discount, not
only compared to retail prices but also compared to Craigslist prices: "I'll usually checkout what's the current selling price and try selling it $5 less. If that doesn't bit [sic] after a
few days, I'll sell it a little bit more. I'll also research similar items on Craigslist what's
the selling price and either try to have a price that’s $1-2 less or a very good description
that entices someone to buy it." Like other women users of the site,197 she takes
precautions when meeting with potential buyers. She typically meets prospective
exchange partners at "the Santa Monica Police Station or near the entrance of a Target" in
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her neighborhood. "I do usually go with a friend," she elaborated, "or someone just to be
on the safe side." Finally, she added, "I also always carry pepper spray." There are
institutions on either side of her selling practices: the commercial institution of the
furniture store motivates her to sell goods in the first place, and the state institution of law
enforcement allows her to safely finalize transactions.
Also in Los Angeles is a man in his 50s who has generated "about 1 million"
dollars in profits through Craigslist over the course of five years. His selling practices are
related to the website infrastructure of filter protocols and scam text messages. This
vendor uses the local market to rent out a three-apartment loft and a photo studio in
Downtown LA, both of which he "owns through prior circumstances". The former rakes
in "over 60K per year" in rent, and the latter brings in handsome returns through hourly
rentals. Craigslist labor is an addition to his formal employment, a job in finance with a
flexible schedule, Unlike the furniture dealer, he sells regularly on the platform, and he
includes in the exchange process a posting strategy that is infrastructural in nature.
Because he advertises multiple times each day, he schedules his advertisements to avoid
the platform's filter protocol, which removes repeated postings and sometimes bans overactive IP addresses. "I post 6-8 ads a time, wait an hour then repeat," he explained. "I'm
competing with other people who run 40 50 ads per day". He subscribes to the Craigslist
subreddit because "CL [Craigslist] changes algorithms occasionally" and the group
discussion allows him "to get ahead of the ball". For him, fatigue accompanies the
infrastructural practice of scheduled advertisements: "I'm so tired of posting," he
conceded, "but it's easy." He has less control over another infrastructural element of the
local market. By including his contact information in hundreds of advertisements, the
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vendor opens himself up to scam text messages, which he fights of "every day".
Scammers locate the contact information listed in his advertisements and, as he explains,
"use my phone number for scam texts and calls". The vendor could not even make it
through our hour-long interview without receiving a scam text message, remarking to me,
"just had one while we chat". Still, the open structure of the platform is what makes the
local market attractive. The vendor's motivations for using the local market revolves
around cost, utility, and reach: "It's free and very popular and it works." For this vendor,
website infrastructure is a major touch-stone of the commercial process, which he
alternately controls through a pricing strategy related to the filter protocol, or fails to
control through the reception of scam text messages.
Meanwhile, a Philadelphia woman in her 40s employs selling strategies related to
the website infrastructure of post expiration. She sells furniture and jewelry as a way to
clean out her living spaces and make casual revenue. A veteran of local commerce, she
has been on the platform for "more than 20 years", and she feels that the site has "not at
all changed" in that time. She continually renews her advertisements to prevent them
from expiring, an infrastructural feature of the platform. Because each "posting will
expire in a new days", she must regularly "refresh the posting" by posting it again and
again. This practice keeps her wares visible in the crowded market. Like the LA woman
selling furniture, she takes gender into consideration when planning interpersonal
encounters with prospective buyers. "I meet them at a halfway point," she told me.
"Sometime [sic] I have them come to my house only if it's a female." She does not rely
on state institutions to protect her against interpersonal conflict, but she does take steps
related to website infrastructure.
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Further north, a Toronto woman in her 30s uses Craigslist to sell her copy-editing
services, which she performs as an addition to her job in publishing. Her selling strategies
interface with the website infrastructure of post expiration and scam text messages. For
this vendor, the commercial process begins with the composition of an advertisement, an
important practice, given that superlative writing is part of the service that she is offering.
"Writing quality ads is a lot of work," she told me. "A good ad has to have all the
keywords that clients are looking for, but be unique enough to stand out. It also can't
replicate the hundreds of other ads on the site." Moreover, she schedules her
advertisements in relation to the website infrastructure of filter protocols, posting "at the
same time once per day in a set rotation" in order to habitualize the practice and avoid the
platform filter. Posting on the platform has become more difficult during her ten years on
the platform, she told me, because "you get scam txts [sic] if you post ads with your
contact info", and "the volume of scam [sic] has increased dramatically" in recent years.
Like the LA real estate vendor, she manages these unwanted messages as a price of entry
into the local market. Her selling strategies, in this respect, are infrastructural: she tailors
her posts to the filter protocol embedded in website infrastructure, even as that
infrastructure furnishes unsolicited text messages from scammers.
In contrast to these seasoned vendors, a New Jersey man in his 20s came to
Craigslist with minimal experience and stumbled through commercial process in 2017.
The commercial institution of car dealerships, the platform culture of casual buyers, and
the website infrastructure of scam messages figured centrally in his experience of
secondhand auto sales. After he wrecked his first car, he went to a dealership to sell it for
parts, but he wasn't satisfied with the offered price. A friend suggested he post the vehicle
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on Craigslist, which he did, at which point he received a variety of dead-end inquiries: "I
had several people text me asking for more pics and when you send them they just don't
respond. They'll seem interested then just ghost you." The casual culture of Craigslist
meant that buyers were quick to inquire about product but slow to finalize the transaction.
Corresponding with casual buyers "felt like work", and the practice of ghosting, or the
sudden cessation of interpersonal communication, multiplied the correspondence labor.
Having included his contact information in the advertisement, he also began to receive
scam text messages "from unknown area codes with horrific grammar or very clearly not
human, asking generic vague questions". In his experience with scammers, "when you
answer, they’ll send you a wall of text taking [sic] about how they’re in the military or
out of country or in the hospital etc, and would like to PayPal you the money and have an
'agent' pick up the car." At last, he was pleased to receive a reasonable offer from "a guy
who wanted to rebuild [the car]". However, on the day of the meet up, something didn't
feel right. As he explained, "[The buyer] told me he couldn't make it last minute, and that
his brother was coming to pick up the car." The sudden change of plans seemed like a
prelude to fraudulent exchange: "I thought this was some kind of play," he recalled.
Fortunately, his concerns were not warranted, as the buyer's story "turned out to be
legitimate, and [the buyer's] brother gave me cash and took the car." Unlike seasoned
sellers, he did not have a set of tactics for navigating the market, and he consequently
struggled through the commercial process. Indeed, without the know-how of more
experienced vendors, this rookie came close to entering a potentially fraudulent
exchange. Still, the local market remained attractive to him. When I checked up on the
New Jersey vendor a few weeks after our interview, he had just posted another car for
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sale, although he had not yet received any offers. "It's a more expensive car," he told me,
"so I didn't expect it to sell too quick [sic]."
In these cases, Craigslist vendors take steps to control the commercial process, but
in ways oriented toward their goal of selling goods. These are not purely economic steps
but ones related to website infrastructure, platform culture, and state and commercial
institutions. This means that Craigslist is not a self-contained sphere but an embedded
arena of economic activity, as vendors marshal non-economic factors in realizing their
economic motives. This also means that Craigslist is not a self-regulating market, but one
that relies on the de facto regulatory controls of motivated users.

Embedded Economies
On internet markets, vendors take steps to control the commercial process, but in
ways that reflect their goal of selling goods. These steps are de facto regulatory controls
that are designed to facilitate fair exchange. Despite being oriented toward an economic
goal, these steps implicate website infrastructure, platform culture, and state and
commercial institutions. This matters, because internet markets are supposed to be selfregulating and self-contained, yet vendors draw on factors that are external to electronic
commerce in order to manage online exchange. Merchant labor on internet markets is not
a purely economic affair but one that significantly involves non-economic factors. These
factors are not mere backdrops of exchange but important touch-stones in selling
strategies of commercial control. Even as business venues, internet markets are
embedded spheres of economic activity that are infrastructural, cultural, and institutional.
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It is important to underline the role of infrastructures, cultures, and institutions in
merchant labor on internet markets, because accounts of the digital economy and
accounts of digital labor tend to focus on the economic dimension of internet activity.
These accounts help us understand how economic value is distributed and produced on
the internet; but they do less to shed light on the role of infrastructural, cultural, and
institutional factors in the digital economy and in digital labor. To be sure, such factors
appear in these accounts, but they are more often treated as background conditions and
less often treated as significant touchstones of user activity. Cyberlibertarianism takes
this treatment one step further by positioning internet platforms as island of economic
activity — self-regulating, self-contained, and self-sustaining. Once again, the
assumptions of cyberlibertarianism are not far-off fantasies but radicalized versions of
conventional thought patterns. In other words, where accounts of the digital economy and
digital labor position infrastructures, cultures, and institutions in the background of value
production, cyberlibertarianism removes these factors from the scene entirely — save for
the infrastructural protocols that make cultures and institutions irrelevant.
Internet markets are privileged sites for the study of infrastructures, cultures, and
institutions in the context of digital labor and electronic commerce. This is because
external factors become vitally important when vendors aim to control the commercial
process and execute profitable sales in the absence conventional regulations. Internet
markets represent a kind of ground-zero of digital exchange, where market actors freely
encounter one another with few commercial safeguards. Without the trappings of
conventional electronic commerce, internet markets visibly show us how digital workers
leverage the scattered resources available to them. The importance of these resources as
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touchstones of merchant labor complicates the view of electronic commerce as purely
economic. Although debates over digital value production are beyond the scope of this
research, it is worth noting that the value produced by internet vendors is connected to
infrastructures, cultures, and institutions that appear external to digital labor.
Paradoxically, by removing the trappings of conventional regulations and by isolating
vendor practices as conceptual objects, internet markets end up revealing the deeply
embedded qualities of digital labor in the context of electronic commerce.
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CHAPTER 4
THINGS FOR SALE ON THE INTERNET
CIRCULATING INSTITUTIONAL OBJECTS
Institutions also aim to control the commercial process on internet markets.
According to cyberlibertarianism, internet markets should be self-contained spheres of
economic activity, beyond the messy realities of institutions. Yet state, commercial, and
domestic institutions figure centrally in the circulation of objects on internet markets. In
particular, institutions take steps to control the circulation of contraband, antique, and
secondhand objects. These objects often enter digital exchange in exceptional moments
when institutional control falls short, changes orientation, or exceeds expectation. These
moments include: overflows, gaps, and bottlenecks in commercial institutions;
byproducts in domestic institutions; and lacunae in state institutions. Contraband, in
particular, exemplifies the role of institutional "failure" in digital exchange: because state
institutions are tasked with the management of contraband, every act of contraband
exchange is effectively a failure of institutional regulation. Far from being a white whale
of the dark web, contraband circulates across Craigslist, eBay, and Silk Road alike. Every
internet market is thus a black market — a final plot twist in our drama of exchange and
an object lesson in digital commerce. That internet markets circulate contraband
demonstrates the link between the anomalies of institutional regulation and the
circulation of material goods.

Market Objects
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Commodities are widely studied conceptual objects. In his classical formulation,
Karl Marx defines commodities as privately owned goods exchanged in the capitalist
marketplace for a profit, an exchange that alters the social perception of goods.198 Walter
Benjamin follows this line of thinking in his analysis of consumer systems, which
similarly transform the perceptual status of commodities.199 Since Benjamin's midcentury
work, consumer culture has been widely studied as a social, psychological, economic,
political, and historical phenomenon.200 Studies of digital consumer culture generally
follow topical precedent and take a discursive approach to the question of online
consumption.201 Theorists of eBay, for instance, argue that the expansive collection of
objects online is alternately exhilarating and overwhelming to users.202 A recent line of
thought, sometimes referred to as materialist media studies, has moved from a symbolic
conception of commodities to an infrastructural one.203 Here, consumer objects are not

198

Karl Marx, Capital, Volume I (New York: Penguin Books, 1976).
Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project (Cambridge: Harvard Univeristy Press, 1982).
200
Daniel Horowitz, The Anxieties of Influence: Critiques of American Consumer Culture
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005). Julie Schor and Douglas B. Holt,
eds., The Consumer Society Reader (New York: The New Press, 2000). Lawrence B.
Gluckman, ed., Consumer Society in American History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1999). Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1973). Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans.
Richard Nice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984). Jean Baurdillard, The System
of Objects, trans. James Benedict (London: Verso, 1968). Jennifer R. Scanlon, ed., The
Gender and Consumer Culture Reader (New York: NYU Press, 2000).
201
Fortuitously for the present analysis, eBay is a mainstay in studies of digital consumer
culture, many of which treat objects as forms of discourse. Michele White, Buy It Now:
Lessons from eBay (Durham: Duke University Press). Ken Hills et al., eds. Everyday
eBay: Culture, Collecting, and Desire (New York: Routledge, 2006).
202
Janice Denegri-Knott and Mike Molesworth, "'Love It. Buy It. Sell It.' Consumer
Desire and the Social Drama of eBay," Journal of Consumer Culture 10, no. 1 (2010):
56-79.
203
Jeremy Packer and Steven B. Crofts Wiley, "Strategies for Materializing
Communication," Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 9, no. 1 (2012): 107-113,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14791420.2011.652487.
199

122
only signifiers of symbolic meaning but fluid phenomena that require systems of
maintenance and preservation.204 Studies of the internet of things take an infrastructural
approach by considering the vast systems of production, distribution, and maintenance
that make possible smart objects.205 The discursive tradition and the infrastructural
tradition are two key paradigms for understanding the circulation of commodities.
Contraband, antique, and secondhand goods are widely available on the internet.
A brief survey of their presence across the web will help us understand their unique
position within internet markets. The early internet featured several prominent drug
forums and marketplaces.206 At some point in the early to mid-2000s, users began to
populate Craigslist with drug advertisements, although this became decreasingly common
as Craigslist deleted its Erotic Services section, then its Adult Services Section, and, most
recently, its Personals Section.207 Drug distribution on the dark web began with Silk Road
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in 2013.208 Weapon markets on the dark web began to thrive once the alternative
communication network grew in popularity.209 Less expected than the existence of a
weapons market on the dark web is the existence of a weapons market on Craigslist and
eBay. A 2008 study by the United States Governmental Accountability Office discovered
troves of restricted military equipment on the sites, including body armor vests and
nuclear chemical gear.210
Antiques were among the first objects to be widely circulated online. The history
of eBay, in particular, is a history of antique exchange: dealers in collectibles populated
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the auction site in the late 1990s, furnishing a baseline market in objects that helped the
platform reach a critical mass of users in the early days of the internet.211 Bringing the
antique market online was a boom for the collectibles industry, as well as a boom for the
illicit antiquities industry, an underground market in cultural relics, dominated by the
hyper-wealthy.212 By contrast, the online market in used goods is one dominated by the
middle and lower classes. 213 Secondhand economies tend to emerge when the lifespan of
objects is high and the costs of conducting exchange is low.214 The secondhand market is
part of a broader landscape of used good exchange: yard sales, car-boot sales, and flea
markets, as well as clothing swaps, trash pickings, and other micro-economies sans
currency.215 In these cases, contraband, antique, and secondhand objects circulate in the
margins of technological and economic systems.

Object-Oriented Economy
Contrary to the cyberlibertarian vision of a self-contained internet platform, and
against the grain of the discursive tradition and the infrastructural tradition in commodity
studies, institutions play key roles in the circulation of objects on internet markets. In
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particular, state, commercial, and domestic institutions aim (and sometimes fail) to
control the movement of objects within their jurisdiction. Contraband objects enter digital
exchange when the state fails to regulate them through laws and law enforcement bodies
— a failure related to jurisdictional structures and resource allocations. The online
circulation of antiques follows from gaps and overflows in commercial antique
institutions, which allow objects to circulate on the internet, but on institutional terms.
Bottlenecks in commercial retail institutions and overflows in domestic institutions
underwrite the entrance of secondhand objects into internet markets. Secondhand goods
alternately represent the failure of retail institutions to dominate the exchange of goods
within their purview, and the ability of domestic institutions to control the after-life of
household goods. These institutions variously attempt to control the commercial process,
making them yet another player in the regulatory drama of internet markets. In what
follows, we'll consider the objects in escalating order of platform presence: first, antiques
on eBay; then, secondhand goods on Craigslist and eBay; and, finally, contraband on Silk
Road, Craigslist, and eBay. Contraband will be the main focus of the chapter, given its
empirical and demonstrative presence across the internet markets.

Act One: Antique Objects
On eBay, the circulation of antiques follows from overflows and gaps in
commercial antique institutions. Objects qualify as antiques by virtue of their historical
production origins. In antique culture, the production origin of an object — where, when,
and by whom it was produced — is central to the object's qualification and valuation as
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an antique.216 Customs authorities have regulatory jurisdiction over the movement of
antiques, and they determine which objects should not be removed from their production
origins. This is because antiques have a long history of being illegally transported.217
Antiques are also subject to regulation in the form of appraisals by trade associations.
eBay is part of a vast economic landscape in antique goods — retail venues, auction
houses, yard sales, and flea markets — its position within the antique landscape is
connected to its regulatory dynamics.218 On the one hand, eBay is more regulated than
yard sales and flea markets: vendor send auction items through the postal system, making
those items subject to customs regulation. On the other hand, eBay is less regulated than
auction houses and estate sale organizations, which employ in-house appraisers to ensure
the legitimacy and legality of antique goods. eBay thus occupies a middle ground in the
antique landscape between casual sales and formal institutions.
The circulation of antiques on eBay is related to the platform's middle ground
position. Let's consider two antiques that recently circulated on eBay. An antique plate
from eighteenth-century China attracted an opening bid of $25 in early 2018. When I
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interviewed the amateur antique dealer who posted the Chinese plate, he explained that
he purchased the item at an antique fair in New Orleans. Drawing on his knowledge of
Chinese history, the dealer reasoned that the plate was worth "about $200, at least $150",
nearly three times what he had paid for it at the city fair, and he hoped to resell the
antique for a profit. However, few buyers at his local flea market in Baton Rouge could
afford or appreciate the antique. Nor were auction houses an appealing option, given their
tendency to buy low and sell high. As he explained, "They "rip you off by telling you [the
antique] is crap and then making a low-ball offer." eBay offered a commercial middle
ground. "If I post it on eBay," he projected, "it'll actually get goods bids. If I try to sell it
here [in Baton Rouge], people will offer me jack shit." Here, the antique circulated
through a gap in the landscape of commercial antique institutions — namely, the middle
ground between the yard sale and the auction house.
The next antique is a product of a prestigious commercial institution. Where the
plate seller captures the proficient but amateur vendor, the next seller embodies the
institutional dealer, extending retail business into the online sphere. In 2017, an
established antique house posted for sale an eighteenth-century English cabinet with an
opening bid of $11,000. I spoke to the woman who posted the advertisement — an
antique dealer in her early thirties who works at the affiliated auction house and who
started the bookcase auction after the object failed to sell at the venue's brick-and-mortar
showing room. She described eBay as a "back up plan" for the sale of specialized
antiques, and her decision to post on eBay revolved around an excess of supply.
Following a brief stint in the main gallery of the auction house, the cabinet was "sitting in
storage" and "taking up space" for weeks. This prompted the vendor to advertise the
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object on eBay in search of an erudite and resourceful buyer from out of town. In this
case, the antique entered eBay through an overflow in the commercial antique institution.
In these cases, commercial antique institutions either forfeited or exerted control
over objects that fell within their purview. Neither yard sales nor auction houses sought
to control the movement of the Chinese plate, and this institutional indifference prompted
the dealer to sell the object on eBay. By contrast, the English cabinet was an object of
institutional control. The antique house placed the object in digital circulation, but on its
own terms — specifically, on the terms that it would sell and help solve an institutional
problem related to storage infrastructure. Here, the antique market played host to the
interplay of institutional indifference and institutional control. Far from self-regulating
and self-contained, eBay implicated institutions, their regulatory drives, and their
infrastructural capacities.

Act Two: Secondhand Objects
Secondhand goods enter Craigslist and eBay through bottlenecks in commercial
institutions and as byproducts of domestic institutions. On Craigslist, furniture, vehicles,
and electronics are major objects of secondhand exchange. These objects are widely
unregulated.219 They are also widely produced, being manufactured by industries oriented
around economies of scale (vehicles and furniture) or planned obsolescence
(electronics).220 Finally, they are widely purchased. Several social trends keep furniture,
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vehicles, and electronics in high demand: a residential culture of rapid relocation, an
autocentric national infrastructure, a bike-friendly city infrastructure, and a vast consumer
market in video games, televisions, cell phones, and assorted technological toys.221 These
objects are widely unregulated, widely produced, and widely purchased — factors that
typically grease the wheels of commerce. Yet furniture, vehicles, and electronics pass
through retail bottlenecks once they enter the market. Furniture outlets, car dealerships,
bike shops, and electronics retailers sell these commodities at high price, well above the
cost of manufacture. This commercial gridlock — expansive production, broad demand,
and restricted distribution — is a perfect storm for secondhand markets: there are many
of these goods, there are many potential customers for them, and they are far cheaper to
exchange once they leave the sphere of commercial institutions.
In the interviews I conducted with Craigslist users, many identified the platform
with inexpensive secondhand objects. These objects, they explained, could be bought or
sold at prices that were more reasonable than commercial retail outlets. In buying and
selling furniture on the platform, a Los Angeles woman in her 20's explained that "prices
are more reasonable" compared to retail stores. The high turnover rate of furniture by
individuals could occasionally lead to spectacular deals on secondhand interiors,
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"because people get desperate trying to get rid of things". A three-time car buyer with
whom I spoke likewise preferred the platform over conventional dealerships in light of
major price differentials. "I've witnessed dealerships tend to be more expensive," he
explained, "being that they have to make a profit and pay salaries. And I've found that
dealers are more inclined to hide problems with the vehicle that could cause major
problems." Exchange on Craigslist, according to him, was less profit-oriented and less
opaque than exchange at a car dealership, where institutional factors complicated
commerce and drove up the price of goods. For another user I interviewed, the exchange
of electronics on Craigslist was far more equitable than exchange at an electronics retail
venue. Video game retailers, the user complained, are willing to repurchase secondhand
consoles and games — but at an offensively low price. They will, for example, sell a new
XBox One for $500, purchase a used one for $80, and then resell the used ones for $200.
In these cases, secondhand objects enter Craigslist circulate through bottlenecks in
commercial retail institutions.
On eBay, secondhand goods enter the market as byproducts of domestic
institutions. In the auction market, electronics, clothing, and sporting goods are major
objects of secondhand exchange. Since we already spoke about electronics, we'll focus on
clothing and sporting goods here. Clothing and sporting goods are widely produced and
potentially longevous: they may be maintained over years through proper care.222
Moreover, clothing and sporting goods are household objects that circulate through
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domestic institutions, or spaces of human development, such familial households and
other institutions of care. In these domestic spheres, care workers are able to maintain the
longevity of clothing and sporting goods by means of domestic labor — the ongoing
work of washing, drying, folding, sorting, and storing goods. Domestic caretakers, who
are overwhelmingly women, maintain the quality of secondhand objects and thus make
them eligible for resale on internet markets. In this way, secondhand objects on eBay
circulate as derivatives of the domestic care system. The practices of human
development, performed by women and other caretakers, underwrite the afterlife of
consumer objects. Often, this is unintentional: caretakes maintain objects within the
proximate context of domestic institutions, and this long-term care ends up making these
objects eligible for resale.
I interviewed several women who have used eBay to sell clothing and sporting
equipment that their children no longer needed. A California woman began to sell her
daughter's old clothing on the platform in order to clear the house for an upcoming move.
She described the collection as "years of clothes", "nice stuff" that was "basically
collecting dust". After selling "a ton of dresses and shirts", plus "all of the purses" that
she had posted, she took down the remaining advertisements and gave the unsold goods
to charity. Another woman with whom I spoke sold used sporting equipment out of
which her sons had grown: "bats, helmets, cleats, you name it". During our interview, she
reflected on the amount of object turnover within her family. "Everybody needs
something," she stated, referring to her husband and sons, "and then a year later forget
[sic] about it." When a mother of five, who I interviewed, became an empty nester, she
and her husband decided to renovate their basement, which had served as storage space
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for domestic detritus. The pair ended up making "several hundred dollars" by selling a
full pair of old golf clubs, "at least a dozen dresses", and other miscellaneous objects. In
such instances, secondhand objects circulate as byproducts of domestic care systems.
Secondhand objects on internet markets are bound up in institutional dynamics.
Commercial retail institutions try but fail to control the exchange of commodities in their
purview. Furniture outlets, car dealerships, bike stores, and video game retailers seek to
dominate the movement of goods that fall within their respective markets, but their
distribution bottlenecks make them unnattractive commercial venues for many
consumers. By exchanging objects outside of these bottlenecks, Craigslist users avoid the
high prices and slick selling tactics of conventional retail institutions. By contrast,
domestic institutions effectively control the after-life of household goods, even if that
control is unintentional at first. Care work gives secondhand objects a second life,
enabling them move outside of domestic institutions into venues of electronic commerce.
In such cases, merchant labor serves as an extension of domestic labor. Care work not
only makes secondhand objects eligible for resale; but the act of reselling is itself a
means to clean, and thereby maintain, the household. In one fell swoop, domestic care
workers maintain the household and generate revenue for the domestic institution. In both
cases, institutional dynamics figure centrally in the circulation of objects through internet
markets.
Here, role of institutions within electronic commerce stands in contrast to the
cyberlibertarian vision of a self-contained internet platform. It also exceeds the realms of
discourse and infrastructure, which are considered integral factors in commodity
circulation.
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Act Three: Contraband
On Craigslist, eBay, and Silk Road, the circulation of contraband follows from
lacunae in state institutions. More than commercial institutions, and far more than
domestic institutions, state institutions vigorously attempt to control the movement of
objects under their jurisidiction. By and large, they succeed in this attempt — enforcing
drug, firearm, and military equipment laws through authoritative state agencies. Yet the
digital exchange of contraband represents a failure by the state to regulate outlawed
objects. Silk Road enjoyed a temporary vacation from institutional control due to the
state's jurisdictional structure, in which only federal agencies have the capacity to execute
technologically sophisticated operations. On Craigslist, the movement of contraband also
follows from the jurisdictional structure of the state, but in a different way: local law
enforcement bodies generally lack the resources necessary to monitor illegal
advertisements and locate offending parties., Contraband on eBay likewise follows from
the jursidictional structure of the state, falling into a middle ground between federal and
local agencies. Loopholes in the state laws also figure into the circulation of contraband
on these platforms. That all three internet markets are also black markets underlines the
relationship between state institutional "failure" and internet market objects: contraband
enters digital circulation in those situated spaces where the state fails to control the
objects in its purview. Let's begin with drugs on Silk Road and Craigslist before turning
to the arms trade on Silk Road, Craigslist, and eBay.
On Silk Road, multiple lacunae in state power made possible the circulation of
drugs on the platform. In a 2013 Senate hearing on Bitcoin, Silk Road, and the dark web,
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federal law enforcement officials explained the problems associated with the enforcement
of cybercrime.223 The hearing sheds light on the institutional gaps that Silk Road
exploited durings it brief tenture.
First and foremost, the circulation of drugs on Silk Road followed from a jurisdictional
gap related to the infrastructure of the dark web. Conventionally, the United States
government, like many European states, divides jurisdiction over the enforcement of drug
laws between multiple agencies at municipal, state, and federal levels.224 However, in the
case of black markets on the dark web, federal agencies — specifically, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) — are exclusively equipped to enforce drug
laws, because they possess the resources and expertise necessary to shut down dark web
markets.225 Recall that dark web infrastructure is highly anonymous and that federal
agents could only shut down Silk Road after gaining access to its administrative
homepage via the login credentials on Ulbricht's seized laptop.226 Today, federal agencies
continue to shut down dark web markets, but only from the inside, after infiltrating their
root systems.227 Being the original black market on the dark web, Silk Road enjoyed a
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relatively long tenure before being taken down, in the wake of a three-year federal
investigation.228 Because only federal agencies were equipped to enforce drug laws on
the platform, and because that enforcement took years to enact, drugs on Silk Road
circulated through a lacuna in state power that was jurisdictional and transitory in nature
— on the one hand, the absence of non-federal agencies who could typically enforce drug
laws, and, on the other hand, the temporal delay in looming federal enforcement.
Silk Road took additional steps to evade state power while conducting black
market exchange on the platform. In a second lacuna, drugs circulated through a digital
cryptocurrency designed to dodge state power. Unlike interpersonal drug exchange, drug
transactions on Silk Road were technical processes with inevitable digital trails. Even as
the black market was briefly immune to state takedown, individual merchants could still
be identified and prosecuted through their financial dealings. Silk Road merchants
accordingly conducted commerce in Bitcoin, a digital cryptocurrency that supports
verifiable and anonymous transactions without a centralized third party.229 Bitcoin may
be exchanged electronically between parties and without the direct involvement of banks
or states, as the digital "wallets" that hold Bitcoin are currently not under the regulatory
purview of either institution.230 Bitcoin may be sent over the internet with relative ease
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and stored in a digital wallet with relative anonymity, making the currency attractive to
those looking to evade state surveillance online. Beyond the reach of the state and
between the parties involved, Bitcoin allowed Silk Road drugs to be exchanged outside
the purview of state records and state surveillance. Covert delivery practices (discussed at
length in chapter 3) also allowed drugs to be exchanged without detection by the state.
Silk Road drugs were often delivered through the postal system, which, according to
vendors on the discussion board, tended to examine the contents of exchange less often
than private couriers. In order to evade detection by postal authorities, vendors
camouflaged drugs in the mail by padding envelopes, using discreet boxes, and
concealing items inside a variety of containers meant to distract or deceive: tampon
boxes, potato chips, and candy wrappers.231 The relatively small size of controlled
substances made covert shipment a possibility. Here, state postal authorities fail to
control the movement of contraband within their purview.
On Craigslist, drugs circulate through lacunae in state power related to the
jurisdictional structure of law enforcement. Thomas Dart, the former sheriff of Cook
County in Illinois, explained the jurisdictional problem of illegal activity on Craigslist
when he filed an unsuccesful lawsuit against the company for facilitating prostitution.232
His statements in court help us understand the allocation of state resources at the level of
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local law enforcement. Municipal law enforcement agenices typically possess jurisdiction
over local drug exchange.233 However, because these agencies rarely have the resources
to track down internet users, and because federal agencies generally focus on the
takedown of large black markets, drug traffic on Craigslist occurs in a jurisdictional gray
zone — too large of a task for local authorities and too little of a problem for federal
ones.234 That Craigslist is willing to provide law enforcement agencies with whatever
information they require matters little when those agencies lack the resources necessary
to track down actors involved in online contraband exchange. The regulation of
contraband by the state becomes less vigorous on local level, due to the resource
limitations of municipal law enforcement agencies.
Craigslist actors take additional steps to protect themselves from state power.
After all, even though local law enforcement agencies do not meticulously survey
Craigslist, these agencies still operate in the places where Craigslist traders conduct
illegal exchange. Local commerce means cash exchange: the technical trappings of
Bitcoin and Paypal are unnecessary during face-to-face transactions, and cash is the
preferred medium of exchange for criminal actors broadly, because cash is supremely
easy to launder.235 Local commerce also means that temporary mobile phone ("burners")
and peer-to-peer messaging services play roles in the economy of Craigslist contraband
exchange. Trading partners must arrange the details of the exchange and the interpersonal
encounter in real time, and these temporary and encrypted media allow merchants to
evade state power in so doing. Here, the evasion of state power informs the transactional
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and communicative dimensions of contraband. Finally, because Craigslist formally
prohibits the exchange of illegal objects on the platform,236 drug vendors on the platform
use obfuscated text, colloquial terms, and linguistic cyphers to evade platform filters.
Coded terms, vague and ever-changing, are able to evade the site's automated protocol,
formalized and static. Craigslist drugs consequently circulate through loopholes in digital
protocols, in addition to gaps in state institutional control.
Lacunae in state power also make possible the digital exchange of weapons on
internet markets. Despite the wide production and the minimal regulation of guns in the
United States,237 the arms trade on Silk Road faced significant regulatory challenge.
Firearms law in the United States requires a federal license to ship firearms across state
lines, one of the few regulations by which gun retailers on the internet must abide.238
Unlike drugs, weapons cannot be hidden in candy wrappers and shipped in secret. Yet a
condition in firearms law permits gun parts or "components" to be shipped without a
license.239 Consequently, Silk Road vendors broke down weapons into their constituent
parts, and shipped each part separately. Buyers were responsible for assembling the
weapon on their own, a task covered in gun tutorials on firearm websites.240 This postal
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hack is essentially a commercial version of packet switching, the computing process by
which information is broken down into constituent bits for delivery and then reassembled
upon arrival. Where the computational process exploits the small size of bits for speedy
delivery through a digital network, the delivery method exploits the legal status of
weapons parts for permissible delivery through a postal network. Drugs circulated
through this exception in firearms law — a state regulation designed to control the
movement of guns.
Where the arms trade on Silk Road relied on a postal loophole in firearm law, the
arms trade on Craigslist relies on an the interpersonal loophole in firearms law — that
weapons may be exchanged freely between private citizens.241 Firearms on Craigslist
circulate through the regulatory exemptions of interpersonal weapon exchange, an
abeyance in the state enforcement of firearms law. Further, because Craigslist is a local
market that relies on face-to-face encounters, users of the platform are exempt from
postal regulations, both the legal permits of online gun distributors and the obfuscation
strategies of Craigslist merchants. Craigs formally prohibits weapons, just as it prohibits
drugs and other illegal items.242 Indeed, weaponry is the first group of items on the
platform's list of prohibited objects, suggesting that the platform recognizes the existence
of an arms trade on its site. In its Prohibited policy, Craigslist forbids the exchange
"weapons; firearms/guns and components; BB/pellet, stun, and spear guns; etc." and

Technica, March 22, 2018, https://arstechnica.com/informationtechnology/2018/03/youtube-to-crack-down-harder-on-videos-about-building-buyingfirearms.
241
Wintemute, Background Checks for Firearm Transfers.
242
Craigslist, "Prohibited."

140
"ammunition, clips, cartridges, reloading materials, gunpowder, fireworks, explosives".243
Yet firearms advertisements appear regularly on the platform, often without textual
obfuscation, in places such as New York, Texas, and Georgia. The explanatory logic of
firearms circulation finds a limit in the platform's black box filter. It is possible that the
filter errs on the side of laissez faire and that some weapon advertisements are indeed
taken down. What is evident, however, is the presence of an arms trade that evades state
and platform regulations alike.
On eBay, weapons circulate through a different lacuna in state power. eBay
mainly features auxiliary protective gear and defense equipment. The items that qualify
as contraband are those that the military produces for internal use only. According to
2008 report by United States Governmental Accountability Office, eBay circulates a
variety of sensitive military equipment: F-14 antennas, biological chemical gear, and
body armor plates, some of which are in demand by enemies of the US.244 This is
equipment that is regulated by the military, but that escapes the military's system of
object control, presumably through theft and mishandling. (However informative, the
GAO survey does not detail the internal military policies surrounding the regulation of
sensitive defense equipment.) Although the report is dated, restricted military equipment
continues to appear on the platform, contrary to eBay's formal ban on illegal objects.245
Following black market logic, military gear is often more valuable than firearms,
precisely because firearms are so widely produced. For instance, a 2017 auction for a
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Kevlar helmet directly indicates its exclusive use in the military. As on Craigslist, the
platform's black box filter prevents a clear expanation of this state of affairs. It is possible
that the filter is more permissive than restrictive in determining what objects are allowed
to circulate in the auction market. Regardless, these pieces defense equipment circulate
through a breakdown in the state regulation of objects— in particular, the military
regulation of objects.
In all of these cases, the circulation contraband on internet markets follows from a
failure of state institutions to regulate the objects that they outlaw. This failure is the
exception, not the rule, as the state conventionally wields its legal authority to effectively
prevent the circulation of contraband. Platforms likely take down more contraband than
they passively allow to circulate, cooperating with law enforcement authorities when
necessary. Yet state institutions feature jurisdictional structures, resource limitations, and
legal exceptions that make possible the online circulation of contraband. Contrary to the
cyberlibertarian vision of a self-regulating and self-contained internet platform, the
regulatory endeavors of state institutions figure centrally in the digital exchange of
contraband.

Whose Objects?
Cyberlibertarianism casts internet markets as self-regulating and self-contained
spheres of digital activity, discrete zones of electronic commerce that are immune to
regulatory concerns and external interferences. Central to the cyberlibertarian vision of an
internet platform in perpetual equilibrium is the absence of institutions — those bugbears
of libertarianism and cybernetics that are said to undermine the integrity of economic and
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technological systems. Craigslist, eBay, and Silk Road variously subscribe to this
cyberlibertarian vision, even as they cooperate with state institutions and operate
according to corporate structures. The dream of fully automated commerce is also a
dream of commerce beyond institutional involvement. Yet state, commercial, and
domestic institutions figure centrally in the circulation of objects on internet markets.
These institutions take steps to control the movement of goods within their purview.
These steps range in character from vigorous to casual, but they make institutions key
players in the regulatory drama of internet markets.
Contraband is the most conspicuous case of institutional and regulatory drama, as
states invest significant resources in the regulation of contraband yet fail to
comprehensively undercut the movement of outlawed goods. In such cases, black market
actors not only exploit the circumstantial absence of institutional control but take
additional steps to evade state detection. The interplay of institutional control, actor
strategy, and market activity in the context of contraband exchange exemplifies the
regulatory drama of internet markets. That contraband circulates across Craigslist, eBay,
and Silk Road alike demonstrates the relationship between electronic commerce and
regulatory exception: objects enter the free digital market in moments when institutional
control falls short, changes orientation, or exceeds expectation. Anomalies in institutional
regulation helps underwrite objects in digital circulation. A strange day for one is a
typical day for the other.
The digital free market shows us how institutions enter into the exchange process
through the provision of market objects. This is important, because internet markets are
designed to make regulations and institutions obsolete. If institutions make oblique
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appearances in the very place where they are supposed to be irrelevant, then it is likely
that electronic commerce will always be connected to institutions in some fashion. The
role of institutions in digital exchange may be obvious in the context of postal delivery
systems, which help transport the objects sold online; but it is less obvious in the context
of object provision, as institutions help furnish the goods that make digital exchange
possible. In addition to discourses and infrastructures, then, institutions can play
important roles in the circulation of commodities on the internet. With material interests
and regulatory powers, institutions are not neutral backdrops but motivated actors in
digital exchange. As we saw in the last two chapters, users and platforms sometimes rely
on institutions to control the commercial process, as when Craigslist merchants meet in
front of local police stations or when eBay tailors its policies to corporate structures. But
this is not all: institutions themselves enter the theater of electronic commerce and exert
regulatory control over the movement of objects. The digital free market also show us
how institutional regulatory control can break down, alter course, or surpass expectation.
On internet markets, institutions can fail to realize their regulatory goals, shift their
regulatory strategies, or perform regulatory functions without prior intention. This helps
us understand how institutions work in the context of electronic commerce — and how
they fail.
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CONCLUSION
BEYOND CYBERLIBERTARIANISM
According to cyberlibertarianism, internet markets should be self-regulating and
self-contained spheres of digital economic activity. Yet exchange platforms are scenes of
regulatory drama, as actors of all stripes — individual, institutional, casual, and dedicated
— take steps to control the commercial process and alleviate concerns of fraudulent
exchange. Automated protocols, designed to replace regulations, end up being the very
means by which economic conflict occurs. Website infrastructure and platform culture,
figured by cyberlibertarianism as neutral backdrops of exchange, end up being vital
resources for actors intent on controlling the commercial process. State, commercial, and
domestic institutions, cast as irrelevant to an autonomous internet by the digital ideology,
end up furnishing many of the objects involved in internet exchange. Far from the
cyberlibertarian vision of digital exchange beyond regulations and institutions, internet
markets are embedded spheres of electronic commerce, which implicate control
mechanisms and external factors in their core operations. My critique of
cyberlibertarianism, rooted in the dynamics of internet markets, has broader
consequences for how we understand the digital ideology, the dynamics of electronic
commerce, and the role of regulations and institutions on the internet.
As venues that actualize cyberlibertarian principles, internet markets are ideal
case studies of the digital ideology. The actualization of cyberlibertarian principles is
important, because advocates of the digital ideology are wont to complain that
regulations prevent the emergence of an internet equilibrium. Karl Polanyi noted this
tendency in his midcentury critique of free market libertarianism, which always insists
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that its theory will be realized, once the next regulation is removed (and the next, and the
next).246 By meeting the laissez faire conditions demanded by cyberlibertarianism,
internet markets are experiments in the digital ideology that decisively disprove its
predictions. They foil the cyberlibertarian excuse that internet regulations are standing in
the way of an autonomous digital sphere. If the predictions of cyberlibertarianism cannot
be realized in the free digital market, then they likely cannot be realized anywhere. This
makes internet markets valuable objects of study: they uniquely actualize the tenets of
cyberlibertarianism and, in so doing, demonstrate significant flaws in the influential
paradigm. Moving forward, they may serve as a counterpoint to the claim that an internet
equilibrium is just one regulatory removal away.
Nearly two decades ago, Lawrence Lessig penned a classic work on internet
regulation. In Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Lessig critiqued the idea that
conventional regulations could not touch the internet.247 Several years later, in the preface
to the second edition of Code, Lessig noted that he had originally set out to evaluate the
fashionable notion that "cyberspace was beyond the reach of real-space regulation"248.
Popular ideas about the internet have considerably changed since the original publication
of Code. Today, one popular idea is that regulations ought not touch the internet — an
idea that I characterize as cyberlibertarianism. Central to this ideological imperative is the
rejection of regulations and institutions on the internet. In this line of thought, internet
activity, including commercial activity, is fundamentally cooperative, making regulations
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effectively unnecessary, and making institutions largely obsolete. Peter Thiel's vision of a
libertarian island nation is a nice material analog to the vision of internet platforms as
self-regulating and self-contained spheres of digital activity.
Still, cyberlibertarianism is changing. For instance, internet platforms have begun
to install increasingly sophisticated systems of content moderation.249 Laissez faire might
be the company line, but the company practice is quite different. This recalls a paradox of
cyberlibertarianism, discussed in the introduction: internet platforms insist on immunity
from state regulations, even as they cooperate with state institutions in various ways. The
state is also whistling a different tune when it comes to platform liability. Recent
legislation introduced an exception to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
by eliminating platform immunity in cases of human trafficking.250 This is the very first
crack in the legal edifice of Section 230, upon which platforms have relied to defend their
autonomy against state interference. Mark Zuckerberg's 2018 Congressional testimony
captures some the changes in cyberlibertarianism as they unfold within states and
platforms. Although the questions posed by members of Congress were far from
sophisticated, the governmental demand that Facebook account for its mismanagement of
data denotes an institutional willingness to, at the very least, have a conversation about
internet regulation, institutional oversight, and platform responsibility. Zuckerberg's
token response to the problem of regulation was not self-regulation by users (as it was in
2010) but self-regulation by automation — specifically, artificial intelligence tools
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designed to monitor and analyze content. This answer, which I discuss in more detail
below, suggests an active approach to platform regulation that does not simply rest on the
combined decisions of users. In this respect, cyberlibertarianism is coming to feature
another paradox: platforms insist that they are basically self-regulating, but they install
regulatory controls nonetheless. As with the paradox of the state, platforms want to be
seen as self-regulating and get credit for installing regulations. "We don't need
regulations," the new company line seems to run, "but we're going to install them
anyway."
If cyberlibertarianism overlooks the role of regulations and institutions on the
internet, then actors outside of the technology industry should insist on the reality of
regulations and institutions in order to create a fair and cooperative internet. Part of the
critical intellectual tradition consists of identifying the ideological assumptions that
structure social life. Cyberlibertarianism is an ideology that structures social life in its
technological aspect. It is crucially important that we understand cyberlibertarianism —
not only because technology companies have major public platforms upon which to
espouse their views and defend their practices, but also because other forms of thought
share assumptions with cyberlibertarianism. My argument in this project identifies the
subtle parallels between cyberlibertarianism and certain scholarly formulations. In
pointing out these parallels, I do not mean to suggest that these formulations of thought
should be dismissed as unwitting puppets of the digital ideology. Rather, I mean to
demonstrate that cyberlibertarianism is far from a pet theory of motivated technology
actors. It cannot be reduced to an ideological pawn that serves the economic interests of
Silicon Valley (although it certainly does serve those interests). Cyberlibertarianism
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should instead be understood as a compelling way of thinking about technology and
society, which variously influences internet policy, public debate, and scholarly research.
In the context of internet markets, cyberlibertarianism shares key assumptions
with electronic reputation studies, free labor theory, and accounts of digital economy,
digital labor, and digital commodities. Cyberlibertarianism and electronic reputation
studies converge on a view of internet exchange, including economic exchange, as
fundamentally cooperative. Here, in the absence of conflict, regulations and institutions
have little importance as mechanisms of cooperation that are grounded in productive
authority. These paradigms overlook the important difference between regulations, which
can be enforced by jurisdictional institutions, and protocols, which can only be embedded
into computational systems. Code, as Lessig had it, is indeed a kind of law — but a law
without a regulatory institution to enforce its conditions. In Kojin Karatani’s political
terms, code is law in the “nation” sense of guiding behavior but not in the “state” sense of
enforcing behavioral standards. In overlooking this distinction, cyberlibertarianism and
electronic reputation studies are unable to account for the manipulation of platform
protocols, whereby actors take advantage of institutional absence to avoid regulatory
consequence. In particular, the idea that rating systems can replace status codes misses
the regulatory enforcement that face-to-face communities are able to enact. Recognizing
the difference between protocols and regulations can set the groundwork for platforms
regulations that are actually effective and that don't rely on a vision of fully automated
commerce.
Meanwhile, in its focus on monetization, free labor theory ultimately forwards an
economic functionalism, in which all internet activity contributes to the online production
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of capital. Tiziana Terranova frames internet platforms as economic whirlpools that drag
all activity into their monetizing currents. Despite its roots in the critical tradition, this
framework is not so different from the cyberlibertarian vision of internet markets as selfcontained economies. The upshot of both paradigms is that economic forces are
fundamental and non-economic forces are marginal. Yet internet markets demonstrate the
importance of non-economic forces in the operations of digital exchange. The claim that
economies are embedded is far from original, but, in the context of the internet economy,
the claim needs to be asserted as a counter to an economic functionalism that privileges
the movement of capital as proper to internet platforms. Here, economic functionalism
neglects the role of regulations and institutions online, unless they play conspicuous parts
in digital monetization.
The conceptual focus on resource allocation continues in accounts of digital
economy and digital labor. These accounts generally sideline infrastructures, cultures,
and institutions in their emphasis on the location and provision of economic resources
online. As functions of institutions, regulations play even less of a role in many of these
accounts. Such accounts are willing to recognize the role of non-economic factors, but as
conditions that set the scene rather than as elements that drive the narrative — as prelude,
not as plot. Wikimomics makes no mention of regulatory concerns over data brokerage,
and The Rise of the Network Society assumes that immaterial and material objects will
float through global networks without regulatory stopgaps.251 Accounts of digital labor
fare better in this evaluation. Lily Irani and Sarah Roberts consider the infrastructure and
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the culture of technology work, but they mainly focus on the economic value generated in
these outsourced spheres.252 Although many of these writers would certainly recognize
the embedded nature of the digital economy and digital labor, this recognition does not
necessarily play out in their analyses. The conceptual focus on economic resource
distribution can overlook the ways that non-economic factors enter into that distribution.
In the context of the internet, scholars should follow the money — but keep going once
they find it.
The discursive tradition and the infrastructural traditions of commodity analysis
are more willing to consider the role of non-economic factors in the circulation of
consumer objects. Still, these traditions tend to treat commodities as symbolic objects or
systemic objects, rather than as institutional objects. When institutions do enter the
picture, they are sites rather than agents: commercial institutions produce objects, and
domestic institutions consume them. This brings us back to the lacuna of exchange,
discussed in the introduction: the sphere of production and the sphere of consumption are
well covered in the scholarship, but the sphere of circulation is less comprehensively
studied. Institutions operate differently in the context of circulation, as they take on the
messy task of controlling the movement of objects. State institutions, in particular, face a
staggeringly complex task in the control of contraband circulation. As black markets,
exchange platforms underline the relevance of state institutions to the study of
commodities. More broadly, insofar as institutions provide many of the objects that
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circulate in the free digital market, exchange platforms encourage us to think about
commodities as symbolic, infrastructural, and institutional objects. To overlook the role
of institutions in the circulation of commodities on the internet is to risk a
cyberlibertarian formulation, in which exchange platforms play host to the movement of
goods beyond the banal realities of institutions.
Cyberlibertarianism, then, is not a pipe dream of technologists but an appealing
framework for understanding technology and society. Those who are interested in an
equitable internet must understand the appeal of cyberlibertarianism in order undermine
its influence. The appeal of cyberlibertarianism is partially rooted in its relationship to
other ideologies and its simplicity as a conceptual framework. First and foremost, the
digital ideology draws on the celebration of the market as an engine of prosperity; this
celebration continues today, even after the decline of free market fundamentalism in the
Hayekian vein.253 It is not a far leap from a self-regulating market to a self-regulating
internet to a self-regulating internet platform. The celebration of the market, in turn,
draws on the classical liberal formulation of negative liberty, which defines freedom as
the absence of authority, including institutional authority. Here, freedom and control are
mutually exclusive forces that are in perpetual competition with one another.
Cyberlibertarianism follows in the footsteps of market ideology and negative liberty by
making an absolute distinction between internet freedom and institutional control. This
way of thinking about freedom and control is seductively simple: it creates a storybook
narrative of good actors and bad actors, and it pins all problems of technology and society
on the overbearing control tendencies of the bad actors.
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Individuals invested in a cooperative internet must understand the appeal of
cyberlibertarianism in order to create new frameworks that may counter its influence. We
need to think of compelling ways to frame technology and society that demand
accountability from actors in industry and in government. We need to be critical of state
power without framing institutions as fundamentally burdensome; and we need to
forward a view of positive liberty online, according to which institutional involvement
underwrites individual freedom on the internet. We need to be open to regulations
without framing them as panaceas to structural problems, which would only contribute to
the regulatory capture being executed by technology companies today. It is certainly
easier to create a seductive theory that is simple in nature, but the situation is too nuanced
and the stakes are too high for watered-down formulations. If we don't influence the
conversation around technology and society, then powerful actors with deep pockets and
compelling ideologies will.
One place to enter the conversation is contemporary discussions surrounding
automation. Part of what distinguishes internet markets from conventional markets is
their attempt to fully automate exchange and thereby facilitate commerce without
regulations and institutions. Blockchain advocates understand automation as a means to
outmode regulations and institutions in the context of electronic commerce. The
blockchain is a public ledger that records every cryptocurrency transaction and is,
undoubtedly, an important technological development.254 However, for many blockchain
advocates, the public ledger is a viable replacement for regulations and institutions,
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because the technology makes all transactions open and transparent.255 In this line of
thought, contracts are unnecessary when the blockchain is recording all transactions, and
courts are obsolete when the blockchain serves as a public record of exchange. For
advocates of the technology, the blockchain protocol promises to automate trade and
transcend the banalities of contract and court. The dream of fully automated commerce
lives on. In contrast to this dream, we should underline the shortcomings of automation
and highlight the differences between protocols and regulations. We should also consider
the role of the state in electronic commerce without subscribing to a blanket opposition to
institutional involvement.
In his 2018 Congressional hearing, Mark Zuckerberg positioned automation as a
clean technological solution to complex structural problems related to content
moderation. The idea that automation will comprehensively solve platform dysfunction
relies on a cyberlibertarian vision of a digital system in perpetual equilibrium. We should
counter this vision by highlighting the problems of internet conflict — not only
harassment and hate speech, but also deception and fraud, which treat automated
protocols as raw materials rather than definitive barriers. Paradoxically, by affirming the
reality of conflict on the internet, we can make inroads to a more cooperative web. In this
respect, contemporary studies of platform cooperativism could benefit from a broad
recognition of internet conflict, which will continue to be a problem on democratically
owned platforms.256 Internet conflict can become a point of departure for broader
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conversations surrounding platform governance, understood as regulations that are
institutionalized on the level of platforms.
Internet markets showcase the flaws of cyberlibertarianism, and they help us
understand the root structure of the digital ideology — its core assumptions, its idealized
visions, and its seductive qualities. Cyberlibertarianism is a sleek way of thinking about
the relationship between technology and society in an increasingly complex world:
innovation and freedom are good, institutions and regulations are bad, and the internet, to
revise Stewart Brand's formulation, wants to be free. Internet markets offer an alternative
account of freedom and control in the context of electronic commerce, and they help us
reframe the relationship between technology and society without the biases and blind
spots of cyberlibertarianism. The past decade witnessed considerable changes in
conversations surrounding technology, and the next decade will likely follow suit. As
cyberlibertarianism changes form, there is an opportunity to shift the dialogue in a
nuanced and cooperative direction. The state and the public are no longer willing to sit
back and let technology companies sidestep issues of accountability. At this critical
juncture, free digital markets help us understand the stakes of an unregulated internet, and
they furnish evidence that allows us to reframe conversations surrounding technology. A
new digital framework should ask what makes electronic commerce equitable or unfair,
what makes platforms functional or dysfunctional, what makes the internet cooperative or
conflictual, and what makes technological life liveable or, all to often, unliveable.

155

APPENDICES

Appendix I
Discussion Boards

Craigslist, eBay, and Silk Road each feature an internal discussion board on their
respective web domains, as well as auxiliary discussion boards on the Reddit web
domain. They each feature hundreds (in some cases, thousands) of conversational
threads, and they reach back to the origins of the markets themselves, or to the origins of
Reddit in the 2005. In these discussion boards, merchants have carte blanche freedom to
discuss anything that they please, from commerce and technology to culture and politics,
as well as critiques and complaints about the hosting platform. Understandably, most
discussion board conversation revolves around commerce, that being, after all, the topic
that unifies these internet merchant. Discussion boards are attractive research sources,
because they feature organic and topical conversations among many users, including
experienced users, over an extended period of time.
As organic discursive phenomena, discussion board conversations constitute
naturally occurring talk, understood as "informal conversation which would have
occurred even if it was not being observed or recorded, and which [is] unaffected by the
presence of the observer and/or the recording equipment"257. Naturally occurring talk
offers a window into the experiences, practices, and attitudes of interlocuters, without the
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mediation of the researcher and concomitant liabilities of her observing presence.
Discussion board conversation unfolds without the onus of being an object of
observation. Naturally occurring talk should not be cast as purer than other sources of
data that include observation,258 but it is useful for capturing extemporaneous interactions
between speakers.
From a methodological perspective, there are important limitations and drawbacks
to discussion board conversations. As digital discursive phenomena, discussion board
conversations do not include "the details of talk"259, such as pauses and non-verbal
expressions, which can offer insight into user attitudes. In addition to being uniquely
polished, discussion board conversations are unevenly distributed: not all users
participate in discussion board conversations, and, among those who do participate, some
contribute more than others. Further, as crowd-sourcing venues, discussion boards feature
what might be called the problem of experiential extremes. In a typical case of a
discussion board thread, a very inexperienced user asks a question, to which a very
experienced user offers an answer. Here, middle-ground perspectives are absent, and
discussion board analysis risks an over-emphasis on user extremes (naiveté and
expertise). Further, as crowd-sourcing mechanisms, discussion board conversations are
often oriented around problems. For instance, users may come to discussion boards after
they have been defrauded, in order to to vent, complain, or fix their commercial mistakes.
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Here, successful exchange is absent, and discussion board analysis risks an overemphasis on market breakdown. The problems of experiential extremes and market
breakdowns informed my processes of data collection, as discussed below. Despite these
problems, discussion boards are valuable sources of internet research, and there are many
precedents for analyzing user conversations in order to understand platforms.260
In order to identify trends in user activity on internet markets, I ran a total of
eighteen (18) web crawls — three on each of the six discussion boards. These crawls
were custom-built scripts in Python and Java, and they utilized a series of computational
tools to pull data out of HTML files and render them in manageable parse trees. These
tools included Celery, an asynchronous task queue that executes multiple jobs at once;
RabbitMQ, a messaging agent that manages these tasks; and Docker, to help coordinate
these programs. Given that thread conversations on discussion boards follow a commentresponse cycle, I designed the scripts to render whole threads rather than singular posts,
and this allowed me to capture the ebb and flow of naturally occurring web discourse.261
In effect, the scripts crawled (went through page by page) the discussion boards and
rendered (put into a separate document) all of the conversations that included select
keywords. When crawling the internal discussion boards of Craigslist and eBay, I
incorporated temporal boundaries and only rendered threads composed after 2010,
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around the time that Craigslist and eBay solidified their internet presence, as discussed in
the case studies section. Temporal boundaries helped limit the number of threads
rendered from these expansive and longevous discussion boards, which began in the
1990s.
I ran these scripts in groups of six at three different intervals. Let's go through my
logic for each script, foregrounding methodological processes in the spirit of Cho and
Trent, before discussing data analysis and interpretation. I used an iterative criterion
sample to guide my data collection during the web crawls. 262 That is, I sampled
discussion board data based on a criterion (the inclusion of certain keywords) and ran
multiple iterations of web crawls based on the findings of the preceding crawl(s).
Collecting data in waves helped "clarify the main patterns, see contrasts, identify
exceptions or discrepant instances, and uncover negative instances — where the pattern
does not hold"263. The criterion was theoretically driven: I began with general concerns,
and then developed orienting concepts as I went along.264 This process ran as follows.
Motivated by the relative absence of research on internet fraud,265 I began with a
series of keywords related to topic: fraud, scam, con, trick, and their semantic variations.
In this first wave, I ran web crawls with fraud-related keywords on each of the six
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discussion boards under study: the internal discussion boards and the Reddit boards of
Craigslist, eBay, and Silk Road. It should be noted that the Silk Road discussion board
that I crawled was an archived version of the original site,266 and, while the subreddit is
technically active, all of the posts from the Silk Road era were archived by Reddit. In
analyzing and interpreting these fraud-related threads, I noticed that users developed
commercial practices related to fraud evasion and market success. This lead to my second
set of crawls, which rendered threads with the following keywords: trust, honest, fair,
cooperative, good, best, and their semantic variations. This second round helped counter
the problem of market breakdown on discussion boards, or their tendency to foreground
failure and malfunction. In analyzing and interpreting these cooperation-related thread, I
found that users had different opinions on the matter, depending on their position as
buyer or seller. This lead to my third round of crawls, which rendered threads with the
following keywords: seller, vendor, sales, work, labor, business, and their semantic
variations. Each of these web crawls rendered between two hundred and three thousand
threads related to the topical keywords.
After developing a corpus of posts, I pattern-coded the parsed data with themes
that emerged progressively during the initial review.267 The data was rendered in a
Microsoft Word document, and I included pattern codes in the top left hand of the
document. (See coding protocol below.) I developed the pattern code in an iterative
fashion, moving between the collected data and my interests in electronic commerce.
This lead to the identification of typical case samples, which exemplified user activity in
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the context of fraud, cooperation, or labor.268 I concluded the pattern-coding when I
reached a saturation point, having had repeated (and decreasingly valuable) encounters
with the same set of accounts of user activity.269 Each waves of crawls generated
evidence that exceeded the concerns of its original criteria. In analyzing fraud, I came
across patterns of user customs and collective intelligence; in analyzing customs and
intelligence, I came across patterns related to labor and sales; in analyzing labor and
sales, I came full circle to patterns about fraud and customs. Through them all, I came
across patterns about systems and objects, those mute shadows of user activity.
Following collection, I employed a critical, interpretive approach to these case
samples. Drawing on textual analysis, I sought to identify patterns in user activity,
understood as a triplex of user experience, user practice, and user attitude.270 These
patterns were often explicit, as when users simply recounted what they did, how they did
it, and what they thought about it. Sometimes, these patterns were implicit, as when user
statements evinced deeper assumptions about commerce or technology. In those cases, I
followed Stuart Hall in considering the ideological "deep-structure" of discussion board
statements — their operative assumptions, embedded in the social and institutional
contexts of their utterance.271 Like critical discourse analysis, this type of analysis
respects the veracity of actors while remaining remaining attentive to their underlying
social position and material interests.272 Unlike critical discourse analysis, it does not rely
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on a formalized semantic code to unveil latent meaning; rather, it uses humanistic
interpretive methods to navigate the explicit and the implicit dimensions of a text.273
The question of ethics accompanied the collection of discussion board data. Users
were not entirely anonymous, because their statements were connected with their
profiles, and their profiles were connected to an active email. That said, users were
relatively anonymous, given the distance between identity and avatar.274 Craigslist, eBay,
and Reddit users posted in a public forum, "open and available to anyone with an internet
connection"275, with the knowledge that it would be read by others, although not
necessarily analyzed by others. Silk Road users posted in a semi-public forum, "available
to most people"276 with the technical know-how to navigate to the dark web. That data is
public or semi-public does not mean researchers have a priori permission to use the data
in their work.277 Privacy is a matter of "expectations and consensus"278, and internet
research needs to be attuned to the propriety of information flows.279 In the case of the
discussion boards, there was an evident public or semi-public quality, as well as a
relatively high degree of anonymity — either by virtue of the avatar/identity distance, or
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by virtue of anonymizing dark web protocols. Still, in order to protect user expectations
of privacy, and to ensure reasonable distance between individual, avatar, and research
data, I followed others in internet studies and refrained from citing individual discussion
board numbers, as these would shorten the figurative distance between individual and
research data.280
The nature of the discussion differed between venues and platforms. Craigslist
and eBay users discussed a set of commercial concerns that were not particularly
sensitive, given the general social acceptability of internet exchange.281 Silk Road users
discussed a set of commercial concerns that were particularly sensitive, given the illegal
nature of contraband exchange. I found that two factors mitigated this ethical issue. First,
users who posted on the Silk Road discussion board could only do so through a Silk Road
account, which required a dark web address for registration; this added a level of
anonymity to posts. Users who posted on the Silk Road subreddit did not have this
anonymous protection, but they posted on a public forum with less expectations of
privacy. Second, the Silk Road discussion board is an inactive website, making it even
more difficult to trace the connection between an avatar relic and an anonymized user.
On both the internal discussion board and the Silk Road subreddit, all users were a priori
former users. Like public circulation, temporal distance does not give researchers
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permission to use data sets, but it does lessen the stakes of admitted illegal activity.282
Between the expectations of privacy, the anonymizing technologies, and the archived
nature of the websites, I determined that discussion board conversations related to Silk
Road could be ethically collected. More broadly, given the proper storage and
management of the data, I found that discussion board conversations qualified as ethical
sources of research.

Crawl Details

Craigslist Forum

Website

https://forums.craigslist.org

Technical Elements

Python (Celery, RabbitMQ, Docker)

Keywords

Dates

Renders

Fraud, scam, trick

July 2017

905

Best, good deal, fair

August 2017

488

282

Emma Wincup, Criminological Research: Understanding Qualitative Methods
(Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2017).
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Seller, vendor, work

October 2017

654

Craigslist Reddit

Website

https://www.reddit.com/r/craigslist

Technical Elements

Python (Celery, RabbitMQ)

Keywords

Dates

Renders

Fraud, scam, trick

July 2017

248

Best, good deal, fair

August 2017

112

Seller, vendor, work

October 2017

186

eBay Discussion Board

Website

https://community.ebay.com/t5/Discussion-Boards/ct-

p/12001
Technical Elements

Java (Celery, RabbitMQ, Docker)

Keywords

Dates

Renders

Fraud, scam, trick

July 2017

1022

Best, good deal, fair

August 2017

356
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Seller, vendor, work

October 2017

768

eBay Reddit

Website

https://www.reddit.com/r/Ebay

Technical Elements

Python (Celery, RabbitMQ)

Keywords

Dates

Renders

Fraud, scam, trick

July 2017

296

Best, good deal, fair

August 2017

183

Seller, vendor, work

October 2017

205

Silk Road Forum

Website (original)

http://dkn255hz262ypmii.onion

Website (archived)

https://www.gwern.net/DNM-archives

Technical Elements

Python (Celery, RabbitMQ, Docker)
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Keywords

Dates

Renders

Fraud, scam, trick

July 2017

176

Best, good deal, fair

August 2017

97

Seller, vendor, work

October 2017

112

Silk Road Reddit

Website (presently)

https://www.reddit.com/r/deepweb

Website (formerly)

http:www.reddit.com/r/silkroad

Technical Elements

Python (Celery, RabbitMQ)

Keywords

Dates

Renders

Fraud, scam, trick

July 2017

84

Best, good deal, fair

August 2017

68

Seller, vendor, work

October 2017

47
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1. Establish that the post concerns the keyword topic: fraud, cooperation, selling, objects.
2. Mark the post as relating to one of the keywords.
3. Identify patterns within the marked posts to develop subcategories.
4. Mark the keyword-marked post as relating to one of the subcategories.
5. Stop when the subcategorized posts stop exhibiting diversity.
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Appendix II
Interviews

Twenty-seven semi-structured interviews with internet merchants constitute the
second major source of research data. I followed IRB protocol at each stage of interview
research, from contacting participants to storing data, and I received IRB approval from
the University of Pennsylvania.283 Where the discussion boards offered a breadth of data
related to user activity, the interviews offered a depth of data related to user activity. This
allowed me to hone in on the experiences, practices, and attitudes of individual users. On
the one hand, these interviews had an emic dimension, being concerned with platform
activity from the first-person perspective of individual users, each with their own
idiosyncratic circumstances, practices, and viewpoints.284 In this capacity, the interviews
gave me insight into the life-world of users and permitted me to "explore the meaning(s)
participants give to ideas and terms"285. This was helpful, for example, in understanding
how users thought about fraud. User perception plays a role in platform activity, blurring
the boundaries between the internal world of users and the external world of platforms.286
On the other hand, these interviews occurred within the broader etic orientation of the
research study, concerned with platform trends more than user perception. In this
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capacity, the interviews were valuable as triangulation mechanisms, as users elaborated
on platform trends identified in other sources.287 Conducting semi-structured interviews
over a seven-month period meant speaking to users about particular phenomena as
patterns emerged in the research. Still, my concern in those cases was with depth of data:
had users encountered this phenomenon, and, if so, what did they think about it?
Participant responses lead me in unexpected directions: some patterns appeared
significant but were not confirmed by users; and other patterns appeared insignificant but
turned out to be major concerns for users. Here, triangulation supported, but did not
conclusively guarantee, the identification of trends, whether expected or unexpected.
I selected interview participants first through a theoretical sample and then
through a sequentially-driven conceptual sample.288 In the theoretical sample, I sought
out experienced users of internet markets, understood as users who had been on Craigslist
or eBay for over seven years. These participants were "encultured informants"289 who had
command over platform activity and "access to information"290 derived from their time
on the site. In order to locate experienced users, I posted a call for interview participants
on four discussion boards: the internal discussion boards and the subreddits of Craigslist
and eBay. From this round of posting, I found thirteen users (seven from Craigslist and
six from eBay) who fit my criteria, and I conducted interviews with them over the course
of four months. Reddit was my most effective recruitment venue, as nine of the thirteen
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users contacted me through my advertisement on the site. These participants ranged in
age from 20s to 60s, and nine of the thirteen participants were men. In order to enhance
the credibility of my findings, I sought interview participants who would "reflect a
variety of perspectives"291. While the age range of the first sample was relatively varied,
the gender composition was not. Both men and experienced users were over-represented
in the sample, and this informed the next stage of recruitment. I returned to the discussion
boards and, through another set of advertisements, took a conceptually-driven sequential
sampling of women users and inexperienced users.292 In other words, my "initial choice
of informants lead [me] to similar and different ones"293 as points of comparison and
contrast. From this round of posting, I found eight users (four from Craigslist and four
from eBay). Five of them were experienced women users, two of them were
inexperienced men users, and one of them was an inexperienced woman user. These
interview took place over the course of two months. My last round of interviews occurred
over a month and proceeded according to a different conceptual frame — not the
characteristics of users but of objects. I identified typical advertisements for secondhand
and antique goods on eBay and Craigslist, and I contacted the users who posted those
objects for sale. Among those who agreed to be interviewed, two were men, and four
were women. These participants, ranging from expert dealers to casual resellers,
contributed to the experiential and gendered variety of the sample. I concluded the
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interviews when they reached a saturation point and stopped exhibiting significant
diversity.
Following recruitment, I conducted hour-long, semi-structured interviews with
participants in order to understand user experiences, practices, and attitudes. These were
text-only internet interviews that occurred in private chat rooms over Cyph, a peer-topeer online messaging system.294 I followed IRB protocol in protecting the confidentiality
and privacy of the interview data during each stage of the research process.295 As internet
interviews, they featured a degree of "contextual naturalness"296, understood as a sense of
conversational ease, arising from the familiar circumstance of a computer terminal, as
opposed to a face-to-face interview. This allowed participants to "use language the way
they do in most of their everyday interactions"297. However, as textual interviews, they
lacked the material richness of face-to-face interviews, being without facial expression
and body language, as well as "details of talk"298 — silences, verbal pauses, and selfcorrections. These non-verbal communication practices, valuable to the interview
researcher, were not available during my text-based, internet interviews.
In creating an interview template, I followed Herbert Rubin and Irene Rubin in
thinking of interviews as "structured conversations"299 designed to cover research
problems, which the interviewer develops beforehand, and to explore organic themes,
which arise during the course of the interview. I also followed Rubin and Rubin in
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structuring the interview into main questions, follow-up questions, and probes. These
question forms are designed to occasion "depth and detail, vivid and nuanced answers,
rich with thematic detail"300. Here, interview participants are understood as
"conversational partners"301, both information sources and meaning makers, and the
importance of follow-up questions and probes reflect this constructionist sensibility.302
First, I developed twelve main questions related to my research problems, such as fraud,
customs, and labor. These were general questions about user activity. How long have you
been using this platform? Are you more of a buyer or seller? What do you buy or sell on
the platform? Have you ever been scammed? Some of these were questions about user
opinions. Does selling on the platform feel like work? What do you think about platform
policies? Do you ever feel unsafe during meet-ups? I also included a few droll questions
that were relevant to my research questions but that also introduced some levity into the
(relatively intensive) interview. What was the weirdest thing you have ever seen on the
platform? Do you have a favorite memory associated with the site? Second, during the
interviews, I asked follow-up questions in response to participant statements. These
questions were formulated to occasion rich and nuanced explanations of user activity.
Detail and description were central guiding principles, as I focused on specific events and
objects. How did you come upon that rare antique? What happened the time you were
defrauded? Why did you post that item for sale online in the first place? How did you feel
about that? Third, as corollaries to the follow-up questions, I asked probes in order to
elicit clarity and deepen user responses. What do you mean by that term? Could you give

300

Rubin and Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing, 129.
Rubin and Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing, 79.
302
Warren, "Qualitative Intervewing.”
301

173
me an example of that? In preparing and conducting the interview, I worked to be
reflexive about my position as a researcher. I understand reflexivity as a process of selfquestioning in which the researcher remains "conscious of their cultural, linguistic,
political, and ideological origins and those they are studying"303. Aware of my
background in the university304, I used conversational language and steered clear of social
science categories305, asking low-stakes and open-ended questions in everyday terms.306
In analyzing the interviews, I pattern-coded the data with themes that emerged
progressively during review. The interviews were rendered in PDF documents, and I
included pattern codes in mark-ups to the documents. Some of themes overlapped with
patterns in other sources of evidence, and some of them were standalone themes unique
to the interviews. On the one hand, I treated the interviews as autonomous texts with their
own themes and patterns. I sought to identifying common experiences, practices, and
attitudes, while respecting the particularity of each user's experience. On the other hand, I
positioned the interviews alongside other sources of evidence. Consequently, during the
pattern-coding of the interviews, I identified patterns internal to the interviews, as well as
themes that cross-referenced with other sources of evidence.
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Following collection, I employed a critical, interpretive approach to the interview
data. As in the interpretation of discussion board conversations, I drew on textual analysis
in identifying patterns in user experience, user practice, and user attitude. These patterns
were both explicit and implicit, sometimes at the same time — as when users recounted
experiences (explicit) but did so in a way that belied deeper (implicit) assumptions about
that experience. In analyzing the implicit dimension of interview statements, I continued
to follow Stuart Hall in considering their ideological "deep-structure", or their covert
conceptual underpinning.307 As in critical discourse analysis, I respected the veracity of
actors while remaining remaining attentive to their underlying social position and
material interests.308 Still, I did not employ the semantic tools of critical discourse
analysis, preferring the tools of humanistic interpretation to navigate the manifest and
latent dimensions of interview statements.309 The specificity of interviews as a research
source also informed my interpretation of the data — and distinguished it from my
approach to the discussion board. Where discussion board conversations offered a
breadth of data and allowed for the interpretation of user activity within a far-reaching,
group context; interviews offered a depth of data and allowed for the interpretation of
user activity within a well-rounded, individual context. Unlike the discussion board,
interviews wove together the three dimensions of user activity — experience, practice,
and attitude — as users painted inclusive portraits of their platform engagement.
Comparatively, discussion board statements were fragmented: users related experiences,
practices, and attitude that fit the conversational circumstances, often without context.
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For example, where a discussion board participant might mention a strategy for selling
antiques in response to a question about sales, an interview participant could explain that
their selling strategies are derived from their experiences of purveying antiques and their
opinions about digital antique culture. The holism of the interview made for rich
interpretation, in which the explicit and the implicit were interwoven, and the three
dimensions of user experience were linked in single cases.
In reporting the interview, I followed Jonathan Potter and Alexa Hepburn in
making transparent the conditions of the interview, including the active role of the
interviewer.310 This meant, for example, mentioning when a statement was a response to
a specific question asked by me. I aimed to balance a commitment to transparency, on the
one hand, with a sense of flow in the presentation of evidence. Unlike other studies
involving research interviews, I did not reproduce the question and answer format of the
exchange. This was because my interpretation did not occasion a semantic analysis and a
concomitant breakdown of statements into constituent parts.311 There were other
limitations to the interviews beyond linguistic approaches. I did not collect data on class,
race, sexuality, ability, and other social factors that are part of internet markets insofar as
they are part of social life. I relied on a large-scale Pew survey of internet merchants to
set a baseline understanding of class and race on these platforms — which are
overwhelmingly occupied by middle-class whites. 312 Still, given the absence of relevant
data in my research, I avoided arguments related to these topics, despite there being many
to be made. Finally, as already mentioned, I did not conduct ethnographic field work, and
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my interviews cannot be taken as comprehensive accounts of internet markets, but only
as situated perspectives on experiences, practices, and opinions.

Recruitment Post

Hi everyone. Are there any regular [eBay/Craigslist] users interested in a paid and
anonymous interview? I'm looking for regular [eBay/Craigslist] users willing to
participate in a paid and anonymous interview about the platform — $40 via paypal for
an hour-long online chat interview.

A bit about me: I'm a phd student at the university of pennsylvania studying digital
economy. My dissertation is on internet markets, and [eBay/Craigslist] is one of my case
studies. You can check out my credentials on the university of pennsylvania website:
asc.upenn.edu/people/students/jonathan-pace

Safe travels and thanks for reading.

eBay Interview Questions

1.! What is your current city, gender, and age range (20s, 30s, etc.)?
2.! For how long have you been using eBay?
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3.! Are you more of a buyer or a seller?
4.! What are some examples of things you have purchased on eBay?
5.! What made you choose eBay over a conventional retail store?
6.! Have you ever purchased goods from other internet markets, such as Craigslist?
7.! Do you shop at antique stores or yard sales, as well?
8.! Have you ever seen bizarre or unexpected objects for sale on the website?
9.! What are some examples of things you have sold on eBay?
10.!What prompts you to post something for sale on the website?
11.!Do you have any selling strategies?
12.!Are you generally pleased with the price at which things sell?
13.!How much does selling through the website feel like work? Does it take up a lot of
time?
14.!Have you ever posted something for sale and received no bids on it?
15.!Have you ever encounter problems with fraud or scams?
16.!Are you active in the [forums/reddit] ? What is your interest there?
17.!Do you have a favorite memory or fun story associated with the website?

Craigslist Interview Questions

1.! What is your current city, gender, and age range (20s, 30s, etc.)?
2.! How long have you been using Craigslist?
3.! Are you more of a buyer or a seller?
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4.! What are some examples of things you have purchased on Craigslist?
5.! Why did you choose Craigslist over a conventional retail store?
6.! Where do you meet up with sellers to conduct transactions?
7.! Have you ever felt unsafe during a meet up?
8.! Have you ever seen bizarre or unexpected objects for sale on the website?
9.! Have you ever purchased goods from other internet markets, such as eBay?
10.!What are some examples of things you have sold on Craigslist?
11.!What prompts you to post something for sale on the website?
12.!Are you generally pleased with the price at which things sell?
13.!How much does selling through the website feel like work? Does it take up a lot of
time?
14.!Where do you meet up with buyers to conduct transactions?
15.!Have you ever posted something for sale and received no inquiries about it?
16.!Have you ever encounter problems with fraud or scams?
17.!Do you think Craigslist is doing enough to prevent fraud and scams?
18.!Are you active in the [forums/reddit]? What is your interest there?
19.!Do you have a favorite memory or fun story associated with the website?

Coding Protocol

1. Mark user statements as relating to one of the keywords: fraud, cooperation, selling,
objects.
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2. Identify patterns within the marked statements to develop subcategories.
3. Mark the keyword-marked statements as relating to one of the subcategories.
4. Stop when the subcategorized posts no longer exhibit significant diversity.

Interview Dates and Participant Numbers

Round 1

13 participants

July 2017

Round 2

8 participants

September 2017

Round 3

6 participants

October 2017
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Appendix III
Governmental Records

In analyizing governmental records. I looked at court cases; public reports from
governmental agencies; Congressional hearings, codes of law, such as contract, fraud,
postal, drug, and firearms law. I accessed these documents through PACER, an online
service that provides access to court records and documents; the University of
Pennsylvania law library; and governmental websites. My goal in looking at these
records was to understand the legal and governmental systems within which internet
markets operate. I began with a theoretical sample of institutional documents that directly
involved my case studies: court cases to which they were party and public reports in
which they were directly mentioned. This lead me to documents that indirectly involved
my case studies: court decisions that set precedents for internet laws under which they
operate; public reports about the internet crimes that occur on them; and Congressional
hearings related to their infrastructure, such as payment and dark web infrastructure, and
related to the regulation of contraband, which platforms circulate. Finally, I sought out
codes of law to fill in the gaps of my knowledge: contract and fraud law to understand the
legal dimensions of electronic commerce, and postal, drug, and firearms law to
understand the circulation of contraband through internet markets.
In analyzing the data, I pattern coded the material according to themes that
emerged during review. These pattern codes took the form of mark-ups on PDF
documents. Some of these themes overlapped with those developed in other sources. On
the one hand, I was interested in connecting institutional activity to user activity and
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platform activity. This was helpful, for example, in understanding how the circulation of
contraband (a user activity) could proceed without the intervention of content moderation
(platform activity) or law enforcement (institutional activity). On the other hand, I sought
out the novel components of the legal and governmental record, searching for evidence
that was unique thereto. For example, courts of law may demand that platforms explain
their secret or "black box" technologies in order to resolve legal disputes, and those
explanatory instances are valuable for internet research. Similarly, Congressional
hearings offered insight into the internal processes of governmental agencies, such as law
enforcement agencies.
In interpreting the documents, I continued to employ a critical, interpretive
approach, drawing on textual analysis to identify patterns in the systems surrounding
internet markets. Here, however, I foregrounded the institutional context of their
production. These are governmental documents, composed within state organizations that
have routinized processes and clear interests. Those who are speakers in these documents
— judges, federal officials, government workers — are embedded within this state
organization and follow its rubrics. I aimed to respect the veracity of these actors while
remaining remaining attentive to their underlying institutional position.313 In addition to
drawing on textual analysis, I drew on political-economic analysis in seeing states as
actors with material and symbolic resources, as well as strong incentives to protect and
maintain those resources.
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Documents List

Court Cases
•! Chicago Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law v. craigslist. Inc. 519 F.3d
666 (7th Cir. 2008).
•! craigslist. Inc. v. 3Taps, Inc. 3:12-CV-03816-CRB (N.C. Cal. 2015).
•! craigslist. Inc. v. Alecksey Kerbel et al. C-11-3309 EMC (N.D. Cal. 2012).
•! craigslist. Inc. v. John L. Stover et al. CV-11-03308 SBA (N.D. Cal. 2012).
•! craigslist. Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc. 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
•! Grace v. eBay. Inc. 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 192 (California Ct. App. 2004).
•! The United States of America v. Approximately Four Hundred Fifty (450) Ancient
Cuneiform Tablets; and Approximately Three Thousand (3.000) Ancient-Clay Bullae,
Case No. 1:17-cv-03980 (2018).
•! Thomas Dart, Sherriff of Cook County v. craigslist. Inc. 665 F. Supp. 2d 961 (E.D. Ill.
2009).
•! Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc. 576 F.Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
•! United States of America v. Ross William Ulbricht. 31 F. Supp. 3d 540 (S.D.N.Y..
2014).
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Governmental Reports
•! United States Governmental Accountability Office. "Internet Sales: Undercover
Purchases on eBay and Craigslist Reveal a Market for Sensitive and Stolen U.S.
Military Items." Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. House of
Representatives. April 10, 2008.
•! Internet Crime Complaint Center. "Internet Crime Report, 2017.” Last modified
January 15, 2018. https://pdf.ic3.gov/2016_IC3Report.pdf.

Congressional Hearings and Legislation
•! "Beyond Silk Road: The Potential Risks. Threats. and Promises of Virtual
Currencies." Hearing Before the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs. United States Senate. 113th Congress. November 18, 2013.
•! "Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017." H.R. 1865.
115th Congress.

Coding Protocol

1. Establish that document is relevant to one or more of the research topics.
2. Mark document as relating to one or more of the keywords: fraud, cooperation, sale,
objects.
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3. Identify patterns within the marked statements to develop subcategories.
4. Mark the keyword-marked statements as relating to one of the subcategories.
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Appendix IV
Platform Documents

Platform documents included user agreements, terms of use, user guidelines,
market policies, and promotional materials. In the case of Silk Road, I also used internal
platform records that detailed major site-related activity; these records were retrieved by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation during their investigation into Silk Road, and they
were presented as evidence by the prosecution in the criminal trial of Silk Road's
architect. I took a theoretical sample of platform documents related to user activity. Each
of these documents was designed to control user activity (guidelines and policies) or to
protect markets from problematic user activity (user agreements and terms of use). I
pattern-coded this data with themes that emerged progressively through review, and some
of these overlapped with themes that developed from other research sources. For
instance, a user agreement bans a practice that, as relayed in discussion board
conversations and interviews, nevertheless occurs on the platform; and the phrasing of
the user agreement reflects the state of internet law, as relayed in the legal records. Note
how triangulation unfolds in this case — not with the goal of comprehensive
generalizability but with the goal of credible trend identification. In interpreting these
documents, I drew on textual analysis to identify patterns in platform activity. More
notably, I drew on political-economic analysis to consider how the material interests of
platforms inform their user documentation. This includes, for instance, how user
agreements enable platform companies to control economic resources or evade legal
liabilities.
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Document List

•! Craigslist
o! "About"
o! "Avoiding Scams"
o! "Flags and Community Moderation"
o! "Jim Buckmaster"
o! "Prohibited"
o! "Terms of Use"
•! eBay
o! "Money Back Guarantee"
o! "Prohibited and Restricted Items"
o! "User Agreement"
•! Silk Road
o! "Weekly Reports"
o! "Expense Reports"
o! "Net Worth Calculator"
o! "Breakdown of Sales Data"
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Appendix V
Supplemental Media

ABC News
AIM Group
Alexa Statistics
The Atlantic
Ars Technica
Bright Planet
Business Insider
CBS News
CNN
CNet
Columbia Business Times
Crunchbase
The Economist
Fast Company
Finance India
Forbes
Gawker
Gizmodo
GQ
The Gothamist
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The Guardian
The Hill
Marin Independent Journal
Mashable
The Morning Call
The New York Times
The New Yorker
NBC Los Angeles
NBC Washington
Philly.com
Quartz
SF Gate
Slate
Tech Crunch
Vanity Fair
Variety
VICE
The Washington Post
Wired
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Appendix IV
Primer on the Case Studies

Craigslist
The history of Craigslist begins in 1995, when Craig Newmark, a computer
programmer turned consultant, started a e-mailing friends and coworkers about events in
San Francisco related to art and technology.314 The e-mail chain eventually snowballed to
a formal listserv that included two hundred people, who introduced apartment searches
and job hunts into the discussion. When the listserv grew too large, Newmark created a
website with a dot-org top-level domain; he named the platform Craigslist, because, as he
recalls, users told him, "'Hey, we already call it Craigslist. Let's keep it personal and
quirky and just call it Craigslist.'"315 By 1999, when Newmark hired Jim Buckmaster to
oversee the site's technical operations, Craigslist was being visited over a million times
per month, making it one of the most popular platforms on the (relatively) budding
internet.316 Over the next few years, Buckmaster expanded the platform to include locales
beyond San Francisco and beyond the United States. He also instituted a community
moderation system, which allowed users to flag posts that seemed off-topic or
illegitimate; this removed the onus of content review from the company's shoulders and
permitted Buckmaster to focus on back-end maintenance rather than front-end upkeep.
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With these developments, Buckmaster became company president and CEO, while
Newmark remained as chairperson of the board of directors. Craigslist rode the wave of
Web 2.0 through the early 2000s, and, by the end of the decade, one in five adults
reported using Craigslist every month. Since then, Craigslist has solidified its technical
structure and dropped from the eighth to the fifteenth most popular website in the country
— hardly a Roman fall, given the general increase in traffic and platforms on the internet
since then.317 True to the "quirky and personal" spirit of the platform, Newmark and
Buckmaster continue to eschew targeted advertising and information brokerage.
Craigslist generates revenue by charging fees for job postings in certain locations and for
brokered apartment listings in New York City.318
Outside of commerce, Craigslist has a laid-back platform culture and a popular
reputation as a no-frills market that is utilitarian and effective but also "quirky and
personal". Several cultural objects attest to this reputation. In 2005, a Montreal man, Kyle
McDonald, began to barter objects on Craigslist with the purpose of obtaining
increasingly valuable goods.319 Documenting the journey on a personal website, he began
by trading a red paperclip for a pen, and, less than a year later, he was trading a role in
movie for a two-story farmhouse in Saskatchewan.320 "Weird Al" Yankovich wrote a
parody song about the website, in the style of 1960s blue rock.321 There, he hums on
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about the idiosyncrasies of platform commerce and user posts: a missed connection from
"Saturday at the mall"; the trade of a Chevy Malibu for and "old wheelbarrow and a
slightly used sombrero"; "an open letter to the snotty barista at the Coffee Bean on San
Vincente"; and a "trash can of Styrofoam peanuts" offered for free — but only the
peanuts, "the trash ain't part of the deal".322 2009 saw the premiere of Craigslist Joe, a
documentary about a man living off of food, shelter, and transportation gleaned through
Craigslist interactions.323 The film concludes with the sentiment that people are
"overwhelmingly trustworthy and generous"324. Craigslist Joe echoed the humanistic
tone of 24 Hours on Craigslist, a documentary capturing the stories of people who posted
in the San Francisco section Craigslist over the course of a single day.325 These character
vignettes include an Ethel Merman impersonator, a member of a support group for
diabetic cats, and a ballroom dance instructor. In the words of Variety film critic Dennis
Harvey, the documentary is a "colorful human mosaic", less about the internet than about
"the stubborn nonconformity for which it provides an outlet"326. These eclectic objects in
popular culture evince the Craigslist's reputation as simultaneously utilitarian (McDonald
finds a house, Weird Al exchanges goods, Joe locates provisions, and diabetic cat owners
find support) and eccentric (a paper clip turned piece of property, a missed connection, an
open letter, a free trash can of peanuts, and a cast of colorful characters).
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From a technical perspective, the Craigslist interface is scandalously
unassuming.327 The interface features blue text in an Arial font, set against light gray
banners and a white background — an iconic layout that the platform has barely altered
since the 2000s.328 A home page outlines the site sections and subsections, listing
platform documents beneath a live calendar. One of the sections is a discussion section,
home of the discussion boards that constitute a major research source in this project. The
discussion boards are organized in topic, ranging from art and literature to money and
taxes, and they are structured in conversational threads, publishing comments in
chronological order in response to a foundational post. For instance, an owner of a
diabetic cat might begin a new thread in the Pet section by posting a question about
animal medication; users would then reply to the post, and their comments would be
listed in chronological order beneath the original post. Unlike the Craigslist market,
discussion boards are not locally bounded, and users from all over the world may post on
the same board. They are analogous in structure to Usenet or Reddit forums.
Craigslist users post classified advertisements in specific categories, and
interested users reply directly to the poster through email or phone number. Classified
advertisements may be viewed as a list of thumbnails, as a gallery of photos, or (if
relevant) as a map of locations. Outside of job and housing postings, users pay no fee to
publish advertisements, which expire after several weeks. Despite the simplicity of the
posting from the perspective of users, Craigslist features several protocols and
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functionalities that serve the technical foundations of local commerce. Craigslist utilizes
an filtering protocol that prevents the posting of multiple identical advertisements and the
repeated loading of the site (in technical terms, repeated client requests). Site
advertisements are published with a flag functionality, through which users can report
posts that appear suspicious. Advertisements are removed when they accrue a certain
number of flags, although that number is not publicly known. Craigslist refers to the
process of user flagging as "community moderation"329. Craigslist also includes a profile
functionality, and users can only post on the platform after creating a profile — a simple
process that consists of verifying an email, agreeing to terms of use, and setting a
password. Craigslist provides a temporary email account or "mail relay" through which
users can communicate and which services as a relatively anonymous contact method. In
creating a post, users select a category, provide basic information in a text box, indicate a
preferred contact method, and answer a captcha. Neither names nor identifying
documents are necessary to create accounts of post advertisements, making Craigslist
users anonymous by default. Finally, Craigslist features a set of platform documents
related to best practices: a manual for avoiding fraud, a list of banned objects, and
personal safety tips.

eBay
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In 1996, Iranian-American computer programmer Pierre Omidyar founded
AuctionWeb to exchange some of his collectibles, which he had started to amass as a side
hobby.330 When the site began to attract high levels of internet traffic, especially from
antique dealers accustomed to auction exchange, Omidyar upgraded to his internet
service to a business account in order to accommodate the surge in online activity.331 By
1997, the platform was hosting two million auctions each month, hiring executives and
board members to fill its ranks, accepting seven million dollars in funding from a venture
capital firm, and rebranding itself as eBay — an adaptation of Echo Bay, Omidyar's first
choice for the site name, tabled due to an unavailable domain address. 332 When eBay
went public in September 1998, the company was the over-achieving child of the dotcom boom — an early tech unicorn that with a userbase of a million and a market
valuation of $1.88 billion.333 Through the 2000s, eBay expanded beyond collectibles and
travel products to include clothing, electronics, sporting goods, and other consumer
durables, as well as cars, for which the company briefly created (and then shuddered) a
separate market in automobiles.334 During this period, eBay also took commercial
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advantage of Web 2.0 developments through the acquisition of online auction markets,
such as Up2Sale.com, Half.com, Mercadolibre.com, Lokau.com, Carad.com,
Baazzee.com, Marketplaats.nl, Rent.com, Loquo.com, and Shopping.com; conventional
auction houses, including Butterfield & Butterfield and Alando ; and communication and
payment technologies, such as Skype and Paypal — two of the company's most profitable
investments.335 eBay also took a 28% stake in Craigslist, buying out a shareholder and
former employee in 2004.336 However, the relationship soured by 2008, when eBay sued
Craigslist for diluting its stake in the company to 24%, a move that cost eBay a board seat
and prompted Craigslist to buy back the minority stake.337 In the 2010s, eBay introduced
retail sales to the website, furnishing company-made clothing and home goods to
compete with internet retail giants, such as Amazon.338 This distinguishes eBay from
Craigslist and Silk Road, which rely exclusively on the peer-to-peer commerce of users.

Ankurt Chauan, "The Brand That Auctioned the www,” Finance India, March 24,
2009http://finance.indiainfo.com/2009/04/24/0904241614
_the_brand_that_auctioned_the_www. Crunchbase Staff, "eBay Acquisitions,”
Crunchbase, last updated February 2018,
https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/ebay/acquisitions/acquisitions_list#sectionacquisitions. Jonathan Chew, "PayPal Returns Today With a Market Cap Larger than
eBay,” Fortune, July 20, 2015. Jean-Louis Gassée, "Why Did MicroSoft Spend $8.5bn
on Skype?” The Guardian, May 16, 2011,
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/may/16/ballmer-microsoft-skype.
335
E-Commerce Journal Staff, "Ebay's History.” Crunchbase Staff, "eBay Acquisitions.”
336
E-Commerce Journal Staff, "Ebay's History.” Crunchbase Staff, "eBay Acquisitions.”
337
Ryan Mac, "eBay Ends Ties With Craigslist, Sells Minority Stake Back To
Craigslist," Forbes, June 19, 2015,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2015/06/19/ebay-ends-ties-with-craigslist-sellsminority-stake-back-to-craigslist.
338
Jeff Himmelman, "EBay's Stragey for Taking On Amazon,” The New York Times,
December 19, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/magazine/ebays-strategy-fortaking-on-amazon.

196
eBay culture reflects the history of the platform and the transactional form of the
auction. In consumer culture, eBay is considered a place to find rare or unexpected items.
In 1999, someone tried to auction off a kidney on the platform.339 A 2001 episode of the
television series Will & Grace featured a fierce bidding war between characters over a
pair of Britney Spears' sneakers. In 2015, to commemorate the platform's twenty-year
anniversary, Time magazine published a list of "The 20 Weirdest Things Ever Sold on
eBay"340. An Instagram account with forty-five thousand followers "finds the weirdest
shit on eBay so you don't have to"341, posting screenshots of disfigured dolls, Versace
jump ropes, and other detritus from the open auction market. Here, eBay is a source of
consumer goods that are rare or eclectic, not necessarily valuable but not necessarily
worthless. Further, as the Will & Grace example illustrates, eBay culture is also an
auction culture that features the competitive economic practices proper to sale by bid.
These practices include: bidding wars, in which buyers aim to out-bid each other on
objects before the auction timer runs out; sniping, in which buyers wait until the very last
minute to post a high offer that will secure them the item; and shill bidding, in which
sellers bid on their own products in order to drive up the bidding prices among
customers.342 Auction culture blends into antique culture, another crucial dimension of
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eBay, as both view the exchange of goods as a competitive practice, or, at least, highstakes practice that can turn into a lucrative investment or a missed opportunity. As an
antique venue, eBay is part of a vast economic landscape in collectibles — retail venues,
auction houses, yard sales, and flea markets. The foundational role of antique dealers in
the early days of the online auction market means that eBay culture is also antique
culture: the platform generally follows the representational conventions of collectibles
exchange, even when other objects are offered for sale.
On a technical level, eBay has a unique interface and runs on a series of protocols
and functionalities. The current platform interface features a standardized scheme of
bright colors, bold black text in Arial font, and multiple banners that direct users to
different parts of the site. As on Craigslist, there is a discussion board that is not
moderated by the platform, allowing users to freely discuss their concerns without
penalty or censorship. Auction page are uniformly formatted, with a product photo on the
left, real-time auction information on the right, and product description below. Still,
auction pages enjoy a high level of customization: there are few limits on the length and
the format of product descriptions, and some vendors create their own formatting
templates to standardize their offerings.
eBay also features several protocols that are important to market operations.
There is a filter protocol that removes advertisements for banned items. Once an
advertisement passes through the filter, it moves through the auction protocol, where
vendors are prompted to set for the auction a timeframe (ranging from days to weeks), a
reserve price (minimal acceptable bid), and a Buy it Now price (price that secures the
item and thus ends the auction). In the case of a successful bid, the buyer pays the vendor
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through a payment protocol, Paypal, which places electronically transferred money in a
temporary escrow before delivering it to the receiver. This protocol, through which every
transaction must pass, allows the platform to collect a commission on each transaction,
ranging from ten to twenty percent of the selling price. Further, eBay features a
reputation protocol, which allows buyers to rate sellers after a purchase. There, buyers are
to evaluate the accuracy of product description and the quality of customer service
offered by sellers. eBay also maintains a dispute resolution center to resolve contested
transactions, including claims of fraud. Outside of protocols, eBay includes a copyright
functionality, which allows companies to request item removal if the item is a suspected
counterfeit. Profile creation is a simple process that consists of email verification and
password creation. Seller fees and credit card numbers accompany vendor profiles, which
have access to the post functionality but may be financially penalized in cases of
contested dispute.

Silk Road
Silk Road was a market on the dark web. The dark web is an amorphous
collection of internet sites that run on darknets, or overlay networks that employ nonstandard communication protocols in order to encrypt and anonymize information.343 The

343

Typically, a domain name is translated into a corresponding IP address through the
Domain Name System (DNS). Once the address has been located, Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) enables a connection between two hosts, who are then able to exchange
information. TCP/IP refers to this suite of standard communication protocol. Instead of
having a standard top-level domain (such as .com) and a corresponding IP address that
can be translated by DNS, dark web sites employ a non-standard top-level domain
(.onion) that can only be accessed through private overlay networks, such as The Onion
Router (Tor) and Invisible Internet Project (I2P). Moreover, rather than connect through
the conventional Internet port, dark web sites use alternative ports, of which there are

199
term "darknet" was initially coined in the 1970s to designate networks insulated from
ARPANET. Only in the early 2000s did the term gain relative purchase, following a
conference publication by Microsoft employees on digital piracy344 and topical articles in
Wired345. The phrase "dark web" likely developed contemporaneously within hacker
circles as an idiomatic reference to darknet-accessible websites. Despite some
terminological confusion in the popular press, the dark web is not equivalent to the deep
web, or the assortment of websites, mostly databases, that have not been indexed by
traditional search engines.346 The dark web does not include file-sharing websites, such as
Kazaa, as these utilize standard internet protocols, nor does it include military networks,
such as the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network, as these are structurally detached
from the public internet.347 Dark web sites are published and maintained primarily
through Tor Hidden Services, which conceal user identities and hide server locations.348
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They predominately function as underground marketplaces for the exchange of illegal or
highly regulated goods: fake identification and passports, stolen credit cards and
identities, hacker services and manuals, pirated media and electronic goods, human slaves
and escorts, guns and ammunition, and street and pharmaceutical drugs. The dark web
also hosts social networking sites for criminal and radical groups, including terrorist
organizations349 and hacker collectives350.
In January of 2011, Ross William Ulbricht, an American man in his thirties,
developed and launched Silk Road as a business venture and an experiment in free
markets.351 After obtaining a hidden server to host Silk Road — named after the
sprawling trade networks of antiquity — Ulbricht advertised the site on drug and
cryptocurrency forums on the clear web, such as Shroomery.org and Bitcointalk.org.352
Living in Colorado at the time, he grew psychedelic mushrooms in his backyard in order
to post them in the market and therefore attest to the legitimacy of the site in the absence
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of a user base.353 By October of 2011, Silk Road was facilitating a million dollars worth
of trade each month; Ulbricht was collecting a hundred thousand dollars in commission
as his monthly paycheck; and law enforcement agencies were investigating the platform
after a seller agreed to turn state witness.354 Four months later, in February 2012, Ulbricht
hired programmers to help maintain the site, which was now moving two million dollars
worth of contraband each month.355 Stakes rose in the summer, as Silk Road hit one
hundred million in sales and federal agents went undercover to infiltrate the anonymous
site.356 Ulbricht was unknowingly corresponding with an undercover FBI agents when he
reported the "explosive growth" of Silk Road to the discussion board in November 2012,
and when he hired an assassin to murder a user who was extorting him in January
2013.357 Later that year, the Reykjavik Metropolitan Police (RMP) in Iceland, where Silk
Road's hidden server was located, identified the platforms dark web address, leading the
FBI to search and shut down the domestic servers in Pennsylvania hosting Silk Road
data.358 In order to capture Ulbricht, however, the FBI needed to directly connect the
executive to the platform, a difficult task in the anonymous conditions of the dark web.
Consequently, in October 2013, federal agencies staked out the San Francisco Public
Library, where Ulbricht often worked, until the executive arrived, opened his laptop, and
logged into the Silk Road central administration page.359
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From a technical perspective, Silk Road featured a conventional interface and
operated through a set of protocols and functionalities. Visually, the interface resembled
the bare-boned Craigslist system, inflected through hacker aesthetics: product categories
presented in their entirety, advertisements arrayed as thumbnails in lines of three, set
against a white background with dark green Arial text, and the Silk Road logo on the
upper left. It also drew on the internet retail conventions with a shopping cart
functionality, displayed on the top of the interface.
An escrow protocol was key to the site's operation Traders dealt in Bitcoin, a
digital currency that supports verifiable and anonymous transactions without a centralized
third party.360 When purchasing a good on Silk Road, buyers were to place their
payments in a site-supported escrow. Upon receiving the item, the buyer was to inspect
the product and finalize the purchase. Finalization released the funds from escrow to the
vendor. The escrow system was designed to prevent the sale of counterfeit products and
to generate revenue for the site executive. Ulbricht took a commission, ranging from ten
to twenty percent of the selling price, on every trade that passed through Silk Road's
escrow system.361 Silk Road also featured a reputation protocol in the form of a five-star
rating system, which allowed buyers to evaluate vendors. The vendor reputation system
was also designed to encourage competition among sellers, who could strategically brand
themselves claim a small market segment.
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